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Abstract 
 
The 1855/6 adoption of limited liability as a standard feature of companies incorporated 
under English law has puzzled historians.  Members of a limited liability company have 
the reassurance of knowing that if the company gets into trouble, their personal financial 
assets will not be liable for company debts.  Yet historians have found relatively little 
enthusiasm expressed by the investors or businessmen who might have been expected to 
benefit from the 1855/6 endorsement, prompting several to echo Philip Cottrell’s 
observation that, 'it is extremely difficult to account for this sharp and dramatic change'. 
This thesis provides a first, sustained attempt to examine this historical question in detail, 
and identifies neglected reasons why change came to seem important when it did.  
Opinion shifted seismically under the economic and social pressures of the late 1840s, 
when commentators, of whom John Stuart Mill was the most influential, interpreted 
railway 'mania', the 1847 financial crisis and then the 1848 French revolution in terms of 
a wider need for limited liability, as a means of expanding participation in companies and 
capital.  Calls for financial democratisation acquired further momentum from the 
example of the United States and the large number of lawyers who joined Parliament 
following the election of July 1852.  Political and commercial interest came together in a 
covert campaign organised by solicitor Edwin Field, shipowner Robert Lamont and 
politician Robert Lowe, who joined forces in early1853 to try and effect legislative 
change. 
Knowing more about these events casts fresh light on the route that wider changes, 
grounded in steam-power and joint stock companies, took to limited liability.  This helps 
illuminate a pivotal moment in British finance, when older-established intuitions about 
capital and companies, rooted in physical individuals, gave way to abstract, recognisably 
modern conceptions. 
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Introduction 
 
 
On a September evening in 2003, the Royal Society for the Encouragement of Arts, 
Manufactures & Commerce - or RSA - held a debate on the question: 'The limited 
liability company: has its popularity peaked?'.
1
  Long experience with economic debates 
apparently paid off, since at 6pm, a large number of interested business professionals had 
assembled ready to address the chosen topic.  Perhaps mindful of their surroundings, they 
also proved ready to display a sense of history.  When discussion began, the first speaker 
launched a defence of what he called 'one of the greatest and most influential British 
inventions', with a paean to Victorian achievement and the 'great Companies Act of the 
mid-nineteenth century'.
2
  Not to be outdone, a second called instead for a return to the 
values of an earlier age.  When limited liability companies were still under state-control, 
she said, they were 'in effect a public good'.
3
  After further contributors had had their say, 
the chairman eventually drew formal proceedings to a close.  He remarked as he did so 
that the division of opinion had proven a gendered one.  Where the women had looked at 
the limited liability company and seen a social threat in urgent need of regulation, the 
men had seen a social saviour, widely misunderstood but still capable of transforming the 
world if only trusted to take care of itself. 
 
 
 
The moral of this story is, as someone once said, that you don’t have to be a Marxist to 
see that history repeats itself.  About 150 years before this modern-day debate took place, 
the freedom to establish a limited liability company in England was first formally 
granted, and in the accompanying discussion, participants also took up polarised stances 
on either side of a moral divide.  Since very few women took part in the Victorian debate, 
the division of opinion was not then noticeably aligned with gender.  It was however, 
similarly split between those who feared moral degeneration and others happier to see 
moral maturity.  The banker Lord Overstone was very definitely of the former camp, and 
                                                          
1
 The Economist/RSA conference, 18 September 2003, transcript from www.thersa.org 
2
 John Micklethwait, RSA conference. 
3
 Deborah Doane, RSA conference. 
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warned that under limited liability, 'the commercial world, like Nature under a poisoned 
atmosphere, [would] teem with all monstrous things'.
4
  Robert Lowe, sponsor of the 
parliamentary Bill which prompted this response, anticipated an altogether rosier future: 
'unlimited and unfettered liberty of action [would tend] to the prosperity and happiness of 
man'.
5
  Others predicted either 'an act of great injustice upon every man who conducts his 
own business'
6
 or nationwide 'elevation of character, dignified bearing, and increased 
self-confidence'.
7
  Some clearly thought such rhetorical flights too much in evidence.  
Manchester MP John Bright, for one, found expectations 'grossly exaggerated on both 
sides'.
8
  He would hardly be reassured by some of the contentions made since.  Writing in 
1912, the American philosopher Nicholas Murray Butler declared the limited liability 
corporation to be 'the greatest single discovery of modern times' - and his is only one of 
the more frequently quoted claims, a favourite introduction to American articles on the 
subject.
9
  The British too have their community of true believers.  One late-Victorian 
enthusiast, looking back on the events in which Bright, Lowe and Overstone participated, 
claimed that by 'the simple expedient of adding the word "Limited" to the company’s 
name, … the greatest commercial revolution ever inaugurated was accomplished'.10 
At first sight, it is not easy to see what these and many others found to get so excited 
about.  A limited liability company is a company whose members have no liability for 
corporate debts beyond the nominal value of their share-holding.  As such, it provides an 
insurance policy for investors, reassured that they know the extent of any potential losses, 
and that their private financial assets will not be called upon to cover company debts.  
What is there in this arrangement to inspire such vehemence?  Faced with this and doubts 
as to the underlying economic interest, historians have acknowledged a distinct problem 
in trying to understand limited liability: namely, how to account for the sweeping nature 
                                                          
4
 Hansard, 3rd series, vol. 141, c140 (14 March 1856). 
5
 Hansard, 3rd series, vol. 140, c138 (1 February 1856). 
6
 William Hawes, Observations on Unlimited and limited liability and suggestions for the improvement of 
the law of partnership (London, 1854), p.30. 
7
 'Partnerships with Limited Liability', Westminster Review, October 1853, p.62. 
8
 Manchester Chamber of Commerce Annual General Meeting, 4 February 1856, Proceedings of the 
Manchester Chamber of Commerce, 1849-58, M8/2/5, f474, Manchester City Library. 
9
 Nicholas Murray Butler, Why Should We Change our Form of Government? Studies in Practical Politics 
(New York, 1912), p.82. 
10
 Edward Manson, Builders of our Law during the Reign of Queen Victoria (London, 1904 edition), p.198. 
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of the endorsement given it in 1855/6, after decades of apparent reluctance to accept even 
partial reform.  H. A. Shannon was the first to comment on the suddenness with which 
legal change apparently materialised, in his 1931 Economic History article, 'The coming 
of general limited liability'.
11
  Shannon also left a question mark against economic 
motivation, seeing a contrast between politicians who had backed reform and 'successful 
big businessmen in their vested interests' who opposed it.
12
  A few years later, J. B. 
Jefferys added to doubts about businessmen's interest, in calculating that by 1885 only 10 
percent of what he termed 'important' English firms were accounted for by the limited 
corporation.
13
  Also writing in the 1930s, economist Eli Heckscher noted that limited 
liability's absence apparently 'did not hinder the extension of enterprises', and concluded 
that it had 'neither in earlier history nor at the present time the economic significance 
which it may presumably have from a legal point of view'.
14
  As this might suggest, 
lawyers and legal historians have proven a consistent source of limited liability studies, 
even if for the first half-century after its 1855/6 endorsement, they did not show much 
interest at all.  The most eminent English-law jurist of the late nineteenth century, Albert 
Venn Dicey, showed more sympathy with the practices that the 1856 Act eclipsed, and 
confined acknowledgement of it to a factual footnote.
15
  After a slow start however, a 
succession of lawyers as well as economists and historians have examined the formal 
endorsement of limited liability, while continuing to question the motivation behind it.
16
  
Doubts culminated in Philip Cottrell's 1980 Industrial Finance, 1830-1914, which 
concluded that 'the reasons for [the] dramatic change in the basis of company law had 
                                                          
11
 H. A. Shannon ,'The coming of general limited liability', Economic History, 2 January 1931, pp.207-91. 
12
 Ibid., p.287. 
13
 J. B. Jefferys, 'Trends in business organization in Great Britain since 1856, with special reference to the 
financial structure of companies, the mechanism of investment and the relations between shareholder and 
company' (Unpublished PhD thesis, University of London, 1938).  See too Paddy Ireland, 'The Rise of the 
Limited Liability Company', International Journal of the Sociology of Law, 1984, 12, pp.239-60.   
14
 Eli F. Heckscher, Mercantilism, vol 1 (London, 1935), p.367.   
15
 Albert Venn Dicey, Lectures on the Relations between Law and Public Opinion in England (London, 
1924), p.245 and p.246, n.2. 
16
 See: David Perrott, 'Changes in Attitude to Limited Liability- the European Experience', Limited Liability 
and the Corporation (London, 1982), ed. Tony Orhnial, pp.81-116, p.115; Stephen B. Presser, 'Thwarting 
the Killing of the Corporation: Limited Liability, Democracy and Economics', 87 North Western University 
Law Review (1992) 148, p.1192; Graeme C. Acheson, Charles R. Hickson, John D Turner, 'Does Limited 
Liability matter?  Evidence from nineteenth-century British banking', paper presented at the XIV 
International Economic History Congress, Helsinki, 2006; Charles R. Hickson, John D. Turner, Claire 
McCann, 'Much Ado about Nothing: the Introduction of Limited Liability and the Market for Nineteenth-
century Irish Bank Stock', Explorations in Economic History, 42, 2005, pp.459-76. 
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little to do with the requirements of manufacturing industry'.
17
  This has crystallised a 
recognised problem in the historiography.  Following Cottrell, it has become almost de 
rigueur to begin or end a consideration of limited liability's approval by endorsing his 
observation that 'it is extremely difficult to account for this sharp and dramatic change'.
18
 
In addressing this challenge, a number of relatively non-contentious points may be made.  
Considered as a before-and-after snapshot, it is at least easy to see why the change has 
been thought dramatic.  Freedom to set up a limited company was first made generally 
available in England under the Limited Liability Act of 1855.
19
  This was then 
incorporated into the Companies Act of 1856, when the minimum number of company 
members was reduced from 25 to seven.
20
  Notably liberal (irresponsibly so, in the later 
judgment of some
21
) the 1856 Act required only that the seven or more shareholders who 
wished to establish a limited company should take up just a single company share - a 
share for which there was no minimum value and for which no money needed to have 
been subscribed.  Immediately before these two Acts, anyone wishing to set up a limited 
liability company in England needed the official approval of Parliament or the Crown; 
thereafter, as summarised in Cottrell’s account, 'joint stock companies with limited 
liability could be formed for most purposes by the simple process of registering a 
memorandum of association signed by seven shareholders'.
22
 
There seems little doubt that the company here crossed a conceptual Rubicon.  In a 
company with a personal or mixed liability regime, obligations could in principle be 
fulfilled by individual company members.  In a limited company, creditors and other 
claimants had no recourse beyond the company itself.  This shift in financial focus 
marked the company’s coming of age, as the privately incorporated company took 
responsibility for its own debts.  It is not too fanciful to say that it thereby matured 
metaphorically.  It does not seem too fanciful either to claim this as a culturally seismic 
                                                          
17
 Philip Cottrell, Industrial Finance 1830-1914: the finance and organization of English manufacturing 
industry (London and New York, 1980), pp.33 and 41. 
18
Ibid., p.54. 
19
 18 & 19 Vict. c133. 
20
 19 & 20 Vict. c47. 
21
 Geoffrey Searle considers the case for this, Entrepreneurial Politics in mid-Victorian Britain (Oxford, 
1993), pp.187 and 193. 
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moment.  In a moment of eclipse, physical individuals - and the sense of obligation which 
one might feel towards another - yielded formal precedence to an altogether more 
abstract world of balance sheets and other quantifications.  The sociologist Ernst Gellner 
has argued that 'the liberation of economic relationships from social and political ones … 
is exceptional and requires elucidation' and, exceptional or not, it would be difficult to 
think of a better defining moment for such liberation than public endorsement of limited 
liability.
23
  Or a better icon of capitalist faith than the limited company. 
The question of what led people to endorse that faith is a topic for lengthier 
consideration, but it is easy to identify headline concerns.  An obvious one was with joint 
stock companies - defined in one legal history as companies 'with a fluctuating 
membership engaged in the operation of a common capital fund for profit'.
24
  Such 
companies managed ownership of the common fund through transferable shares.  By the 
mid-nineteenth century, they were an established feature of the commercial world, 
acknowledged as effective capital-raising vehicles but frequently criticised for their 
potential to diffuse and dilute a sense of responsibility.  An 1852 letter to a new London 
financial magazine pointed out that: 'It has become a proverb, that gentlemen sitting at a 
board ... have no hesitation in doing many things which, individually, they would shrink 
from.'  Joint stock companies could be the means of achieving great things - building 
bridges, railways and other great infrastructure developments - but they also brought the 
risk that: 'In the attainment of mere physical force, we lose moral power.'
25
  Many saw 
that risk exemplified in railway companies.  Discussing these in 1855, the social 
commentator Herbert Spencer remarked upon 'the familiar fact that the corporate 
conscience is ever inferior to the individual conscience - that a body of men will commit 
as a joint act, that which every individual of them would shrink from did he feel 
personally responsible'.
26
  Adding limited liability to such bodies, in which the effect of 
individual conscience was already diffused, could seem a social risk too far. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
22
 Cottrell, Industrial Finance, p.41. 
23
 Ernst Gellner, Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and its Rivals (London, 1994), p.145. 
24
 Colin A. Cooke, Corporation, Trust and Company: An Essay in Legal History, (Manchester, 1950), p.59. 
25
 'Joint Stock Companies', Lawson's Merchants' Magazine, vol. 1 May-December 1852 (London, 1852) 
pp.259-62, p.261. 
26
 Herbert Spencer, Railway Morals and Railway Policy (London, 1855), p.10. 
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Attitudes to that risk split attitudes to limited liability.  For those wedded to a traditional 
sense of business-ownership, it seemed reckless to promote further 'that corporative 
feeling which is sure to be engendered when ... little or nothing is left to the personal 
responsibility of individual character'.
27
  Others saw this as head-in-the-sand denial.  
Companies were an inescapable fact of modern life - as the Leeds Times put it in the 
summer of 1854 when reporting the latest round of parliamentary debate, 'the sign of the 
times is that 'firms' are everywhere.'
28
  Rather than retreat into the past, effort should go 
into promoting good financial governance, and widespread participation in companies.  
Limited liability, by focusing attention on defined capital, might help with both. 
To this end, proponents of limited liability were happy to sacrifice personal responsibility 
for company debts.  Here it is necessary to qualify Gellner's observation, and 
acknowledge that limited liability's supporters did not so much renounce social ties as re-
define them.  Their arguments had their own social framework, and as such a pronounced 
moral element.  Its nature is readily identified in broad terms, in that it relied upon faith 
in an independent-minded economic individual.  If the bottom-line of any moral ethos is 
what one person intuitively feels another can be allowed to get away with, then by ring-
fencing financial loss, limited liability signaled comfort with a bottom-line less concerned 
with threatening defaulting debtors with retribution and more actively supportive of 
individuals’ efforts to appraise and control their own economic destiny.  Favouring those 
efforts at the potential expense of communal obligation implied that it was more 
important to show initiative than to belong, effectively granting individuals permission to 
fail.  Anthropologists and psychologists have seen in the acceptance of such failure (and 
the absence of an internalised need to punish it with rejection from the community) the 
key distinguishing feature of an individualist ethos.
29
  In limited companies, and the 
ready access to them confirmed in 1856, permission to fail was institutionalised.  
Privately incorporated companies were to be allowed the responsibility of doing their 
own failing. 
                                                          
27
 Circular to Bankers, 27 April 1838, p.341. 
28
 'Free trade in Partnerships', Leeds Times, 1 July 1854, p.4. 
29
 For a review of thinking, see Batja Mesquita, 'Emotions as Dynamic Cultural Phenomena', Handbook of 
Affective Sciences, ed. R.J. Davidson, K.R. Scherer, H. Hill Goldsmith (Oxford, 2003), pp.871-87. 
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The interesting question is how they acquired it.  Historians who have tried to answer that 
have usually tackled limited liability in the broader context of companies or the specialist 
requirements of the law, rather than considering the issue itself in detail.  The result is an 
extensive but notably piecemeal historiography.  Attention has largely focused too on the 
early 1850s, when limited liability became the subject of sustained public debate.  If we 
want to understand the shape of that debate however, we need to go back further, to the 
arguments and concerns which started to come together a century before.  Understanding 
better the influences at work, and how they were worked through in contemporary 
comment, may help us see how change came about and why it came to seem important 
when it did.  It may even help us see too why the limited liability company turned out to 
be something to get so excited about.
  12 
Chapter 1: Limited liability’s public emergence in England 
 
When limited liability was discussed in nineteenth-century England it was understood in 
the same terms as today i.e. as a means of allowing an investor to share in company 
profits while their share of potential losses was limited to a defined amount, usually taken 
to be equivalent to the capital staked.  If such a company failed, and debts exceeded 
available capital, its members would have no additional liability for the shortfall.  
Acceptance of limited liability has usually entailed finding a reason to think that 
acceptable. 
Many such reasons have been forthcoming over time, and if no one has been able to 
locate the precise historical origins of limited liability, this is probably because the idea 
of a stakeholder ring-fencing commercial liability within a discrete pool of assets goes 
back as far as there have been assets to point to and ventures to want a piece of.
1
  The 
earliest recorded instance usually cited in modern legal histories is the discretion which 
Roman law allowed slaves and minors (barred from owning property in their own right) 
to trade with a defined portion of their owner or father’s property, known as a peculium.  
On the basis that the owner or father was technically liable only to the extent of the 
peculium for any debts which might result, it has been possible to conclude that the 
Romans, to quote one legal authority, 'had a well developed concept of limited liability'.
2
  
The legal accounts do not relate when supposed Roman precedent was first cited, but it 
was certainly freely invoked in mid-nineteenth century limited liability argument.  At the 
height of public interest, a member of the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce claimed that 
the notion was 'as old as the year 533' and the Emperor Justinian's compilation of Roman 
law.
3
  London's Daily News noted that, 'It has been shown by Mr Pardessus that the 
Romans made very similar contracts'.
4
  Pardessus was a French jurist, and lawyers were 
                                                          
1
 For a discussion of the possible legal origins of limited liability, see Perrott, 'Changes in Attitude to 
Limited Liability'. 
2
 Ibid., p.87.  
3
 'Meeting of the Chamber of Commerce - The Question of Limited Liability', Liverpool Mercury, 31 
March  1854, p.11.  
4
Daily News, 7 May 1855, p.4. 
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the main source of Classical claims.  An interest in continuity of form also led them to 
pay special attention to the commenda which emerged in mediaeval Northern Italian 
states as a vehicle for financing ships’ voyages.  A commenda's complementary mix of 
investing and managing partners, with limited and unlimited liability respectively, 
descended through continental European law as the société en commandite, a form of 
limited partnership.  For reasons speculated upon by legal historians but ultimately 
obscure
5
, English law had no equivalent to commandite and anyone taking a share in a 
partnership was bound to take a share too in responsibility for its debts (pace the oft-
quoted 1793 Waugh v Carver judgment that 'he who takes a share of the profits of a 
business takes part of the fund on which creditors rely for payment'
6
).  There was 
therefore no official provision for the investing - or 'sleeping' - partner who participated 
financially in a business, but otherwise took no active part in it.  Limited liability was 
however, a recognised feature of certain large corporations, in England and elsewhere.  In 
these and commandite, as well as in other specialist or less formalised usages, reform-
minded individuals found a variety of past and present examples to reinforce their own 
assertions. 
Doubtless there was much revisionism in their attempts to credit consciousness of a 
concept of limited liability to Roman and Renaissance businessmen.  In 1849, London's 
Society for Promoting the Amendment of the Law admitted that '[t]o what extent 
[limited] partnership was in use among the Romans is not very clear'.
7
  How far putative 
early users had been conscious of a distinct principle which could be replicated in 
different contexts must be highly doubtful.  Principle was a key concern of Victorian 
legal reformers however, operating in what has been described as an 'age of principles'.
8
  
For limited liability, some claimed an ancient principle (later subverted) in corporation 
law.  The defining characteristic of a corporation was taken to be that it had 'an existence 
independent of its members', with implications for property-ownership, suing - and, for 
                                                          
5
 Cooke suggests that England's relatively late adoption of double-entry book-keeping may have worked 
against a distinction being made between company and partner accounts, Corporation, Trust and Company, 
p.46. 
6
 As cited by Saville, 'Sleeping Partnership and Limited Liability, 1850-1856', Economic History Review, 
VIII, 1955,  p.428, n.1. 
7
 Report of the Committee on the Law of Partnership (London, 1849), p.9. 
8
 Patrick Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract, (Oxford, 1979), pp.345-58. 
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some, limited liability.
9
  Solicitor Edwin Field argued on this point in 1854 that: 'The 
very granting of a charter [was], by our old law, of itself, without any words to limit, a 
limitation of liability, or rather a notice to every body, that it [was] the corporate power 
alone that trades'.
10
  The obvious fly in the ointment here is the 'without any words' 
element, and if some found this omission hard to gloss over when Field made his 
assertion, later legal authorities have continued to wrestle with how much licence to read 
between the lines of early charters, which established corporations under common law.
11
  
Gower‟s Principles of Company Law states that 'the fact that an individual member of a 
corporation was not liable for its debts [was] accepted in the case of non-trading 
corporations as early as the fifteenth century, and … was eventually recognised at the end 
of [the seventeenth century] in the case of trading companies.'
12
  That same source then 
rather undercuts the purport of this however, by going on to point out that the creditors of 
such companies, while unable to hold company members directly responsible for 
company debts, could nevertheless require a company to levy assessments against its 
members, and so achieve the same result indirectly.  Colin Cooke, in his 1950 analysis of 
English company law, interprets this to mean that 
'unless there was an express limitation of liability in the instrument of 
incorporation which cut across any presumption of an obligation from the 
members to the corporation to meet the latter's debts, the members might be held 
indirectly liable ... [I]t would be too much to say that a charter implicitly 
contained [this specific limitation].'
13
 
A distinction was thus made between personal and corporate assets, but it is easier to see 
in it concern to protect corporate assets from individuals, than concern to protect an 
                                                          
9
 Perrott, 'Changing attitudes to Limited Liability', p.83. 
10
 Edwin Field, Observations of a Solicitor on the right of the Public to form Limited Liability Partnerships 
and on the Theory, Practice and Cost of Commercial Charters (London, 1854), p.59. 
11
 Discussed by W. S. Holdsworth, A History of English Law (London, 1925) pp.192-222 and by 
Gary M. Anderson and Robert D. Tollison, 'The Myth of the Corporation as a Creation of the State', 3 
International Review of Law and Economics, 1983, pp107-120.  Robin Pearson considers late-seventeenth 
century treatment of the issue in the context of trusts, 'Shareholder Democracies?  English Stock 
Companies and the Politics of Corporate Governance during the Industrial Revolution', English Historical 
Review, cxvii, 473, (September 2002), pp.840-866, p.848. 
12
 Paul L. Davies, Gower‟s Principles of Modern Company Law, 6th edition, (London, 1997) pp.21-22. 
13
 Cooke, Corporation, Trust and Company, p.78. 
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individual per se.  This is important because, although there may be many forms of 
liability-limitation within the context of a company, it is protection of the individual, and 
their separate assets, which is taken as the defining test of limited liability.  The rise of 
interest in the concept is thus closely bound up with a rise in concern for the individual.  
In the absence of much such explicit concern, legal historians have generally been 
happiest to see records from before the nineteenth century as de facto work-rounds rather 
than acknowledgement of any recognised principle. 
The attempt to identify principles has been further complicated by the fact that there were 
two distinct bodies of English law pronouncing upon company activities, in common law 
and equity.  Partnerships, which - unlike corporations - had no separate legal personality 
but 'traded through the personalities of [their] members', were mostly the subject of 
common law.
14
  Jurisdiction over their internal relations developed however, under 
equity, the more innovative system, and joint stock arrangements were thus addressed by 
equity, even though joint stock was seen as a branch of partnership.  A joint stock 
company was legally a large partnership.  Joint stock companies might however, be 
incorporated by charter, and unincorporated companies also attempted to mimic a 
corporation's characteristics, in further equity developments.  Their lack of recognition at 
common law confused legal debate for much of the first half of the nineteenth century, 
but unincorporated companies were nevertheless established as a recognised third 
company-form (and a third potential vehicle for limited liability) alongside corporations 
and partnerships.  Cooke considers that 
'by 1800 it [was] firmly established that the unincorporated company with a 
carefully drafted deed of association [could] conduct its affairs with all the 
advantages of incorporation.  Such things as the unrestricted transfer of shares and 
the limitation of shareholders' liability were known and employed by these 
companies and were accepted by the Chancery [equity] Courts'.
15
 
This state of affairs appears to have come about with relatively little public contention.  
                                                          
14
 Aubrey L. Diamond, 'Corporate Personality and Limited Liability', Limited Liability and the 
Corporation, ed Orhnial, p.34. 
15
 Ibid., pp.187.  Cooke also states that 'It was by no means certain that an unincorporated company, with 
  16 
The odd pronouncement apart, the judicial authorities were almost completely silent on 
the subject of shareholder liability before the nineteenth-century.  This appears to reflect 
the fact that there was little investor-concern to deal with.  Historians have found 
extensive enthusiasm for joint stock arrangements but very little publicly-expressed 
desire for limited liability. 
This may seem a counter-intuitive response to the rising capitalist activity that is clearly 
identifiable through the eighteenth-century.  If individuals were then investing in rapidly-
growing numbers and in larger agglomerations of capital, would not commonsense alone 
have made them concerned to protect themselves from potentially catastrophic financial 
fall-out with limited liability?  The assembled evidence - or lack of it - suggests 
otherwise.  The lack of much overt interest can probably be attributed in part to the 
optimism habitually enjoyed by investors engaging in a new project - as the Bankers' 
Magazine observed laconically in an 1855 article on the subject, 'people do not embark 
their capital in order to lose it'.
16
  The more technical reason appears to lie in the facility 
which individuals did make a public fuss about.  For anyone harbouring doubts about the 
risk to their own assets involved in an economic venture, the standard answer before the 
nineteenth century seems to have been that they should transfer their holding and so get 
out of the venture.  This was achievable through share-transfer, available in joint stock 
corporations and (less officially) unincorporated companies, if not (at all officially) in 
most partnerships.  Share-transfer did not necessarily mean liability-transfer, but by the 
end of the eighteenth century it was commonly accepted that it did.
17
  Legal historian 
David Perrott considers that the cake-and-eat-it option of securing both personal 
protection and a continuing interest was little entertained, and concludes that 
'[f]rom the sixteenth to the early nineteenth centuries, the English seem to have 
felt … that the facility of rapid realisation of the capital invested in a “going 
concern” was a more important incentive to investment than the protection of the 
non-invested capital on the failure of the concern.'
18
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There was also the issue of a vehicle to attach limited liability to.  In 1720, the Bubble 
Act officially restricted access to companies with transferable shares by outlawing the 
unincorporated company.  The Act may have to be exonerated from any accusation of 
cutting off overt interest in limited liability in the process, since there does not seem to 
have been any, and the Act has nothing explicit to say on the point.  It had a significant 
indirect effect however, in trying to prohibit unincorporated companies.  One of the most 
obvious lessons from any review of limited liability’s history is that concern with the 
issue gained ground more readily in that context than in partnership.  The Bubble Act 
failed to put an end to unincorporated joint stock companies - these continued to 
proliferate - but meant that the prevailing technical regime for most English businesses, 
for most of the eighteenth century and into the nineteenth, was not one in which formal 
consideration of limited liability was particularly accessible.  Perrott sees widespread 
indifference in legal records continuing for a century.
19
 
Some were however, prepared to push a point.  Desire for limited liability has first been 
found explicitly expressed in England in eighteenth-century charter requests for 
corporations, and provisions about liability-limitation appear in significant number from 
about the middle of the eighteenth century.  Earlier references have been cited.  Ron 
Harris, in his Industrializing English Law, identifies two late-seventeenth century legal 
rulings which appeared to him to confirm 'the exemption of shareholders of certain 
corporations from bankruptcy procedures' and the need for charters 'specifically to give 
power to levy calls-for-debt-coverage on corporation members', if this was to be 
understood.
20
  Harris nevertheless concluded that legal treatment of limited liability was 
at this time 'confused and inconsistent'.
21
  W. R. Scott, in his study of pre-1720 joint stock 
company practices, was struck by a bankruptcy clause in the East India, Guinea and 
Fisheries statute of 1662, which seemed to him to limit shareholder liability.  The 
company is however, an isolated example, and, since the clause appears only to rule out 
liabilities incurred before an investment date (i.e. to protect against inherited liabilities) it 
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does not imply that investors should not be personally liable at all.
22
  In his classic 1938 
examination of eighteenth-century company developments, Armand DuBois identified an 
example from a century later - the Warmley Company’s proprietors’ 1768 (failed) 
attempt to obtain incorporation - as 'the earliest comprehensive recognition of the limited 
liability motive as a factor in incorporation'.
23
  DuBois, a lawyer, was one of a number of 
American scholars who produced monographs on the technical development of English 
companies in the 1930s, taking up where Scott had left off.  As he pointed out, liability-
limitation was not mentioned in the Warmley Company’s formal petition, but surfaced in 
a subsequent hearing, when opponents alleged that the intention was to limit subscribers’ 
liability.  The Warmley counsel 'frankly admitted the truth of this assertion' and the 
pattern of this motive emerging under questioning was not uncommon, as DuBois’ 
extensive notes make clear.  Most of the comment that he identified comes from lawyers, 
but occasionally a well-informed, potentially-vulnerable investor, such as industrialist 
Matthew Boulton, comes to the fore, to show that concern was not entirely of lawyers' 
own making.  Quite when liability-limitation became routinely identified as a key 
advantage of incorporation is impossible to gauge from the small number of examples, 
but DuBois identified a range of arguments invoked from mid-eighteenth century.  We 
should also acknowledge here a whole legalistic sub-genre (to which DuBois contributed) 
which has focused on the legal grey areas of bankruptcy clauses and mining company 
customs.  These, even if unable to achieve full limited liability, had in view the same goal 
of investor protection.  In the face of such variety, and as much creativity of argument 
against liability-limitation as for it, DuBois himself was happiest to see a trend towards 
definition, and an understanding that 'express authority for the exercise of a power must 
be found in the appropriate charter, act of parliament or deed of settlement'.
24
  Harris also 
sees this as the time when the inclusion of a clause explicitly limiting shareholder liability 
became standard in incorporation statutes.
25
 
It might be thought that such definition would provide a target for dispute, but this does 
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not appear to have taken off before the early nineteenth century, with the first of a 
number of intermittent booms in company formation.  Perrott, from his study of case-law, 
considers that before then limited liability was '[not] seen by the establishment as 
particularly desirable or undesirable, [but] merely as technically unobtainable, outside 
formal incorporation by charter or act of parliament'.
26
  Harris cites an 1804 source as 
evidence that by then incorporation was closely identified with limited liability and 
sought 'principally for the purpose of exempting the shareholders from any responsibility 
as partners'.
27
  The earliest public disputes of the issue outside such formal identification 
appear to have been between insurance companies.  In a 1787 example, the 
unincorporated Phoenix Assurance company is found, again by DuBois, arguing that 
incorporated competitors with limited liability are not to be trusted since 'holders of 
shares in [these] incorporations stand sheltered from any responsibility beyond the extent 
of their chartered capital'.
28
  Harris similarly highlights the 1789 agitation surrounding the 
Westminster Assurance Company.
29
  Here is clear evidence of both concern and public 
dispute.  By 1810, unincorporated companies were actively testing the identification of 
limited liability with incorporation.  DuBois considered that 'unincorporated groups 
operating a joint-stock [became] extremely bold in asserting that there was a limitation of 
liability'.
30
  
Can crystallisation of public consciousness of limited liability be pinned down further?  
One way to do so, amongst Anglophones at least, might be to identify when the term 
'limited liability' was coined as a neologism.  The historiography has little to say on this.  
DuBois pointed out that the phrase 'stock limited', in use in the 1780s, 'suggests the term 
“limited company” of the nineteenth century', but did not otherwise trace development of 
terminology.
31
  The one linguistic point which has elicited widespread comment is the 
1855 formal adoption of the suffix 'ltd' for English limited liability companies.  Credit for 
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this is commonly given to George Bramwell, a pro-limited liability barrister who served 
on the Mercantile Laws Commission of 1853 and later achieved eminence as a Law Lord.  
Bramwell was happy to claim responsibility for the innovation, usually credited to his 
contribution to the 1853 Commission.
32
  Edward Manson, for many years Registrar of 
Companies, drew upon personal contact with Bramwell in writing an account of his 
career (first published in 1895) and said there that Bramwell was 'proud of the invention.  
“Mention it in my life,” he said jocularly'.33  Manson duly did so, even though what 
Bramwell actually recommended to the 1853 Commission at least was more complicated 
than the now-familiar 'Limited' tag.
34
  His 'invention' has however, acquired folklore 
status.  Sir Hubert Llewellyn Smith's 1928 The Board of Trade has Bramwell 'playfully' 
suggesting that 'limited' should be inscribed on his tombstone and credits him with a 
'brilliant though simple idea'.
35
 
Bramwell may deserve to be credited with an apt suggestion but he essentially helped 
formalise a notion already well-established amongst lawyers by the 1830s.  Since it was 
then readily acknowledged that liability might be limited in a private contract (if it could 
be shown that consent had been given by all concerned) it was a logical - if controversial 
- step to extend this, through an emphasis on freedom of contract, into a general notice 
directed at all potential contractors.  Submitting evidence to an 1836 Board of Trade 
inquiry, William Tinney KC was asked if it might be possible to introduce some 
distinguishing mark, to alert individuals to the fact that they were dealing with a 
partnership with a sleeping partner, who would have no liability for partnership debts, 
beyond his invested capital: 'Would you consider it a sufficient advertisement if those 
partnerships had some mark or designation which would enable the public to know it?'.  
Tinney agreed that it would, stipulating only that 'It should be a mark that all persons who 
deal with them would be likely to know.'
36
  Several years later, solicitor John Duncan told 
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an 1843 Select Committee that it should be easy enough to find suitable designations for 
'proprietors liable companies', 'proprietors non-liable companies' and 'proprietors semi-
liable companies' (i.e. unlimited liability companies, limited liability companies and 
commandite partnerships respectively).
37
 
By mid-century, the idea had an established currency.  In 1854, Charles Morrison, 
wealthy merchant banker, proposed a distinguishing mark of 'Associates' or 'Association' 
(not 'Ltd') with 'Company' reserved for unlimited liability companies, as the default 
standard.
38
  Morrison did not acknowledge any debt to Bramwell, and neither did 
solicitor Edwin Field, who also argued in 1854 for '[registering] the names of [a firm’s] 
associates; and where they [were] not on an unlimited liability basis, marking the firm’s 
title with the word “limited”.'39  Field had made the same point - albeit without the neat 
suggestion of a 'Limited' tag - before a Select Committee three years earlier, and was not 
the only person then to do so.
40
  Barrister John Ludlow suggested the same thing, and was 
then re-iterating a point he had made to another Committee the year before.
41
 
If the official arrival of the 'limited' company is relatively clear-cut, the advent of the 
phrase 'limited liability' itself is harder to pin down.  A trawl through parliamentary 
references from the first three decades of the nineteenth century shows a variety of 
descriptive phrase, and if there was a standard phrase, it was not 'limited liability'.  
Banker Hudson Gurney referred in parliament in 1825 to partnerships with 'limited 
responsibility', and this more personally-nuanced terminology was the commonest then in 
use.
42
  Personal ownership can perhaps be detected too in the impulse to include 
indefinite articles, as in 'a limited liability', a common formulation which persisted into 
the 1830s.
43
  'Responsibility' and 'liability' were both by then readily used, and in 1833 
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Chancellor of the Exchequer Lord Althorp covered both options in proposing that joint 
stock banks of deposit should be permitted to have partners 'liable or responsible only to 
the amount of their shares'.
44
  Three years later, MP William Clay, again on joint stock 
banking, invoked a tripartite formula whose alliteration may have helped promote limited 
liability’s currency as an expression: joint stock banks, he insisted, would be best served 
by a combination of 'limited liability, paid-up capital, perfect publicity'.
45
  From the mid-
1830s to mid-1840s, Clay waged a personal campaign for use of limited liability by joint 
stock banks - as a fellow MP observed, he made 'a hobby' of it.
46
  From the mid-1840s 
however, with attention no longer so closely centred on banking, debate diversified.  
Parliamentary discussion shows 'limited liability', and its corollary of 'unlimited liability', 
now standard expressions.  Their use was not universal, and Edward Cardwell could still 
refer in 1855 to 'joint stock companies of limited responsibility'.
47
  Boyd Hilton has 
suggested that conservatives tended to favour the pejorative 'diminished responsibility', 
but it is hard to see the terminology following any very clear-cut divisions.
48
  
'Responsibility' was perhaps more likely to be invoked in a partnership context - the 
Report of the 1853 Mercantile Laws Commission begins by using this for partnership and 
'liability' for joint stock, though the association soon breaks down.
49
  In general, everyone 
now referred automatically to 'limited liability' - or rather, in the principle-laden 
discussions of the mid-1850s, to 'the principle of limited liability'. 
At some point then, during the second quarter of the nineteenth-century, the term 'limited 
liability' gained ground as a standard.  It was during the second quarter too that references 
to limiting liability, however termed, proliferated in company prospectuses and contracts.  
Their claims were contested, but one practice at least - limiting liability by a clause in a 
contract with a named individual - had standing in law.  This lent itself to exploitation by 
insurance companies.  As DuBois shows, insurance companies had been disputing the 
relative merits of making shareholders personally liable or not since the 1780s but he says 
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that it was 'not until the early years of the nineteenth century that policies appear with 
clauses limiting the liability of the company'.
50
  The formalisation of these clauses 
appears to be one more instance of the increase that took place then in public 
assertiveness.  DuBois also adds that 'the efficacy of such clauses in case of a contest may 
well be doubted'.  They were nevertheless vigorously asserted.  Sir Frederick Morton 
Eden, chairman of an insurance company which petitioned (unsuccessfully) for 
incorporation in 1806, argued that the long-term nature of insurance business made it 
especially suited to joint stock structures.  He considered that the public 'affix little value 
to the general Liability of Property which is not exclusively pledged to them'
51
, and two 
'qualities' of a joint stock fund should rather provide them with reassurance.  Firstly, the 
fund could be regulated and monitored, its accounts 'subjected to an undisguised 
publicity'.  Secondly, it was 'peculiarly answerable for [its customers'] contracts; it is 
exclusively appropriated to their use; and cannot be effected by the private Dealings of 
the individuals composing the body corporate'.  Eden was here stressing the ring-fencing 
of assets that was the basis of limited liability.  The public should take reassurance from 
the definition offered by a joint stock fund.  In contrast, 'the Amount of a personal 
Responsibility Fund never can be known'.
52
 
Insurance company debate also contributed to a broader breakdown in associations 
between large companies and monopoly, as the numbers of large joint stock companies 
grew and supporters urged their claims, against the supposedly monopolising agendas of 
the Bubble Act and 'overgrown capitalists'.
53
  An 1810 Select Committee on Marine 
Insurance pronounced against monopoly, and opened the way for more joint stock 
insurance companies (even though, following opposition from Lloyds, the committee's 
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recommendations did not take full statutory effect until 1824).  The liability-limitation 
clauses that these unincorporated insurance companies now routinely included in policies 
and deeds of settlement were not yet routinely accepted, but Cooke sees this as the time 
when they were established in case-law.
54
  Deeds of settlement provided for 
arrangements amongst shareholders, and could also include provisions about a company's 
operation which set limits on debt-levels, or capital-loss, or other factors which might 
limit risk.  The companies' lawyers argued that this could ensure that private assets would 
never be called upon in practice.  As others pointed out however, a deed could not limit 
obligations to external creditors (since they were not party to the agreement it 
represented) and so provided no absolute guarantee.  Francis Baily, in a guide to London 
life assurance companies, quoted Lord Chief Justice Ellenborough's opinion that to imply 
that a deed could limit liability to a shareholding was a 'mischievous delusion'.
55
  Baily 
thought this opinion could not 'be made too public'.
56
 
Despite the protests, limiting clauses had some prominent defenders.  One was William 
Huskisson, who became President of the Board of Trade in 1823, and the following year 
quashed a parliamentary attempt to challenge liability-limiting clauses, as 
'interference with private contracts.  If a party chose to take the more limited 
responsibility of a joint stock rather than have his remedy against each individual, 
he was averse from interposing against the exercise of such discretion.'
57
 
Significantly, Huskisson here makes an automatic association between joint stock and 
liability-limitation (although the exact form of that is unclear). This did not mean 
however, that he was necessarily in favour of their widespread use.  Two weeks earlier, 
he had said that an insurance company incorporation Bill should not be approved without 
a personal-liability clause.
58
  At the time he spoke, the Bubble Act, and its prohibition of 
unincorporated companies and transferable shares, was still officially in force.  The Act 
might be openly flouted, as another boom in company formation gained momentum, but 
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Huskisson did not want to see wholesale liberalism in its place: 'To authorize an 
unlimited number of [incorporated] trading companies ... would be to do a material 
mischief to the country.'
59
  
What Huskisson particularly objected to was de facto erosion of the Crown's authority 
over companies, under the volume of incorporation applications now being made to 
Parliament.  He set out what he thought the correct, 'established practice' for company 
incorporation (and by implication for undisputed use of limited liability) in May 1824.  
This was to seek first the approval of the King in council, and then apply to Parliament 
for confirmation or qualification of the Crown's decision.  Without such prior Crown 
approval, there could be no reassurance for the public that the charter of a delinquent 
corporation might be forfeit, since only Crown, and not statutory, approval of a charter 
could be revoked.
60
  This system was being circumvented by companies who applied first 
to Parliament, arguing that a conditional grant could then be confirmed by the Crown.  
Huskisson defended the reputation of joint stock companies against the sweeping rhetoric 
of the Bubble Act, but disapproved of the status of forty gas companies operating without 
royal charters.  The pull of partnership was apparent too in his assertion that the 'owners 
of shares ... might be considered as sleeping partners in trades of which they know 
nothing but the name'.
61
 
We should also acknowledge here one other strand from early nineteenth century 
parliamentary debate, in discussion of general limited liability rules.  Legal historians 
have debated at length what might qualify as the earliest general rule made under English 
law, with some support even for an Elizabethan candidate.
62
  Most have however, settled 
on the 1782 Irish Limited Partnership Act.
63
  Very little use was made of this Act - an 
outcome commonly attributed to political instability and the fact that it was hedged about 
with restrictions.
64
  It was not until after the Napoleonic wars that a general rule was 
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discussed in the context of England.  Historians have lighted on a brief exchange that 
took place in the House of Commons in April 1818.  Saville terms it a failed attempt to 
introduce discussion of the société en commandite, and insofar as it was intended to apply 
to England, it did fail.  City of London MP, Matthew Wood proposed the repeal and 
consolidation of Irish partnership laws and was accused of a broader attempt to legalise 
joint stock companies, 'leaving the parties to them liable only to the amount of their 
respective shares'.  Wood denied any intention of pushing his proposal beyond Ireland, if 
MPs objected, though he did argue that, given the high levels of post-war unemployment 
in England, there 'could be no hesitation in adopting it for this country' once its 
provisions were understood.  Here he was over-optimistic, but his resolution as it applied 
to Ireland ('where the importance of such a measure could not be denied') met with 
approval.
65
  Wood was a well-known City figure, twice Lord Mayor, and from a 
Dissenter background.  His chief parliamentary opponent on this occasion was Pascoe 
Grenfell, a prominent businessman and Evangelical.  The pattern of reformist Dissenter 
opposed by conservative Evangelical was to be repeated in subsequent discussions of 
limited liability.  As too, the argument that if there were objections to reform in England, 
then Ireland at least was a deserving cause.  Liability-conservatives persisted in arguing 
that limited liability and joint stock were incentives needed only in jurisdictions such as 
Ireland and France, whose populations required stimulus to invest.  At the time Wood 
made his proposal, that perception was routine. 
This then was the position at the beginning of the second quarter of the nineteenth-
century, with limited liability a readily recognised concept, and the subject of lawyers' 
ingenuity and occasional public questioning.  In January 1825, the political economist 
Thomas Tooke formally tabled it for a first discussion at the Political Economy Club: 
'Are there, and, if any, what disadvantages attending Partnerships en commandité - in 
other words, Joint Stock Companies?'
66
  Over the succeeding quarter of a century, the 
Club would debate the issue a further eight times.  1825 also saw repeal of the Bubble 
Act, effectively a dead letter and a clear anomaly in the face of another company boom.  
Perrott says that repeal and 'the possibility of a rapid rise in the number of chartered 
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limited liability companies'
67
 triggered opposition to limited liability, and hence that 'the 
first move to facilitate the extension of genuine limited liability was paradoxically 
accompanied and vitiated by the first real unpopularity of the concept'.
68
  The reaction 
was not perhaps so very 'paradoxical', since it is easy to believe that endorsement and 
opposition might have fed off each other.  Indeed, there are grounds for thinking they had 
necessarily to do so, and that unusual company activity was needed to focus public 
attention on company matters.  This is acknowledged by Saville's observation that: 'much 
of the comment was the product of exceptional circumstances; boom years and their 
aftermaths of failures and frauds provoked controversy about the nature of speculation.'
69
  
Unless feelings ran high, questions of company structure were easy to ignore.  This was 
however, far from easy in late 1825, when feelings on company structures - and bank 
company structures in particular - ran very high indeed. 
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Chapter 2: Public discussion, 1825-33 
 
Financial crisis and inquest 
With hindsight, the year 1825 marks an obvious turning-point in public attitudes to 
limited liability.  Before this, it is clear from statements such as Tooke's that an automatic 
association between joint stock and liability-limitation was readily made.  This was no 
longer legally possible after the June 1825 repeal of the Bubble Act.  With cancellation of 
the Act and its condemnation of company promotion, politicians faced a decision as to 
what sort of companies they wished to see promoted, and opted categorically for 
conservatism.  The Bubble Act Repeal Act made explicit Crown discretion over 
incorporation, and gave the Crown power to make a corporation's members 
'individually liable ... for the debts, contracts and engagements of such 
corporation, in such manner, and to such extent, and subject to such regulations 
and restrictions as His Majesty, His Heirs or Successors, may deem fit and proper, 
as shall be declared and limited in and by such charter; and the members of such 
corporation shall hereby be rendered so liable'.
1
 
In other words, the Crown reserved the right to specify liability exactly as it saw fit. 
Whatever interpretation might be made of earlier statements, a charter of incorporation 
could not now of itself be assumed to confer limited liability.  Cooke sees this as the 
point when incorporation and limited liability were first officially separated ('[t]he two 
had hitherto always gone together'
2
).  The Crown's power over corporate privilege was to 
be administered by the Board of Trade, formalising a second route to limited liability, 
alongside Parliament. 
In taking this approach, the authorities had responded to the prevailing investment 
climate, and public disparagement of the many new companies being formed.  An 1824 
letter to a newspaper attacked one chartered company as a 'hydra', 'an establishment of 
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limited responsibility ... without the safeguards of care and responsibility that always 
attaches to the individual Merchant but which becomes lost in the vortex of a joint-stock 
company'.
3
  An 'Old Merchant' also declared it 'preposterous that an association of 
individuals should, by subscribing a deed, or by any other act or contrivance of their own, 
have it in their power to exempt themselves from the operation of the laws' and from 'the 
great and salutary safeguard of private responsibility'  In support, he cited Adam Smith.
4
 
Much of the criticism was directed at mining companies, the focus of an investment 
boom and the subject of questioning about limited liability.
5
  An MP-supporter of one 
company told fellow MPs that 'the House could not expect that people would embark 
their property in speculations if they were liable for more than the sum they had 
subscribed'.
6
  A succession of company Bills was presented to parliament in search of 
corporate privilege and provoked complaints there about the role of private influence.  
MP Hudson Gurney, called for 'one general law for the formation and regulation of all 
joint-stock companies - Whether the introduction of a law of registration of partnerships, 
with limited responsibility, as in France, and many other states of the continent, he was 
not competent to say.'
7
  Comment continued after Bubble Act repeal.  The Monthly 
Review advocated the free formation of joint stock companies as a remedy for the abuse 
of parliamentary influence, but thought personal (unlimited) responsibility essential to 
'put an end to those fraudulent speculations which have been lately carried on so 
shamelessly'.
8
  Evidently it had become significantly harder to ignore questions of 
liability-limitation, as too their standardised treatment. 
This became still clearer when a major financial crisis broke out in December 1825.  The 
1825 financial crisis is notable for its severity, and for the 'happy exemption of Scotland' 
focusing attention on Scottish joint stock banks.
9
  Scottish banks were not in fact 
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themselves exempt from the crisis, but perceptions were dominated by the shocking 
failure of 73 English banks.
10
  Two banking models - private and joint stock - were 
identified with English failure and Scottish success respectively, and 'pointed a contrast 
in favour of the Scotch'.
11
  Technically-informed comment argued that the English banks 
were in fact, like the Scottish, joint stock companies, distinguished rather by their smaller 
number of partners (restricted by English law to a maximum of six).
12
  Limited liability 
was not a clear point of distinction either since, with the exception of the Bank of 
England and three Scottish chartered banks, the Scottish and English models were both 
subject to unlimited shareholder liability.
13
  In practice however, the Scottish banks were 
identified as definitively joint stock, and associations between this and limited liability 
promoted debate.   
By arising in a banking context, discussion of limited liability was at once diving in at the 
deep end and prone to ring-fencing.  Consciousness of risk was acute in this context, and 
it was always easy to argue that banking was a special case.  Against this, there was the 
argument that limited liability was needed in the situation in which England now found 
herself.  If large joint stock banks had proven stable, and England wished now to break 
with tradition and encourage their establishment, then limited liability 'would, no doubt, 
induce many persons of great credit and fortune, to invest their money in shares of such 
banks'.
14
 
In light of these considerations, Huskisson and Prime Minister Lord Liverpool urged 
limited liability for the English joint stock banks established in the wake of the crisis.  
They faced the objection however, that it was not much used in Scotland, 'where the 
banking system was most efficient'.
15
  Crucially too, the Bank of England objected, and 
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discussion ended in conservatism.  Huskisson put on record his belief that if the Bank 
could be persuaded to relax its charter further at some future date, and 'permit the 
establishment of other chartered banks besides itself with limited responsibility', this 
would be to the country's 'permanent advantage'.  He hoped to 'see the day when the Bank 
would concede to the public that part of its privileges'.
16
  More broadly, he expressed 
'anxiety, that the law of partnership ... should undergo some material alteration'.
17
  For 
now however, the English Banking Co-partnerships Act of 1826 imposed liability on 
shareholders of joint stock banks, and held them potentially liable for corporate debts for 
up to three years from the sale of a share-holding.
18
 
This three-year rule was one of a number of long-running issues now set in train.  
Another was the role played by the Bank of England.  The Bank's price for agreeing to a 
relaxation of its charter was an understanding that joint stock banks - whose members 
must have unlimited liability - should not be set up within 65 miles of London.  The 
argument that vested interest, in the shape of the Bank's Directors, had thereby blocked 
something of public benefit was to run for more than 30 years.  Leading the chorus in the 
1820s was Thomas Joplin, a Newcastle timber-merchant converted to the cause of joint 
stock banking by 'the failure of the banks in the north of England, where I was resident, 
and some acquaintance with Scotland, [which] led me to inquire into the difference of the 
two systems'.
19
  Joplin was one of a number of local merchants co-opted to guarantee 
payments when Newcastle banks got into trouble.  This was standard practice but ever-
more-frequent appeals for help prompted the Newcastle merchants to consider whether 
they might regularise their role and form a bank themselves.  Joplin had published his 
views on how to go about this in an 1822 pamphlet.
20
  This had attracted interest before 
the financial crisis, as part of an early 1820s (failed) attempt to persuade Parliament to 
allow joint stock banks in England, outside London.  That initiative followed on the 1821 
abolition of similar restrictions in Ireland, and the setting up (with Joplin's help) of joint 
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stock banks there, from 1824.  Like the Scottish banks, these were unlimited liability 
banks, and this could evidently be an issue.  Thomas Spring Rice, a director of one, told 
an 1826 Select Committee that it was necessary to have 'a rate of profit rather higher than 
the average', to compensate for the fact that there was 'no limitation of responsibility' and 
induce British capitalists to invest.
21
  Joplin himself was a firm believer in a 'limitation of 
the responsibility of the Shareholders in Banks' as the 'best system for the country' 
(meaning England). 
The issue of limited liability for new English joint stock banks had also already received 
a public airing, pre-crisis, in some northern towns.  An attempt to establish a joint stock 
bank in Durham was later said to have failed because 'the parties willing to form a 
company required a charter to limit their liability to the amount of the capital subscribed, 
and the Government declined promising them [one]'.
22
  Difficulties continued through 
and beyond 1825, with the abandonment of a proposed Northumberland joint stock bank 
('though the country gentlemen were very desirous of the formation of a bank, they would 
not move without a charter to limit their liability, which could not be obtained.'
23
).  Other 
initiatives were more successful, despite lack of limited liability, but in the aftermath of 
December 1825, Joplin took an uncompromising stance on the point.  Once the public 
had had time to recover their nerve, he said, men would have no hesitation in forming 
joint stock banks, but: 'The unlimited responsibility is a bugbear, which, without any 
chance of benefiting the public, defeats the object of the law'.
24
  
That argument was challenged by MP Henry Parnell, an acknowledged financial 
authority, who quoted Joplin's own earlier words against him.
25
  As he pointed out, when 
Joplin had helped establish the Provincial Bank of Ireland several years before, he 
reported that many were at first apprehensive about the lack of a charter (and limited 
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liability), 'but reflection, in the first instance, and subsequent experience, have proved to 
them how perfectly chimerical those fears were'.
26
  Parnell concluded that 'though some 
cautious persons may be discouraged by the prospect of unlimited liability ... the rule of 
the law ought to be rigidly adhered to, and in the case of the banking trade above all 
others'.
27
  In support, he quoted Edinburgh banker Thomas Kinnear, who had relayed to 
the post-crisis 1826 Commons Select Committee on Scottish and Irish banking, his 
opinion that recent banking failures would have been worse with limited liability.
28
  
Other Scottish bankers told Committees that a run on a bank was 'a thing totally unknown 
in Scotland'.
29
  Parnell attributed this happy state of affairs to personal financial 
liability.
30
  
Scottish banks (and their lack of limited liability) continued to loom over English 
banking debate in the years that followed.  Partisans of English country banks, such as 
Henry Burgess, writing in his Bankers' Circular (re-christened the Circular to Bankers in 
September 1828) cited the failures amongst them to argue that people should not trust to 
larger joint stock banks at all.
31
  Burgess had been arguing since the immediate aftermath 
of the 1825 crisis that 
'The [English] public are under great delusion respecting the Scotch banks.  Many 
of them, like the English banks, have only two or three partners; they are no more 
secure than ours, except that the more cautious and calculating character of the 
Scotch renders them more careful in selecting good securities in exchange for 
their money.'
32
 
Burgess believed that 'Charter or share banks will never be generally established in 
England, from the different character of the people', and for good measure added the 
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inconsistent rider that 'if they were, injurious consequences would at intervals result 
therefrom.'
33
  He identified English country bankers with support of 'the active and 
productive classes' and larger, joint stock banks with 'delegated functionaries' and 
impersonal market-manipulation.
34
  The government's promotion of joint stock banks was 
an example of the 'vast mischief which results from measures which appear to men who 
pass their time in the metropolis, and who know nothing of the economy of the country'.
35
  
Burgess had expounded upon his view that 'Scotch banking tends infinitely more [than 
the English country banking system] to promote speculation' in a July 1826 interview 
with Huskisson.
36
  He continued in this vein in pamphlets addressed to other politicians.  
By 1830, he was prepared to admit that '[t]he public have a more absolute security for 
having all their demands paid in full, from a Joint-Stock bank, managed by persons of 
respectability than from a Bank of private copartnership, managed by similar persons', 
but continued to maintain (against the popular interpretation of 1825) that private banks 
were less likely to get into trouble in the first place.
37
 
Not all argument about limited liability was in the context of banks.  Also in the 
aftermath of the financial crisis, the jurist John Austin made a forceful pitch for its use for 
trading companies.  Austin's article appeared in a weighty but short-lived publication 
edited by his barrister-brother Charles, and both men were part of the social circle 
surrounding the Westminster Review.  Notably philosophical, the article argued for 
adoption of French law's commandite principle for large English joint stock companies.  
The members of such companies were 'inevitably passive' and unable to exercise 
effective supervision, so that to try and make them responsible for company debts served 
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no useful purpose.
38
  The repeal of 'the unintelligible Bubble Act' had replaced 
'mysterious terrors' with something worse - a clear deterrent to the 'cautious man' who 
might otherwise support useful projects.  Some of those projects, such as canals, might 
involve conflicting rights and need consideration by the authorities but most could be 
dealt with by a straightforward change in the 'general law of partnership', with no 'special 
sanction of Parliament or the Crown' needed.  Austin thus cut through to a general rule.  
He urged politicians to disregard the rhetoric that habitually surrounded joint stock 
companies in an investment boom.  The companies' effect was 'to enlarge the capital of 
the community', and anyone arguing against them must be prepared to argue too against 
other mechanical efficiencies, in manufacturing and agriculture.  If a large company did 
occasionally result in a monopoly, it was 'a monopoly in favour of the public'.
39
 
Austin's article, though unusual, was not an isolated example.  Another, in the Globe, also 
criticised 'the imperfection of the law which prevents the formation of partnerships en 
commendete [sic]', and said this concentrated 'the surplus wealth of the country, [so that] 
instead of being diffused in more humble and less hazardous undertakings, [it is] directed 
in large masses to vast, showy, and often insubstantial undertakings'.
40
  Post-Bubble Act 
definition had forced the liability issue and raised its profile in the context of trading 
companies. 
Most comment however, focused on banks, with Joplin re-iterating his arguments in 
1830.  Unlimited liability might be a 'very proper' principle for private partnerships, but 
not for 'public companies, more especially [not for] banks.'
41
  Joint stock investors had 
little to fear where liability was limited 'practically from the nature of the business' (as 
with the solidly physical undertakings of canals, bridges or mines) but the individual who 
embarked upon other joint stock investment without safeguards was likely to be thought 
'little short of an idiot.'
42
  For banks especially, 'this limitation must be secured by law, or 
people will be deterred from embarking in them'.  Joplin's point was that bankers of all 
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description resisted calling up any more capital than they thought necessary - too often, 
not enough.  Limited liability focused public attention on paid-up capital, and without 
this salutary pressure, joint stock banking had imported into its operations one of the 
chief vices of private banking i.e. a tendency to trade on credit.  English joint stock banks 
were 'joint credit banks' - large versions of private banks, and the associations of country 
gentlemen who hoped to make easy money without ever being required to put up much 
capital.  Quoting remarks made by Liverpool, Huskisson and Robert Peel in favour of 
limited liability in 1826, Joplin argued that 'Parliament ought, no doubt, to have been 
allowed to do what it thought best for the interests of the public without any ... restraint' 
imposed by the Bank of England.
43
  Reform was 'absolutely necessary to the well-being 
of the country'.
44
 
An obvious opportunity to re-visit these points arose when the Bank of England's charter 
came up for renewal in 1832.  A parliamentary Select Committee canvassed opinion from 
expert banking witnesses.  Respected Somerset banker Vincent Stuckey, who had worked 
with Huskisson at the Treasury before joining the Stuckey family bank, agreed that 
'chartered Banks, with a limited responsibility of partners, and a paid up capital, would 
establish a sound system of banking'.  Although he did not believe limited liability 
essential to joint stock banks' stability, Stuckey thought it 'would hasten' it, because 'it 
would very much increase the number of respectable persons taking an interest and thus 
improve their management as well as their credit'.
45
  William Browne, a partner in a Bath 
and Bristol bank that had failed in the 1825 crisis, took the same line in a pamphlet 
addressed to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Lord Althorp.  This urged the Bank of 
England to 'license Chartered Banks throughout the country, the condition of whose 
charter of limited responsibility being the annual publication of their accounts', and 
quoted authorities who had supported limited liability in 1826.
46
  English joint stock 
banks had now had several years to do without it however, and other Committee 
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witnesses were more equivocal.  George Warde Norman (a director of the Bank of 
England) considered that the commandite partnerships in operation in France 'produce on 
the whole an advantageous effect', even though he did not 'perceive why they should be 
allowed in banking more than any other business'.
47
  Henry Burgess was also asked for 
his opinion, but as Secretary of the Committee of Country Bankers, was too concerned to 
score points off joint stock banks (and rescue the reputation of the private banks he 
thought unfairly maligned in 1825/6) to find anything very positive to say about anything 
associated with joint stock banks.  He raised the thorny issue of liability-enforcement, 
and argued that under the current state of the law it was 'an extremely difficult thing to 
recover money from Joint Stock Societies determined to resist payment'.  Given that one 
partner could be made responsible for the obligations of all (with no guarantee that he 
could then recover money from his fellow partners), any intelligent man would feel 
morally justified in resisting a claim, and 'would undoubtedly put every legal obstacle to 
defeat [it]'.
48
 
These cavils notwithstanding, the government decided to proceed with reform.  Althorp 
introduced a Parliamentary Bill proposing that partners in joint stock banks which did not 
issue their own notes should be liable 'only to the amount of their shares'.
49
  The 
exclusion of banks of issue was questioned, but the distinction proved academic when 
objections led to the proposal being dropped.  Burgess had complained at the 'supineness' 
shown by private bankers in 1825/6, but they had now had time to organise - with 
Burgess's help - more effective representation.  A meeting of the Country Bankers' 
Association, held in London in June 1833, issued the unanimous resolution that: 
'the proposition of the Chancellor of the Exchequer to grant charters to 
incorporated companies, with limited responsibility, ought strenuously to be 
opposed, because Banks formed on that principle would be unjust in their 
operation, - would place the names of eminent and influential men as partners in a 
Bank, for the engagement of which their property is not liable, and thereby create 
                                                          
47
 Report from the Committee of Secrecy on the Bank of England Charter, PP, 1831-2 (722) vi 184. 
48
 Ibid., 421. 
49
 Hansard, 3rd series, vol. 18, c184 (31 May 1833). 
  38 
a false and delusive credit'.
50
  
This was followed by similar Memorials from provincial centres.  The head of England's 
oldest country bank wrote to Althorp to warn that 'the indubitable effect of chartering 
Banking Companies with a limited responsibility must be to annihilate altogether the 
present establishments in a very few years ... [T]he whole body of Country Bankers are 
unanimous in that opinion'.
51
 
In early July, faced with threatened technical obstructions, Althorp conceded defeat: 
'Finding the opposition of the Country Bankers too strong for me on the question of 
limited liability, my colleagues and I have decided that I must not persevere in this 
proposition'.
52
  Althorp's framing of the issue highlights again an association between 
limited liability and investment-stimulus - he had been forced to forego the 
'encouragement which I intended to hold out for the formation of Joint Stock Banks'.  
Opposition had also come from joint stock banks themselves, with their representatives 
also meeting in June to consider their position.  This, as reported in the Circular to 
Bankers
53
, did not initially include any stated concern with limited liability, but by the 
time a 'Humble Memorial' was submitted to the Treasury a week later, a substantial 
section had been added, asserting that: 
'personal liability is ... the surest safeguard of careful management, which is the 
essence of banking ... [T]o limit such personal responsibilities in the way 
proposed by the Right Honourable the Chancellor of the Exchequer ... would be to 
remove the safeguard of good management.'
54
 
The Memorial was signed by Spencer Rogers, who had taken over as chair of the 
bankers' meeting after the departure of its original chairman (and after formulation of the 
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meeting's original resolutions).  Rogers was Manager of the Manchester and Liverpool 
District bank, which took an assertive public line on unlimited liability.  A few months 
after the Memorial it published a statement that, 
'feeling that the security which Joint-Stock Banks professedly afford must depend 
upon the responsibility ... of their Proprietary, and that such security should be 
distinctly understood by the public, [the Bank has] determined ... to announce by 
advertisement the names of its shareholders'.
55
  
A list of names followed.  A prospectus for another Manchester joint stock bank similarly 
stressed the 'indubitable responsibility' of its members.
56
  Althorp meanwhile made it 
clear that he regarded the abandonment of his proposal as postponed business, not the end 
of the matter.  For now however, his acknowledgement that 'the opposition of the 
Country Bankers [was] so powerful as to make it almost impossible to carry that part of 
his measure which related to Joint Stock Banks with limited responsibility' was 
confirmed in parliament and the press.
57
 
 
Small capitalists 
One other aspect of the joint stock banking expansion of the late 1820s and early 1830s 
had implications for limited liability, in that many small investors became for the first 
time - technically, at least - exposed to the potential financial risk that unlimited liability 
joint stock companies could pose.  Financial professionals questioned whether these new 
investors really knew what they were doing.  Bill broker Samuel Gurney told an 1832 
Select Committee that 'very many will take shares who are ignorant of the responsibility 
they incur'.
58
  (He nevertheless had no doubt that 'the shareholders ought to be 
responsible, the same as is the case with private Bankers'.)  George Farren, an insurance 
company director, warned in an 1833 pamphlet that such shareholders were deluding 
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themselves if they believed the assurance of a 'Deed of Settlement or Foundation, that 
[their] responsibility is to be limited to the amount of [their] shares'.  On the contrary, 
Farren warned colourfully, they might find that 'the very bed on which [they] slept might 
be seized' as payment for the bank's debts.
59
 
Farren was here recycling arguments and copy he had first published in 1824, when life 
assurance companies were the subject of public debate.
60
  His later pamphlet was part of 
the 1832/3 debate that surrounded the Bank of England charter renewal.  It was reviewed 
by The Times (a point Farren made much of) and sold rapidly, prompting publication of 
further editions.  It also prompted published responses from joint stock banks.
61
  A 
notably robust one came from solicitor John Duncan, a partner in a law firm with a roster 
of joint stock clients.  He dismissed Farren's melodramatic picture (where 'all is dark and 
fearful') as 'great balderdash'.
62
  The safeguards included in a Deed of Settlement could 
effectively limit shareholders' liability, and Farren was merely trying 'to frighten those 
who do not understand ... the subject'.
63
  Such fear-mongering was driven by 'spite' and 
vested interest, with London private bankers helping the Bank of England maintain its 
control of currency in return for help in blocking joint stock bank competition in 
London.
64
  Such collusion against the public interest, argued Duncan, could not long 
prevail. 
Duncan's was one of a blizzard of publications which appeared in the early 1830s, 
asserting the case for joint stock banks.  Most were triggered by the Bank of England 
charter renewal, and the opportunity to argue for the right to establish joint stock banks in 
London.  Though they had an obvious commercial agenda, they did not hesitate to claim 
moral superiority.  Joplin had complained in the 1820s at the tactics used by provincial 
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private bankers, to try and stop a joint stock bank being set up in their neighbourhood, 
and supporters of mooted London joint stock banks now complained that the same dirty 
tricks were being used in the capital, and included fear-mongering about unlimited 
responsibility.  As before, the tactic would fail: 
'Although in the provincial towns it was at first attempted in every shape, and 
more especially by the bug-bear of responsibility, and legal difficulties, from the 
number of partners, to terrify people from joining the Joint Stock Banks, the 
attempt was very unsuccessful; and such will be the case in London.'
65
 
Lobbyists for joint stock banks argued that shareholders had nothing to fear from 
personal liability.  Anyone doubting the truth of this should ask Scottish investors 'how 
much they have suffered in mind or pocket from being such shareholders'.
66
  Farren and 
others had pressed into service 'every conceivable hypothetical calamity'.
67
  (Farren 
himself responded to this with further attacks upon his 'bilious critics'.
68
) 
As one of the many publications pointed out however, opinion even amongst supporters 
of joint stock banks 'preponderated' for unlimited liability.
69
  The great majority accepted 
its fact, and argued (inconsistently) that this was both reassuring for the public, and - as 
Scotland's experience allegedly showed - nothing for investors to worry about in practice.  
This view was supported by one of the leading names in joint stock banking: J.W. 
Gilbart, appointed first Manager of London's first joint stock bank, the London and 
Westminster, in late 1833.  In a banking guide first published in 1827, he had pointed to 
Scottish example as the one to follow.  Second in his list of Scottish solidity-promoting 
provisions (after the lack of a limit on the number of partners) was the fact that '[t]he 
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private fortune of every partner is answerable for the debts of the bank'.
70
 
In this discouraging climate, disciples of limited liability held to their convictions.  They 
faced the challenge however, that when joint stock businesses were successful there was 
little obvious need for its insurance cover.  Vincent Stuckey continued to argue in favour 
of limited liability but admitted that, 
'I am sure I ought to feel very indifferent on the subject, when I state that, 
although the law makes the property of myself and every one of my partners 
answerable for the Bank debts ... it appears to me next to impossible that this 
private property can ever be called on'.
71
 
Stuckey's confidence rested on sound financial management.  The most commonly-cited 
source of shareholder-reassurance was however, the combination of two clauses now 
routinely included in joint stock bank Deeds of Settlement i.e. that any liability would be 
spread proportionately amongst shareholders (rather than fall heavily upon a single 
individual) and that in the event of a significant portion of a bank's capital being lost 
(usually specified as a quarter or a third), the bank would be wound up.
72
  This, it was 
argued, made the risk of personal financial liability in a large bank illusory.  In 
illustration of just how illusory, several pamphlets claimed that directors of the Bank of 
England had the same potential responsibility in law as ordinary joint stock bank 
proprietors (despite the protection popularly attributed to the Bank charter) and were 
probably serenely unaware of the fact.
73
  One even claimed that the extensive 
proprietorship of a joint stock bank could provide more security than the Bank of 
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England
74
 though another dismissed any comparison as 'unfair and delusive'.
75
  Most 
agreed however, that unlimited liability added reassurance for the public, and 
that,'[b]esides, experience proves, that the proprietary has always improved in wealth and 
influence, as the banks have acquired strength and stability.'
76
  Limited liability would, 
according to this line of argument, become less of an issue with time. 
All of the above represents professional comment, and it is difficult to gauge how much 
investor concern lay behind the claims and counter-claims.  Henry Burgess remarked in 
1833 that the details of investor-liability litigation 
'come seldom before the public in such a way as to cause reflection and deliberate 
examination, but they are known familiarly in all their details by lawyers, and 
hence arises that caution and circumspection respecting Joint-Stock co-
partnerships in which the rest of the community does not participate.' 
He also argued however, that 'men of knowledge and experience in such affairs are 
beginning to perceive the danger', and that 'such questions are much more likely to be 
contested in London than in provincial towns'.
77
 
This may well have been the case, but even in London, published contention still came 
from competing financial professionals (which included Duncan and Farren), sniping at 
each other.  Select Committee witnesses who were asked about the views of investors 
said that these were too focused on the possibility of making money to worry much about 
liability, happy to leave legal detail to the professionals.  Paul James, a Birmingham 
banker who (like Stuckey) had merged his own private bank into a joint stock bank, told 
an 1836 Select Committee that investors were 'generally influenced by their views of the 
state of the concern, rather than by the degree of liability'.  Unlimited liability did 'not 
prevent persons embarking in joint stock banks properly conducted' and, given the 
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already-strong investor interest, it was unnecessary to provide the 'additional 
encouragement' of limited liability.
78
  Investors were perhaps not always as indifferent as 
this implies.  Indications that they could be scared by having the risk brought to their 
attention are found in the claims and counter-claims that surrounded the 1833 
establishment of the London and Westminster Bank.  
The London and Westminster was London's first joint stock bank, with origins mired in 
legal controversy.  By mid-1833, re-negotiation of the Bank of England charter was well-
advanced, when Richard Roy, solicitor for a group of Scottish merchants, suggested that 
its wording had never explicitly prohibited joint stock banks within London.  Roy's 
clients were the group who went on to form the London and Westminster, and their 
argument, when now put to government lawyers, gave pause for thought.  According to 
Roy, a prohibition against joint stock banks within London would constitute grant of a 
new Bank privilege.  Lord Althorp reported to the Bank of England his unwillingness 
now to include such a clause, given the government's desire to restrict, not increase, 
privilege.  This unwelcome - and unexpected - news triggered loud opposition beyond the 
Bank and its lawyers.  As was pointed out in Parliament by heavyweight sympathisers 
including the Duke of Wellington, the strongest argument against the government's 
interpretation, was the fact that no one had ever previously thought it worthwhile to draw 
up a formal application for a London joint stock bank.  Now that the government had 
appeared to open a window of opportunity, one had been drawn up within 48 hours.  
Whatever the legalities and politics, the government, once committed, was willing to 
carry its point.  Althorp had conceded defeat two months before to the private bankers 
who put technical obstacles in his way, but now faced down opposition from the Bank of 
England.  The prospective London and Westminster Bank was allowed to proceed, and 
formed a committee, which was immediately pulled into controversy and a public 
relations battle.  The proposed new bank faced a slew of technical difficulties, but limited 
liability produced most public discussion, perhaps because it was the issue most readily 
comprehensible by laymen.  The bank's committee went to considerable lengths to 
reassure potential shareholders about their personal risk, publishing case-studies of 
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existing joint stock companies to show that claims were unlikely to materialise in 
practice.  T. E. Gregory's 1936 history of The Westminster Bank through a Century  
reproduces a 4 September 1833 minute from the Bank's archive, which instructs that 'the 
paper drawn up by [the Bank's solicitors] Messrs Blunt, Roy, Blunt and Duncan, [and] 
read to the Committee, regarding the liability of shareholders, etc, be printed and 
circulated with the [Bank's] Prospectus'.
79
  Duncan is the probable author of this paper, 
which was reproduced in the following week's Circular to Bankers.
80
  Henry Burgess 
was unconvinced by the arguments of 'some legal men of great sagacity and knowledge 
connected with the new London and Westminster Bank' and continued to complain that 
anyone associating with such a risky undertaking was under a 'delusion'.
81
  Financier 
David Salomons joining the bank's committee in December 1833 helped silence such 
doubters, but the bank persisted thereafter with its assertive stance on shareholder 
liability.  Statements stressed practicality over the letter of the law: 
'[W]hen it is considered that [a joint stock] Bank has a large subscribed capital, of 
which a great portion must necessarily be ... paid up - that the number of 
proprietors amounts to several hundreds - that a great proportion of these are 
persons of wealth, and consequence - the real practical effect of [statute] or of the 
common law, and the deed [of settlement] taken together is, that the individual 
responsibility of each Proprietor is ... strictly limited in extent to his number of 
shares, and in duration to the period of his continuing a partner'. 
Shareholders seem to have accepted the reassurance 'that the partnership risk in a Joint 
Stock Company is indeed a blot patent enough in theory, but seldom or never hit in 
practice'.
82
  As long as times were good, and shareholder liability not 'hit in practice', the 
issue might be left to lie.  
As in 1825, discussion also extended beyond banking.  The July 1830 French revolution 
prompted interest in commandite in the Morning Post's Paris correspondent, who 
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reported on the 'great variety of establishments on this system throughout France, [which 
are] productive of effects of the most beneficial and diffusive kind'.  If these had not so 
far appeared in England, then this  
'may not ungenerously be attributed to the egotism, to the grasping and exclusive 
nature of the large capitals and capitalists which represent themselves in the 
House of Commons, and to whose absorbing capacities such a law would not be 
the most welcome'.
83
 
This was a portent of what was to come eighteen years later, with another French 
revolution.  Barrister Arthur Symonds also raised social questions in an 1834 article in 
the Westminster Review.  Declaring that 'this is the age of small profits', he argued that 
there should be no reason 'why the law should prevent inferior capitalists from uniting to 
obtain the same advantages [as the great capitalist] as far as they can'.
84
  This would offer 
hope to those currently without it.  The mathematician Charles Babbage took a similar 
line.
85
  Most comment was however, in the context of banks, and - with the example of 
Scotland to hand - inclined to the conservative.  The Times may have acknowledged the 
justice of Farren's warnings, but it also thought anyone that needed them a fool.  
Underlying its argument was an assumption that it was possible for - and incumbent upon 
- a company member to monitor other company members' activities: 'if as a sleeping 
partner he chooses to be robbed, the public ought not to be robbed because he chooses to 
sleep'.
86
  So far as introducing limited liability legislation in England went, The Times 
was 'persuaded that no such bill ever will be introduced'.  
That was said in 1833.  By 1836, The Times was prepared to acknowledge the justice of 
the sort of social argument deployed by the Westminster, and even echoed its language in 
regretting the tendency of credit 'to wither and impoverish the small trader'.  It stopped 
short however, of agreeing that limited liability could provide an answer: 'No, it is to the 
wealthy shareholder that the public looks for security ... [Unlimited liability] is the only 
                                                          
83
 'Letter from our Correspondent at Paris', Morning Post, 8 October 1830. 
84
 'Law of Partnership', Westminster Review, January-April 1834, no. xxxix, pp.58-73, pp.55 and 61. 
85
 On the Economy of Machinery and Manufactures (London, 1832). 
86
 27 September 1833, p.2.  The Times' emphasis. 
  47 
law on such a matter which is at once intelligible, just, and safe.'
87
 
This was to prove the height of support for limited liability in the 1830s.  By the time 
another banking Select Committee met in 1836, investor interest in joint stock banks was 
at an all-time high, and opinion had solidified against change.  Even Stuckey admitted 
that with 'men of very large property' already supporting the banks, the need to reassure 
them with protection against personal liability had lessened.
88
  He admitted too, in a 
pamphlet, that there was 'evidently a great disinclination to pass such a law in England'.
89
  
William Clay had called for this latest Committee, adamant that limited liability was of 
overwhelming importance, but few of those summoned to give evidence agreed.
90
  
Stuckey re-iterated his earlier arguments, and one other witness recommended the 
'middle course' of commandite, but opinion was otherwise solidly sceptical.
91
  Burgess 
chipped in with his take on an anti-limited liability article in the Edinburgh Review, 
which he correctly attributed to political economist John McCulloch.  McCulloch, said 
Burgess, 'has much communication with the President of the Board of Trade ... [and] has 
probably undertaken the task at [his] instance, for the purpose of influencing public 
opinion on this important subject'.  Digs about string-pulling apart however, Burgess 
agreed with McCulloch - at least as far as banks were concerned - that 'it should be our 
object not to lessen, but rather to increase responsibility'.
92
  
Further banking Select Committees came and went in 1837, 1840 and 1841, with only 
occasional mention of limited liability, mostly by Clay.  As will be examined in chapter 
6, this was partly owing to the failure of American chartered banks, which cast a shadow 
over debate from 1837.  Public interest ebbed and flowed too with the investment 
climate.  In the immediate aftermath of the 1825 crisis, English banking had appeared to 
be in a situation analogous to that of France or Ireland i.e. one in which a stimulus to 
investment might be needed.  In investment booms, and in the perceived solidity of 
Scottish banks however, individuals found reasons to resist change. 
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Also working against change was the fact that the public nerve had been badly shaken in 
1825.  Symonds' 1834 piece claimed that the public had ever since 'stamped all large 
associations as bubbles and delusions'.
93
  Bishop Carleton Hunt, an American scholar 
who made a study of this post-1825 period in the 1930s, notes public caution matched by 
the Board of Trade, which made remarkably little use of its discretion to grant limited 
liability: 
'[b]etween 1825 and 1834, out of a total of some thirty applications, partial 
[corporate] privileges appear to have been granted in only half a dozen cases and 
approval of full limited liability was extended to only one, the Nova Scotia 
Mining Company (1831)'.
94
   
We should also note that, although limited liability was held to be incontestably 
obtainable only via incorporation, it was not a necessary feature of incorporation.  
Incorporation could be granted without it.  Mark Freeman, Robin Pearson and James 
Taylor judge, from their analysis of company records, that 'it was probably not until the 
1840s that limited liability could be identified as the chief distinguishing feature of the 
incorporated company.'
95
  Outside incorporation, limited liability claims were 
constrained.  Companies' clauses might limit liability in agreements with named 
individuals (the practice now routinely followed by insurance companies) but the law 
held them, as Lord Brougham confirmed in an 1832 case, 'wholly nugatory ... as between 
the company and strangers'.
96
 
In the mid-1830s then, public discussion of liability-limitation in England was largely 
confined to the capital-centric activities of insurance and banking.  For the issue to be 
perceived as a more general one, it would have to be discussed in a context less easily 
rationalised as a special case.  An opportunity arose in the next speculative boom, which 
took off in the mid-1830s.
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Chapter 3: Public discussion, 1834-44  
 
Investment expansion 
The mid-1830s boom was distinguished by a wider variety of companies than seen in the 
mid-1820s.  Freeman, Pearson and Taylor have provided an analysis of these, split by 
industry-sector and by company-type
1
 which shows that although 'entrepreneurs were 
seeking limited liability with unprecedented regularity'
2
 it was not especially common, 
even amongst incorporated companies ('of eighty-six corporations in our sample, only 
twenty-four (27.9 percent) employed a limited-liability clause'
3
).  Of individual sectors, 
Freeman et al see the picture becoming more complex in shipping (with mail contracts 
now a route to corporate charters) and mining (where companies exploited long-standing 
liability-limitation traditions).  Accessibility of means was also a factor.  Attempts to 
limit liability were commonest in insurance companies, which had ready means to hand 
in their agreements with policy-holders - about 70% of unincorporated insurance 
companies 'tried to limit shareholder liability to the extent of the unpaid portion of their 
shares'.
4
  At the other end of the spectrum, they were rarest in banking.    
Qualitative sampling of company records confirms these trends.  The Manchester Marine 
Assurance Company prospectus of 1835 was careful to include a resolution 'that no 
shareholder shall be liable or subject to pay a larger amount than the amount of the shares 
held by him; and that this stipulation be a component part of every contract or obligation 
which the Directors shall enter into, on behalf of the Institution'.
5
  Businesses unable to 
tie matters down through contracts had to rely on confidently expressed practical 
assurances - as in, 'no debt can be contracted, but ... everything must be bought at cash 
prices [and] you will perceive in this principle your guarantee against all liability beyond 
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the subscription of the shares'.
6
  This assurance was offered by a mining company, 
grounded in physical solidity, but newer-fangled service companies took the same 
approach.  A company offering translation services claimed that since it did not plan to 
deal in credit 'no liabilities can in any way arise'.
7
  The Railway Carriage Building 
Company similarly undertook to 'abide by the principle of never [incurring] outstanding 
pecuniary liabilities'.
8
  The commonest option was to refer to protection promised by 
'deed of settlement'.
9
 
Investment booms also habitually brought a round of incorporation Bills presented to 
Parliament.  One such Bill was instigated by the Dublin Steam Packet Company, which 
first submitted an application for corporate privileges, including limited liability, in 1833.  
The company's Irish credentials meant that its application was then relatively 
uncontroversial.  As Irish nationalist MP Daniel O'Connell pointed out too, 'there was an 
Irish statute which permitted [limited liability] in all companies, the object of which was 
not retail trade'.  (He also claimed that 'many practical men regretted that it was not 
applicable to England also'.
10
)  When the company applied for repeat privileges in 1836 
however, in a bid to help raise more capital, opposition was more forceful.  MPs 
questioned why other shipping companies and Bills had received less favourable 
treatment.  The Dublin company did not, after all, limit its operations to Ireland.  
Attorney General Sir John Campbell (MP for a Scottish constituency with acknowledged 
shipping interests) argued that the company should either confine its activities to Ireland, 
or 'let them at once propose one general law upon the subject'.
11
  Sir Henry Parnell 
admitted he differed from Campbell, and thought 'the principle of limited liability ... a 
bad one, ... attended with bad effects both in Ireland and France'.
12
 
Board of Trade President Charles Poulett Thompson felt compelled to make a statement.  
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Although he 'did not desire to have it understood that he had come to any decision on that 
great question of limited responsibility' he acknowledged the 'great variety of opinion' 
expressed in the House during the recent passage of eight private company Bills that had 
requested it (only two had been submitted which did not) and agreed action was needed.  
He had accordingly consulted 'a high legal authority', with a view to 'submitting some 
measure ... during the present Session or in the next ... [which would] put an end to the 
unfortunate state of the law as it now stood, by the introduction of a Bill for deciding the 
question generally.'  Fellow MP John Bowring, closely associated with the Westminster 
Review and recent government investigations into overseas financial practices, applauded 
the initiative.  He hoped 'the time [would] soon arrive when the principle of a limited 
responsibility will be recognised as the most judicious one'.
13
  
Outside Parliament, Henry Burgess was also taking a close interest in '[t]he observations 
upon the general principle, which we regard as most important'.  Although firmly against 
limited liability for banking and small enterprises, where he thought it conducive of 
'waste, negligence and corruption', he was equally firmly in favour of it 'for undertakings 
too great, and too full of risk, for individual adventure'.
14
  Significantly, he saw these 
objects most actively pursued by the United States.   
Poulett Thompson's statement referred to his instigation of an inquiry led by barrister 
Henry Bellenden Ker, which solicited views on partnership reform between March and 
May 1836.  Further views were solicited at a 2 June session of the Political Economy 
Club, to which Ker was invited as a guest.
15
  His inquiry published its Report on the Law 
of Partnership in July of the following year.  It rejected any extension of limited liability 
to partnerships, despite the fact that this had attracted eminent support.  Political 
economists Nassau Senior and George Norman, Lord Ashburton (a wealthy member of 
the merchant Baring family, and former Chancellor of the Exchequer) and his son Francis 
Baring (joint secretary to the Treasury) had all gone on record in support of some form of 
limited liability.  Baring had gone so far as to draft 'the heads of a proposed Bill' for 
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introducing limited partnerships, included in the Report as an Appendix.  The support of 
Ashburton was a notable coup, since he was credited with the authority of a successful 
capitalist and practical, international experience of limited liability's workings.  His 
endorsement would be frequently cited in future discussions.  Most of the politicians, 
merchants and lawyers who now gave their opinion were however, not in favour of 
limited liability.  As Ker summarised matters: 'by far the greater number of those who 
have been examined are decidedly unfavourable to its adoption under any circumstances 
whatever'.
16
  Glasgow cotton merchant, Kirkman Finlay declared flatly that 'In my 
opinion there is no sound or safe system that can admit of limited liability'.
17
  He did not 
have argument all his own way, and Ker also reported - in a formulation that rapidly 
becomes familiar to anyone who reads nineteenth century reports of limited liability 
discussions - that 'opinions … on this difficult and important question are at variance'.18  
Solicitor John Coles had '[no] doubt that beneficial results would arise from the 
establishment of such partnerships in England, under proper regulations'.
19
  His was an 
isolated voice however, and even the cautiously optimistic Norman concluded that 'the 
reasons which induce me to think that limited partnerships would be useful in this 
country, appear to me to apply more strongly to the colonies'.
20
 
Cooke, considering the outcome of this inquiry in 1950, thought that part of the problem 
was that Poulett Thomson had picked the wrong man for the job: 'As a common law man 
Ker could not see the equitable company other than as an unwieldy form of partnership.'
21
  
Because of this, he argued, the 1837 Report failed to offer any advance on the 
unincorporated company's deed of settlement, already available via equity and now 
recognised in statute law by the 1834 Companies Act.  The result was a Report which 
reflected Ker's appreciation of 'the disability at common law of the unincorporated joint 
stock company', followed by a Bill which made 'a further attempt at the problem on the 
old line of approach' (i.e. common law grants of incorporation).
22
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For any supporter of limited liability, this was discouraging enough, but further obstacles 
were to come.  In May 1837, two months before the Report was published, another 
financial crisis erupted, this time involving American merchants and banks.  The years 
1834-6 had seen the establishment of an unprecedented number of American chartered 
banks (with limited liability) - a fact of which English bankers and journalists were well 
aware - and their shocking and wholesale failure now reinforced distrust.  The result of 
Ker's recommendations, the 1837 Letters Patent Bill, followed quickly on the crisis.  
When presented to parliament in June 1837 it acknowledged judicial rulings that 
recognised share-transfer and confirmed that the liability of a shareholder might now 
cease upon such transfer.  It also confirmed that the corporate privileges granted by 
Letters Patent might in principle include limited liability, and explicitly extended that 
prerogative to trading companies, although it did little to make the officially-favoured, 
common law route of incorporation any easier or attractive in cost-terms.  This was still 
sufficient to agitate Alexander Graham, a Glasgow whisky merchant, who urged his local 
Chamber of Commerce to take notice of the important principle he saw now conceded i.e. 
that limited liability might be extended to 'the ordinary branches of manufactures and 
commerce'.
23
 Graham wrote to the Manchester Chamber to enlist their support and his 
Glasgow ally, Kirkman Finlay, 'waited personally on the [Manchester] Board' to follow 
up on Graham's letter and objections he had himself earlier made to Ker's inquiry.
24
  The 
Manchester Chamber resolved to ask local MPs 'to use every exertion to prevent the 
passing of the Bill'.  Although this proved fruitless, their fears went unrealised for the 
present.  Administered by a conservative Board and offering no practical advance on 
facilities already available, the 1837 Letters Patent Act proved largely a dead duck.
25
 
This effectively left matters much as before.  There was nevertheless now a solid body of 
financially-informed opinion, convinced that the law must be reformed in order to take 
account of large joint stock companies.  Burgess saw a moral in the much-publicised 
tribulations of the (unlimited liability) British Iron Company, attributing its directors' 
pursuit of expensive litigation to the 'apprehension of the consequences of personal 
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responsibility, weighing upon [their] minds'.
26
  Private Bills had not become any less 
contentious either.  When in May 1838, yet another was introduced in Parliament (to 
incorporate the National Loan Fund Assurance Company) objections were raised to the 
company acquiring 'powers others do not have'.  Although this particular company had 
agreed not to 'do away with their own individual responsibility', Poulett Thomson 
objected to other 'wide powers' sought, and asked that the Bill's further progress be 
delayed to allow time for a general Bill to be drawn up.
27
 
Poulett Thomson duly tabled a general Trading Companies Bill, which sought to allow 
limited liability (still subject to official authorisation) for companies set up by as few as 
three or four people.
28
  This passed the Commons but was defeated by twelve votes in the 
Lords after Brougham attacked its limited liability provision as 'contrary to the whole 
genius and spirit of the English law'.
29
  Under guise of an unconvincing disclaimer, the 
Whig Morning Chronicle then launched a character attack on Brougham, and his 
'carelessness of the public interest in the gratification of a spiteful nature'.
30
  Brougham 
had, the paper said, acted from malicious resentment at an attempt to rectify his own 
poorly-framed 1837 Act.  As a result,  
'Hundreds of thousands of pounds of capital, various useful undertakings ... have 
been suspended ... [T]he merchants and traders of this country may well ... regret 
the party and personal feelings by which their interests are sacrificed.' 
Henry Burgess agreed in condemning Brougham.  He had 'altogether mistaken and 
misrepresented the object of the Bill', designed not to introduce the small-scale 
commandite partnerships currently proliferating in France
31
, but 'to give encouragement 
and facility for the formation of companies for great enterprises, where the capital 
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required is too large for individual contribution'.
32
  The Circular approved of Poulett 
Thomson's declared intention to re-introduce a general bill in the following parliamentary 
session. 
Only a general bill might have offset accusations of special treatment, but it is clear many 
had trouble seeing limited liability as suitable for general use.  Brougham later admitted 
that he had at first been favourably influenced by the pro-commandite arguments of 'my 
late friend, lord Ashburton' but changed his mind on reading the detail of Ker's Report 
and concluding that safeguards used by the French would be inadequate in England's 
assertive commercial climate.  Fifteen years on, when recalling his doubts, he was still 
holding to the belief that commandite 'appears better adapted to a community which has 
[more] moderate mercantile capital and concerns than ours'.
33
  Looking down on the 
French was relatively easy in this context, and, in the wake of the May 1837 financial 
crisis, looking down on the Americans was easy too.  This international dimension was 
an important part of debate, and the historiography also includes comment from British 
colonies, where greater latitude was in operation.  Walter Minchinton quotes the Sydney 
Herald attacking (as 'cheatery' and a 'new London piece of banking chicanery') the 
limited liability proposed for government-chartered banks in New South Wales in 1834
34
 
and Hunt reports that double liability was the Board of Trade’s standard for colonial bank 
charters.
35
 
Domestically however, very little changed in regulatory terms.  In trying to account for 
this, it has to be said that, the many doubters apart, limited liability was not lucky in the 
personnel it found to support it at this time.  Always a contentious issue, it required a 
degree of commitment which palpably failed to materialise.  Huskisson, who might have 
had the will and political credibility to push through change, died in 1830, and so did not 
live to see the Bank of England Charter-renewal that he had looked forward to in 1826.  
Peel blew hot and cold on limited liability for banks.  Supportive in 1826, he later 
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changed his stance.
36
  Althorp, more consistently supportive, was faced with the tricky 
context of banks while in office, and the lawyers and Board of Trade officials who filled 
the public gap thereafter were hardly of the stuff to make a more determined effort - even 
had they wanted to.  Ker, the Board of Trade's conveyancing counsel and charter 
specialist, comes across in his own writings and the estimation of others as a clever but 
evasive man, who found it easier to criticise than take responsibility for recommendations 
of his own.  Whether for reasons of constitution or circumstance, he was unable to 
commit to a clear line, much less carry it through.
37
  By his own admission, the 
'imperfections of the enactments' that followed his 1837 Report proved 'a subject of deep 
mortification', and he has left behind a detailed picture of failure to contend with lawyers, 
bureaucrats and politicians.
38
  Sir John Campbell, who was (unlike Ker) an equity lawyer 
and Attorney General for several months during 1834 and then from 1835-41, showed 
willingness to consider a general limited liability rule on more than one occasion, but 
took no sort of lead.  The only bill on corporate privilege that he brought in to parliament 
during his time in office, the 1834 Trading Companies Bill, focused on suing rights.  Ker 
condemned the resultant Act as 'utterly useless', though hardly seemed happier with his 
own 1837 replacement.
39
  Poulett Thomson made it clear he thought a general rule 
needed, but failed in attempts to promote one.  Short on effective sponsorship, limited 
liability failed to sustain momentum, and the discussions of the second half of the 1830s 
proved overwhelmingly conservative in their conclusions.  Legislators had considered 
introducing limited liability for joint stock banks and a standardised rule for trading 
companies, but done neither.  Some things had however, changed, while politicians were 
procrastinating.  As these would later prove important, we need to consider what they 
were. 
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Board of Trade discretion 
One significant theme to emerge during the 1830s and early 1840s was criticism of the 
role of the Board of Trade.  The Board's attitude to limited liability was consistently 
conservative, and earned it a reputation amongst joint stock supporters as unsupportive of 
enterprise. 
The most important Board official of the period, with respect to limited liability, was 
Charles Poulett Thomson, Vice-president from 1830 and a devotee of Adam Smith.  Sir 
Denis Le Marchant, who knew Poulett Thomson well as a Board colleague, said of him 
that he was 'thoroughly conversant with business', but if so it seems to have been more in 
the theory than the practice.
40
  Even Sir Denis admitted that there was 'often an air of 
doctrine' in Poulett Thomson's reasoning.
41
  When promoted to President of the Board in 
June 1834, he sent a long, didactic letter on limited liability to Sir John Campbell, 
Attorney-General.  This had more to say about problems than potential solutions, the 
most fundamental being that the Board had found its 1825-bequeathed powers un-
workable.  Structural differences between private partnerships and joint stock companies 
(enumerated at length) meant that practices routine in the first context were 
'impracticable' in the other. 
The letter proceeded on the basis that shareholders would enjoy limited liability as an 
automatic consequence of incorporation, were it not for the 1825 Bubble Act Repeal Act.  
Board officials had searched departmental records for legal reasoning for the 1825 turn, 
but failed to find any.  They had therefore concluded it was triggered simply by a desire 
to 'place some check upon the ruinous spirit of speculation' then in operation and secure a 
'pledge of their Sincerity' from company promoters.  The result was a headline decree 
with no practical follow-through, and a situation where to engage in unlimited liability 
companies meant 'the highest impeachment of any Man's Prudence and sober judgment'.  
Such companies attracted just the sort of people 'into whose hands it is peculiarly 
necessary with a view to the interest of Society at large that Commercial Undertakings of 
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magnitude should not be committed'.  The Board therefore believed it necessary to 
introduce some 'considerable relaxation' in the 1825 rule to encourage 'trustworthy 
persons' to invest, but seemed uncertain as to the form this might take, beyond use of 
Letters Patent and simplified powers of suing.  The least problematic option seemed 
double liability, backed by personal liability continuing beyond the date of a share-
transfer (ostensibly to discourage stock-jobbing, in which a launch share price might be 
pushed by a small group, who then sold out at a premium and left a wider group of 
shareholders facing fallout from a burst bubble).
42
 
The upshot of this letter, and Campbell's response, was the 1834 Companies Act.  This 
allowed the Board of Trade to grant corporate privileges by Letters Patent as well as 
charter.
43
  It thus recognised the role of unincorporated joint stock companies and gave a 
power to grant limited liability, in theory, even to ordinary partnerships.  Perrott 
highlights this as an exceptional concession, but in practice it made negligible difference, 
because of the Board's continuing conservative approach to grants.  The Act also 
required, for the first time, that shareholders register their interests publicly.  That marked 
the official end of shareholder anonymity, and so made shareholder liability more of an 
issue.   
Board conservatism was reinforced in 1837, upon further legislation, when a November 
1834 Board Minute was made publicly available for general guidance.
44
  This confirmed 
an overriding desire not to 'interfere with the course of private speculation and individual 
enterprise carried on under the ordinary partnership laws' and made grants of corporate 
privilege subordinate to the requirements of partnerships.
45
  Limited liability should be 
granted only very exceptionally. 
The product of this philosophy was a system which satisfied few.  One criticism was that 
it fostered cronyism - an accusation which dated from the first confirmation of Board 
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involvement, in 1825.  Scottish lawyer Alexander Mundell called then for a 
transparently-understood general rule: 'It is difficult to see why a commercial country like 
this should not have the benefit of competition by large as well as small companies 
equally as by individuals'.
46
  Crown charters were an invitation to monopoly and suitable 
only for nations in their infancy.
47
  Another lawyer made the same points against the 
Board in the context of the 1834 legislation:  
'whereas in Parliament all must be open and straightforward ... yet before the 
[King's] Ministers [at the Board] there [will] be no open application - no means of 
opposition - no fair fighting; but backdoor influence and private friendship'.
48
 
Like Mundell, he favoured a general Act, with the Board merely carrying out 'executorial' 
powers.  Board officials themselves acknowledged that their powers of discretion made 
them uneasy, but failed to introduce the standardised procedures which might have offset 
complaints.  (The 1837 Letters Patent Act did set out standardised requirements for some 
corporate privileges but these did not cover limited liability.)  This left them open to 
criticism from business professionals inclined to question their fitness for their 
discriminatory task.  In 1832, the Circular to Bankers termed the Board 
'an establishment more for the purpose of receiving deputations from mercantile 
bodies, and devising the best means of dismissing the deputies, with courtesy, 
having, first, bewildered them with official mystifications ... than for any efficient 
purpose connected with the promotion of wealth'.
49
 
That view was shared by Liverpool solicitor Matthew Lowndes who went into print in 
1840 to protest.  Lowndes believed that 'what I consider Mr Poulett Thomson's prejudice 
against Joint Stock companies' still held sway at the Board, after Poulett Thomson's 
departure for new challenges, and urged the straightforward registration of 'every trading 
company, consisting of 10 members or upwards … instead of the President of the Board 
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of Trade wasting his own or the public time in conjectures whether such and such a 
scheme would be beneficial to the public'.
50
  Lowndes' concerns were to be broadly 
answered by the 1844 introduction of freedom of incorporation, but anyone wishing to 
secure a limited corporation had to continue thereafter to make a specific application.  Sir 
Denis Le Marchant, Secretary to the Board for a total of nine years between 1836 and 
1850, openly acknowledged that 'the rule has decidedly been to refuse them rather than to 
grant them'
51
, and very few charters of incorporation were granted.  The Times noted the 
conservative policy in 1840, and approved of the fact that since 1834, 'the Crown has 
never thought fit to grant any one patent conferring the privilege on a company of limited 
liability'.  Companies were 'incompatible with the true principle of partnership in 
commerce'.  Their place was 'peculiar and very limited.'
52
 
After twenty years of this system, lawyers were claiming that the Crown's powers were 
practically a dead letter, and it is easy to see their grounds for saying so.
53
  James Taylor 
has shown that between 1840 and 1844, the Board approved only eleven (of nineteen) 
applications for limited liability.
54
  The number of applications to Parliament was far 
higher.  During the same period Parliament processed over 500 private bill applications 
for some form of corporate privilege.  These did not necessarily include an application 
for limited liability, but the great majority did. 
Solicitors negotiating this system argued that it was best to pursue applications through 
Parliament, because the Board route was not significantly cheaper, and had the extra 
disadvantage of being open to a legal challenge.
55
  As an unaccountable, expensive 
dispenser of privilege - an 'irresponsible tribunal'
56
 - the Board became a symbol of 
impediment, and a target for reformists.  Board officials were not of course the only 
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people called to pass judgment on commercial liability questions at this time.  Lawyers 
did too.  And although they did not have to contend with any major changes in legal 
treatment of limited liability itself, they did participate in related changes that were to 
influence the shape of debate for the next twenty years. 
 
Share-transfer and share reification 
The one piece of legislation of the 1830s and early 1840s that made a direct reference to 
limited liability was the 1837 Letters Patent Act, which stipulated that a company 
member’s personal liability could be limited (by letters patent) to a specified amount per 
share.
57
  Liability, when limited, was here explicitly identified with a shareholding rather 
than a physical person.  Official perceptions had registered an important shift. 
Although transferable shares were now a recognised basis for limited liability, they were 
only a potential basis.  Anyone wishing to secure limited liability still had to secure a 
corporate privilege. This followed the course set in 1825/6, when it was established 
beyond contention that transferable shares, characteristic of joint stock companies, might 
co-exist with personal liability.  England was not the only jurisdiction with unlimited 
liability joint stock companies at this time.  As will be discussed in chapter 6, American 
states had them too, and there is therefore no reason to think the position inherently 
untenable.  That said, transferable shares clearly do promote the accessibility of limited 
liability, in making it more difficult to pin down personal liability, and in associations 
with quantified capital.  France already had a close legal identification between 
transferable shares and limited liability - a point picked up by John Stuart Mill in 
Principles of Political Economy, first published in 1848.  Under French law, Mill said, 
there was no such thing as an unlimited liability joint stock company, since the capital of 
unlimited partnerships could not be divided into transferable shares.
58
  Only capital of a 
limited partnership could be so divided, either in the commanditaire section of a société 
en commandite or in a société anonyme.  In France, transferable shares were identified 
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with the raising of capital, and accorded limited liability within that ring-fencing.  In 
England too, transferable shares were associated with capital-raising, but the ring-fencing 
was not clear-cut, and limited liability was not controlled through them.  Rather, it 
continued to be exposed to the need for specific justification. 
Liability had nevertheless now been identified in law with shares, and - by implication - 
rather less with people.  This can be seen as part of a broader association between 
(transferable-share) joint stock companies and a shift to abstraction, much discussed and 
commented-upon by legal historians.  In Cooke's view, joint stock itself represented a 
shift in focus from 'the unification of a group of persons' (long-established in a 
corporation) to 'the agglomeration of a capital fund', which 'itself provided the common 
interest'.
59
  Early 1840s comment shows that, in the ill-defined world of investors' part-
payments, such capital could be termed 'liability'.  Discussing nominal capital at an 1841 
Select Committee, barrister Sir Peter Laurie suggested that, 'Perhaps liability would be a 
better term than "capital" to put in; [partners] are liable to put that sum in'.
60
  Cooke sees 
lawyers in the eighteenth century first '[wrestling] hard with the new importance of a 
fund in place of people'.
61
 
In trying to determine how that wrestling resolved into law, Cooke and others have taken 
the 1836-7 case, Bligh v Brent as pivotal.
62
  Certainly it seems that Edward Alderson, the 
Exchequer judge called to try it, thought it might be 'of great importance, involving 
extensive consequences'.
63
  He accordingly called in three 'learned brethren' to help and 
the case also involved, as lead counsel for the defence, the Attorney-General, Sir John 
Campbell.  Defence arguments prevailed, with a judgment that focused unequivocally on 
money as central to the company in question's purpose, and rejected a longer-established 
identification between joint stock and physical assets.
64
  The ruling did not necessarily 
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change established practice (part of the defence case was that this company's shares had 
been treated as personal, transferable property for 125 years
65
) but registered with 
lawyers.  Alderson's observations about company-abstractions - made in the context of a 
statutory corporation - were quoted in the 1843 Joint Stock Companies Select 
Committee.
66
  The ensuing 1844 Act established a corporate identity for such joint stock 
companies, ending the legal identification with partnership, and by 1847, the assistant 
registrar of companies could acknowledge that these were 'necessarily impersonal'.
67
  
Paddy Ireland, Ian Grigg-Spall and Dave Kelly consider that by the mid-1850s case-law 
had extended the reification to all types of company with transferable shares, with private 
partnerships continuing to be excluded by their lack of them.
68
 
 
Ireland is also amongst those legal historians who see a parallel shift taking place in 
attitudes to shareholders.
69
  In the late 1830s, it was still routine to argue that 
shareholders who felt themselves deceived in a joint stock company had only themselves 
to blame, for failing to be sufficiently vigilant.  The 1844 Joint Stock Companies Act 
added legal complications to the practical difficulties of this, by giving directors, rather 
than shareholders, power to bind a company, and thus undermining the identification of 
shareholders as partners with power to bind all other partners.
70
  Joint stock investors 
were now financially liable for company activities over which they were acknowledged 
to have little influence.  By mid-century, the impracticality of expecting them to control 
company decisions was commonly acknowledged and, as Hilton remarked, investors 
were more likely to be characterised as innocent.
71
 
 
Amongst these shifts in the roles of people and their shareholdings, the status of the 
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company continued to be linguistically ambiguous.  Legal language shows joint stock 
company personality continuing to be reified as a multiple concept, reflecting multiple 
individuals, through the 1844 freedom of incorporation, to mid-century.  We can see this 
in continuing references, odd to modern ears (and apparently odd to contemporary 
American ears
72
) to a company as 'they'.  In the 1836/7 language of Bligh v Brent, a 
company was consistently plural.
73
  By 1844, a company could be required to give the 
names of 'its' promoters.
74
  Instability persisted however, and Ireland et al cite an 1851 
case in which it was clearly 'they'.
75
  The 1855 Limited Liability Act referred throughout 
to a company as 'it'
76
, but the 1856 Companies Act - perhaps reflecting different drafters 
for different sections - termed a company 'it' in one section and 'they' in another.
77
  The 
1862 Companies Act
78
 has generally been taken as definitive confirmation of a 
company's personality as single - not only separate from physical assets but recognisably 
separate from the physical individuals who constituted it, as an externalised entity.
79
 
 
This chronology makes historical sense of terming a company 'limited' when what is 
meant is the limitation of the liability of its members (rather than of the entity itself).  The 
1855 Limited Liability Act, which introduced the tag, was 'An Act for limiting the 
liability of members of certain joint stock companies'.  Companies were still understood 
to be composed of members, and there was thus clear logic in the suffix.  The tag then 
survived as a relic of earlier understanding when the company came to be more clearly 
understood as a distinct entity.  In approving limited liability, legislators may have been 
helping turn the company from a collection of individuals into an abstraction, focused 
upon capital, but in doing so they still had people in mind. 
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Pivotal to this developing chronology was the 1844 granting of freedom of incorporation.  
Perrott sees widespread indifference to limited liability in court records continuing up 
until the mid-1840s.
80
  Interest in limited liability itself did not at first increase noticeably 
even then, but interest in companies did, as insurance company frauds made it hard to 
ignore questions of company control.  The 1841 Parliamentary Committee on Joint Stock 
Companies had been appointed to address shareholder protection and in 1843, with an 
expanded remit, came under the chairmanship of Gladstone, as President of the Board of 
Trade.  Gladstone's Board was the motor behind four statutes of 1844, widely credited 
with laying the foundation of modern company law.  They had very little to say about 
limited liability, but as an ambitious attempt to regularise the legal treatment of joint 
stock companies, provided a standard point of reference thereafter.  We therefore need to 
understand in more detail what they said. 
 
1844 company legislation 
The first of the four company Acts introduced in 1844 was the Railways Regulation 
Act.
81
  It took the lion's share of parliamentary time, but its only significance for limited 
liability lay in confirming that railway companies, once authorised, were routinely 
accorded it.  Cooke considers the Act notable for embodying 'the principle ...that railway 
companies were one example of a class of company ... formed under special 
parliamentary sanction to carry on an undertaking of a special public nature'.
82
 
The second Act, the 1844 Joint Stock Companies Act, dealt with joint stock companies 
not credited with this degree of public interest.
83
  An Act 'for the registration, 
incorporation and regulation of joint stock companies', it provided a standardised process 
for their incorporation, and established a pecking order amongst debt claims, in 
stipulating that creditors should proceed first against company assets, before making 
claims against company members.  This was designed to give some formal protection to 
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members, although their personal liability was upheld, and - in a provision taken from the 
1834 Companies Act - was to continue for three years after transfer of a registered 
holding.
84
  Lawyers very quickly complained that these provisions were practically 
useless.  John Ludlow, a chambers colleague of Ker, thought this bound to be the case, as 
long as the difficulties of creditors' 'contribution suits' in Chancery went 
unacknowledged.  The requirement to proceed first against failed companies merely 
saddled people with 'useless and expensive formalities'.
85
 
A third statute, the Companies Winding-up Act, made an attempt to address these 
concerns.
86
  Lawyers though had their doubts about this too.  Ker recalled in 1851 how 
'before [the Act] passed I was convinced by [London solicitor] Mr. [Edwin] Field, who 
took a great interest in the measure, that it would not answer its object'.
87
  Field and his 
colleague Thomas Rigge suggested that one way round the Chancery issue was to re-
direct claims to the Bankruptcy Court.
88
  Field's 'continued perseverance' resulted in a 
second Winding-up Act in 1848 (drawn up by Ker, with Ludlow's assistance) and a 
further one, in 1849, which included amendments by 'Mr. Lloyd'.
89
  Ker - unsurprisingly - 
did not approve of Lloyd's amendments, blaming his 'cumbrous mass of provisions' for 
the 1849 Act also proving largely unsuccessful, even when further amended.
90
  Legal 
difficulties were only resolved with a fourth such Act in 1857.  The fourth and last 
notable piece of 1844 company legislation was the Joint Stock Banking Act, which - 
again - made no mention of limited liability.
91
  
This appears to have been in tune with contemporary expectations, which reflected pre-
occupation with recent fraud cases.  The Joint Stock Companies Bill in particular 
attracted very little parliamentary debate, with Gladstone choosing to interpret this as 
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confirmation that it had met with 'pretty general, or ... universal approval'.  He 
acknowledged that the Bill had gained some 'notoriety outside Parliament', but claimed 
that comments received by the Board of Trade were overwhelmingly favourable.
92
   
The lack of parliamentary debate about the Bill reflected too the stance of the preceding 
Select Committee.  This had confined itself in its Report to joint stock companies - now 
defined as companies with transferable shares - and expressly ruled out the potential can 
of worms that was traditional partnership and commandite.
93
  Despite the ring-fencing 
though, these subjects were raised by witnesses giving evidence to the Committee in July 
1843.  Discussions were led mostly by Gladstone himself, together with committee-
members Clay and George Lyall, MP for the City of London.  The Committee heard the 
views of nine lawyers - the bulk of the witnesses consulted - on limited liability.  Clay 
asked the first, solicitor Thomas Farquhar, what he thought about it, but Farquhar replied 
only that he saw no difference in law between partnership and joint stock (although he 
was prepared to allow for the possibility that there should be one).
94
  Thereafter, the 
subject only came up if a witness raised it himself - as several did. 
Solicitor Thomas Bothamley was the first of these.  He said that unlimited responsibility 
had quite the reverse effect of that intended, a point already made in the Committee's 
1841 incarnation ('the heavier the liabilities, the less responsible persons you will 
obtain'
95
).  Birmingham solicitor and parliamentary agent, Joseph Parkes, also brought up 
the topic.  Although willing to allow that 'the aggregation of capital in joint stock 
companies ... has been a most material cause of our national greatness and prosperity'
96
 
he thought its intrusion upon areas of business traditionally handled by private enterprise 
an 'evil' - a view evidently shared by Gladstone.  Parkes' jaundiced view of the profit-
swallowing 'salaried agents' employed by joint stock companies echoed Henry 
Burgess's.
97
  The 'honorary directors' listed in joint stock prospectuses he considered a 
                                                          
92
 Hansard, 3rd series, vol. 75, c475 (10 June 1844). 
93
 First Report of the Select Committee on Joint-stock Companies, PP 1844 (119) vii vi. 
94
 Ibid., 86. 
95
 Ibid., 19, evidence of Sir Peter Laurie. 
96
 Ibid., 238. 
97
 Ibid., 238. 
  68 
nuisance, and - in a phrase that would acquire notoriety within a few years - a 'decoy'.
98
 
By far the most eloquent proponent of limited liability, and joint stock's staunchest 
advocate, was John Duncan, the solicitor who had taken on Farren in print ten years 
before (when he had been occupied 'for months together ... in writing pamphlets ... 
proving that ... acknowledged and known difficulties could be surmounted') and now had 
a client list that boasted many of the best-known joint stock company names.
99
  Like 
fellow-solicitor Matthew Lowndes, Duncan had little time for the approach confirmed in 
the Board of Trade's 1834 Minute.
100
  His extensive experience of company-formation - 
and knowledge of steps taken to evade the law - engaged Committee-members, and he 
reported to them his  
'strong impression … that joint stock companies never will be respectable 
generally, or respected, until the law has been altered to allow companies to be 
formed of the nature of the commandité and Anonyme partnerships in France.'
101
  
Duncan already saw a problem in persuading men to act as directors of unlimited liability 
companies.  Since honest men wished to associate with other honest men, the effect was 
to restrict participation to 'a particular class of individual' willing to take on the risk.  This 
wariness was in contrast to the ignorance of the wider public.  The law deterred an 
informed, potentially useful class of investor (who sounded remarkably like Duncan 
himself): 'private gentlemen ... who are not adapted by their habits or their information to 
join in trade, but who would be very glad to be able to put their money in concerns that 
they thought were well-managed, and to take the profits of trade without the anxieties'.  
Asked if reform would not tempt investors into areas they did not understand, he pointed 
to (limited liability) railway companies, which already had, he said, both a 'vast number 
of private individuals' investing in them (including many women) and as much 'stupidity' 
as was to be found anywhere.
102
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Railway companies also came in for sharp words for the scrip issued in advance of 
incorporation.  This created 'extreme difficulty' in tracing money due - or even in 
maintaining the expectation that it was due.  Duncan contrasted the cost-book system of 
mining companies, and their insistence upon paid-up capital, with the dubious practices 
pursued by railway companies 'under the very nose of Parliament'.  Wholesale reform 
was needed: 'I repeat ... it is partnership liability, and the excessive danger it produces, 
which causes parties to evade the law and actually infringe it by endeavouring to carry on 
business with scrip shares'.
103
 
In what he said about railways, as in much else, Duncan was the herald of themes 
commonplace from the late 1840s.  He effectively ran down a checklist of points later 
made in favour of wider use of limited liability.  Bad company law '[forced] capital in 
bad and unhealthy channels'.
104
  The United States offered the best example of how to use 
limited liability (though Duncan thought the 'go-ahead system' in use there would need 
'checks and restraints' if introduced in England).
105
  Above all, he spoke up unequivocally 
for the claims of dynamic, democratic capital.  Asked whether he would recommend joint 
stock investment for 'minute' as well as large objects, he replied: 
'I certainly would.  Keep capital active, whether it belong to one or many; let skill 
and science be assisted with money; knock away every impediment which 
obstructs energy or activity; an aggregate of several sums should be employed in 
any trade, just as readily as the private individual's purse'.
106
 
When it came to compiling their Report however, the Committee stuck to their professed 
brief and proceeded to pick and choose amongst Duncan's evidence accordingly.  His 
recommendation that unlimited liability joint stock companies be allowed to develop 
'unfettered' was adopted (and confirmed in freedom of incorporation) but his 
supplementary call for equally unfettered 'semi-liable' commandite partnerships was left 
unaddressed, as outside the scope of the Report.
107
  In what it prescribed for joint stock, it 
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followed Duncan, who - typically or not - considered that the Board of Trade had 
'regulated [the administration of charters] so far as I know most satisfactorily' and 
recommended that they should continue to control completely 'non-liable' companies.
108
  
This recommendation had however, been made in the context of an accompanying 
insistence on a need for limited liability in alternative (partnership) form, and this part of 
his advice found no place in the Report.  Duncan had agreed that joint stock’s main use 
was for 'matters of magnitude or matters of considerable risk and speculation'.  Private 
traders and their smaller companies, he allowed, had no need to be completely 'non-
liable'.
109
  The Committee focused on joint stock companies and left their use of limited 
liability to charters.  It ignored the question of a potential application to smaller 
companies and private traders, along with commandite. 
Saved the immediate trouble of contention and practical detail, the Committee was happy 
to allow for the possibility of partnership reform.  It recommended that a Bill 'for 
granting certain privileges to Private Partnerships' be considered.  One was even drawn 
up by Ker (the first port-of-call for such work) and presented to Parliament.
110
  It dealt 
only with the question of suing however, with no mention of commandite, and failed to 
make headway.  When Gladstone resigned as President of the Board of Trade in February 
1845, he left his successor a list of outstanding issues.  Item 23 dealt with 'Private 
Partnerships', against which Gladstone noted the previous Session’s aborted Bill and his 
opinion that: 'The question was too much of a legal character for me to be able to form a 
judgment in it [but] the practical defect … is obvious and pressing'.111  The pattern of 
partnership law attracting more ink than willpower was to continue. 
Limited liability enjoyed slightly more air-time in parliamentary discussion of the Joint 
Stock Banks Bill.  Clay took the opportunity to raise the subject again in the Commons, 
cataloguing bank failures to argue that these would only be avoided 'by limiting the 
responsibility of the shareholders [and putting] a stop to that spurious credit grounded on 
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private fortunes'.
112
  Other MPs did not agree.  Peel had supported limited liability for 
new joint stock banks in 1826, but now argued that: 
'Limited responsibility would be apt to make persons of influence and property 
who became shareholders in banks comparatively careless about the management 
of these establishments, as their chance of loss in consequence of mismanagement 
would be limited to the probably trifling amount of shares held by them.'
113
 
Merchant banker James Morrison agreed, and added his interpretation of the 1837 
financial crisis in support.  American banks 'after having tried the system of limited, were 
establishing the system of unlimited liability'.  It had not been found 'necessary' to insist 
on limited liability in England, and he believed it would be 'highly impolitic' to introduce 
it now.
114
   Benjamin Hawes, another member of Gladstone's Committee,  took issue with 
Peel's sweeping statement that 'all authority [was] against' introduction of limited 
liability, and supported Clay, but opinion was otherwise with Peel.  Clay's proposal was 
'negatived'.  The subsequent Act made it compulsory for joint stock banks to have a 
charter of incorporation, and comply with costly and demanding regulations.  One 
industry sceptic later termed its provisions 'so insurmountable that the existing Joint 
Stock Banks are said to have a monopoly of banking'.
115
 
Some modern legal authorities have written as though the very exclusion of limited 
liability from the 1844 legislation made subsequent focus upon it inevitable.  Gower‟s 
Principles of Modern Company Law says that 'the next 10 years saw the battle fairly 
joined on this issue'
116
 and Patrick Atiyah writes as though discussion set in train in 1825 
had already reached boiling point.
117
  It is hard to see historical grounds for this.  
Gladstone's intuitions reflected his political times, and the tone taken in contemporary 
publications.  Thomas Corbet's An Inquiry into the Causes and Modes of the Wealth of 
Individuals, first published in 1841, showed a traditional lack of sympathy for sleeping 
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partners.
118
  The lack of headline interest is reflected in the historiography, with 
historians having very little to say about what happened to discussion of limited liability 
during the remainder of the 1840s.  Saville says more than most, in considering that 
'[t]here was no discussion of en commandite or of limited liability in Parliament between 
1844 and 1849 and comment outside was meagre'.
119
  This is nearer the mark than 
Gower's or Atiyah, but still needs revision.  Although there was very little parliamentary 
debate, the issue was raised, and comment outside Parliament was considerably more 
than 'meagre'.  It followed the pattern of earlier investment cycles, with inquest following 
on collapse of a round of speculation.  It also saw some engage with limited liability as an 
issue of national social significance.  The next chapter looks at where this brand of 
interest came from, starting with what historians have made of it.
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Chapter 4 - Cultural investment in limited liability 
 
A 'mid-century change of mood' 
In 1988, limited liability's historiography acquired a pronounced moral dimension, with 
the publication of Boyd Hilton’s The age of atonement: the influence of evangelicalism 
on social and economic thought, 1785-1865.  Hilton devoted a chapter to considering 
limited liability in the context of that influence („"Incarnate and Incorporate": The Lord 
of Limit'), and saw it as the beneficiary of a new, expansive social model which eclipsed 
retributive, Evangelical intuitions at mid-century.  This opened up discussion of a seismic 
cultural change and its influence on financial matters.  (Olive Anderson’s A liberal state 
at war: English politics and economics during the Crimean War had covered similar 
territory twenty years before, but with only passing mention of limited liability.)  
Geoffrey Searle noted the new importance of 'shifts in moral and theological perspective' 
to the historical debate, and concluded that 'the probability is that [the] divisions of 
opinion cannot be explained in purely economic terms at all.'
1
  Hilton's social focus was 
criticised by Maxine Berg, who - while she agreed that there were striking parallels in 
theologians' and political economists' terms of reference - argued for greater appreciation 
of an optimistic element in economic debate, attached to the values of 'useful labour, 
industry, invention, productivity and enterprise'.  This still however, left a problem for 
limited liability, in that politicians were there endorsing not so much 'useful labour', as 
the 'artificial or fictitious wealth' that Berg saw marked out as beyond the moral pale.
2
 
 
Following Hilton, there have been two further notable contributions to moral and social 
aspects of the Victorian debate.  Timothy Alborn’s 1998 Conceiving Companies: joint-
stock politics in Victorian England explored joint stock companies' - especially banks' - 
use of republican rhetoric, and saw in the 1856 Act industrialists '[restoring] to their 
credit transactions the ideal of self-government that had once been the trademark of 
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English joint-stock banks'.
3
  Linguistic analysis provided insights into that ideal, but, in 
the absence of much information about who held to it, did little to contradict Cottrell and 
Jefferys’ conclusion that industrialists had not in fact been notable supporters of limited 
liability.  An article by Donna Loftus, 'Limited Liability, Market Democracy, and the 
Social Organization of Production' (first published in Victorian Studies in 2002 and re-
worked several years later) also analysed linguistic tropes, and explored the debt that 
early-1850s interest owed to Christian Socialist influence.
4
  A tentative suggestion that 
this might help explain why far-reaching reform was passed abruptly in the mid-1850s 
rather fell down however, on an accompanying acknowledgement that - as Saville, Hilton 
and Cottrell had all agreed - Christian Socialist political interest had by then dissipated.  
James Taylor’s 2006 Creating Capitalism: joint-stock enterprise in British politics and 
culture, 1800-1870 went some way towards addressing this central question of what re-
ignited public debate, with a narrative of political interest as it developed from February 
1852.  Taylor expanded too on Hilton’s social perspective but, like him, focused on those 
who objected to reform.  Adoption of limited liability was 'as much about stability as 
growth', pushed through despite continuing belief that 'the individual [was] superior to 
the company', and commercial perceptions that 'had altered barely at all in decades'.
5
 
 
The net result of this expanded historiography is that we now have a much greater 
appreciation of a moral element in nineteenth century debate about limited liability, but 
remain very short of information about any moral motivation for limited liability's 
proponents.  Moralising has been largely identified with liability-conservatives - with, 
indeed, many historians seeming to doubt whether reformists had any moral motivation at 
all.  This tendency pre-dates Hilton's work, and has continued thereafter.  It is especially 
apparent in 'discourse analysis' treatments of mid-nineteenth century novels,
6
 which tend 
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to reflect the pre-occupations of the novels' authors.  Adding to the list of those which 
have focused on conservatives' fears would be very easy.  Elizabeth Gaskell’s North and 
South for example (first published in Charles Dickens’ Household Words, 1854-5) has a 
hero, John Thornton, who views speculation with horror, and relies upon commercial 
values shaped by early struggle to pay off his late father’s business debts.  His career-path 
of patient loyalty rewarded was the classic trajectory urged by liability-conservatives, 
who argued that businessmen should 'be content to progress slowly'.
7
 
With conservatives dominating moral analyses, limited liability's supporters have been 
left to claim the realm of hard-headed financial gain.  A Marxist-sympathetic 1997 article 
by Robert Bryer invoked classical rational interests to account for the 1855/6 changes, 
with unnamed drivers of change simply said to be 'the rich', 'wealthy commercial 
capitalists and financial aristocracy'.
8
  Perrott also followed this line, in seeing limited 
liability's prospects fluctuating according to 'whether [the] prevailing ideology [was] 
materialist-expansionist or idealistic and conservative'
9
 and Hilton himself was inclined 
to credit change to parliamentary rentiers.
10
  When Thatcherism prompted Searle to re-
visit Victorian economic debates in the late 1990s, he concluded that reconciling market 
philosophy with 'moral and social duties' had been as difficult in the nineteenth-century 
as the twentieth, and left his reader in little doubt that he thought the challenge one twice 
failed.
11
  Paul Johnson has pointed out that this leaves one having to presume a 
'developing schizophrenia in Victorian society as the way in which people behaved 
increasingly ran counter to the moral beliefs they held'.
12
  Johnson allowed 'this may well 
have been the case'.  In his view, general limited liability represented 'the final removal of 
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the vestiges of a "moral economy” '.13 
As a framework for a cultural shift, this 'marketplace-for/morality-against' framework is 
unconvincing, at odds with both what we know of Christian Socialist mid-century interest 
in limited liability, and with a broader revision of recent years, when morality-free 
rationality has been largely consigned to the realm of economic theory.  As 
anthropologist Alan Fiske asserted in one much-cited 1991 article on the subject, people 
'do not engage in market pricing behavior only because they are self-interested, but also 
because they are socially interested ... the goal is always to relate to others according to 
some proportional standard.'
14
 
Despite the preoccupation with conservatives' moralising, moral counter-arguments do 
occasionally feature in limited liability's historiography.  The clearest instance of a 
reformist 'proportional standard' is the republican rhetoric identified in joint stock 
banking by Alborn.
15
  He quotes a Bankers' Magazine 1847 claim that 'every joint-stock 
banking company [is] a little republic within itself'.
16
  Importantly for limited liability, 
Alborn sees the rhetoric also having a wider application 'in the realm of finance, where a 
narrow circuit of virtuous members could replace "irresponsible" aristocratic credit with a 
newly vigilant creditor-debtor relationship'.
17
  As will be discussed, republican rhetoric 
appealed strongly to supporters of limited liability, who saw in it hope of reduced 
dependence upon 'aristocratic' credit, identified with the City. 
With little guidance in the historiography as to how this took effect, we are pushed back 
onto the intuitions themselves if we wish to try and understand the working of reformist 
social argument.  Hilton saw support for limited liability characterised by optimistic 
sympathy, endorsing Kitson Clark’s comments on a pivotal 'mid-century change of 
mood', when 'the tone of England became gentler' and concern with debt faded.
18
  Social 
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scientists have provided a framework which promises help with identifying the respective 
priorities of both sides of debate more closely, at the same time illuminating why 
supporters of limited liability could dismiss much moral disapprobation as a side-show, 
and conservatives find so much to say about it.  The psychologist Jonathan Haidt claims 
that this signature pattern emerges with any social liberalisation because moral 
disapprobation tends to be relatively diverse.  In a narrowing of focus on the individual, 
he argues, previously-important areas of cultural concern may be de-sensitised (thereby 
exciting the attention of conservatives attached to them) and attachment to surviving 
areas intensify.  In the process, a 'thicker moral world' cedes ground to an intensified 
focus upon values associated with autonomy.
19
 
A narrowing and intensification of focus has also characterised anthropological 
perspectives on social individualism.  In an influential 1998 article, Angeline Lillard saw 
willingness to credit external influences typically replaced by intensified focus upon 
cognition, elaboration of conceptions of intention, and institutions which provide 'training 
in abstraction'.
20
  As mental and emotional states come under social focus, she argued, so 
their elaboration expands, and a tie between emotion and action can be reified as motive 
and intention.  When these are held to be important and knowable, public attention 
focuses less on what people do and more on what they think.  We should perhaps here 
note too Lillard's warning that cultures habituated to well-defined notions of personal 
responsibility tend to over-estimate their significance and objectivity.
21
  Psychologist 
Daniel Wegner has endorsed this and cites Lillard
22
 to support his belief that a sense of 
agency can be inflated (even when a physical impossibility) simply by inflating a person's 
self-consciousness.
23
  On this evidence, moral individualists project emotion-infused 
cognition onto their environment, just as those with a greater tendency to 'situational 
attribution' may do.  The former may prefer to tackle unexplained events with self-
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sufficient theory, rather than supernatural intervention, but the responses are not 
necessarily as different in kind as they may seem.  The key distinction for a shift towards 
more individualist values is not a lack of susceptibility to moral emotion, but a contracted 
range of acknowledged elicitors. 
With this in mind, we can look at two aspects of the moral content of limited liability 
argument, the first of which is made explicit in Lillard's article.  As she observes, legal 
systems vary, along with cultures, in the degree to which they rely upon 'estimations of 
others' intentions', and mention of systems in which 'intention is not important in 
assigning blame; only the actual effect of one's action is considered'
24
 brings to mind the 
concept of 'strict liability', which holds an individual at fault simply 'by virtue of a 
wrongful act, without any accompanying intent or mental state'.
25
  A decisive shift away 
from strict liability is one of several mid-nineteenth century developments discussed by 
legal historians in connection with limited liability.  David Abraham takes George 
Bramwell, a prominent mid-century champion of limited liability, as emblematic of a 
reformist legal generation bent on tackling 'the lethargy and hideboundness of Tory 
England and its "strict liability" world' and identifies their sympathy for liability-
limitation with sympathy for 'capital entrepreneurship'.
26
  Patrick Atiyah also sees 
Bramwell as representative of a wider 'shift in the basis of liability from benefit to will',
27
 
with support for limited liability 'part of a broad process ... to limit the responsibility of 
contracting parties' engaged in commercial enterprise.
28
  Also stressing the enhanced role 
of mental intention, Margot Finn sees 'the legislative category of the fraudulent debtor', 
with its emphasis on conscious intention, increasingly used in legal justifications after 
reforms of 1838-46.
29
  This suggests that we should understand limited liability as, 
amongst other things, the beneficiary of a broader shift in the moral assumptions behind 
liability-related commercial law, marked by a greater focus upon - and definition of - an 
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individual's acknowledged responsibility.  In notions of foresight and intent, lawyers 
could find reason to attribute responsibility - and reason to excuse it too.  Conservatives 
tended to pick up on the excuses, but formalisation of self-consciousness made its own 
demands of individuals. 
This is especially evident in arguments made by George Bramwell, frequently cited by 
legal historians in this context.  Bramwell himself was seemingly happy to be cast as the 
nemesis of outmoded Tory thinking on limited liability.
30
  Although he did not always 
side with industrial enterprise and took the part of 'strict liability' in one mid-century 
landmark case,
31
 he was, as all accounts agree, a consistent defender of defined bargains - 
a characteristic often attributed to his banking background.  Abraham sees his 'deference 
toward limiting liability' most clearly displayed in the 1856 case, Blyth v Birmingham 
Water Works Company, and the case-report provides insight into his guiding intuitions.  
A Mr. Blyth had brought an action against Birmingham Water Works for damage from 
leaking water-pipes, but Bramwell excused the Waterworks company its failure to allow 
for an unusually cold winter.  He considered the plaintiff 'under quite as much obligation 
to remove the ice and snow which had accumulated, as the [Waterworks Company]' - an 
opinion which seems extraordinary, given the interference with Waterworks property this 
would have entailed.  To say nothing of the knowledge required to pre-empt a leak, 'the 
cause of which was so obscure, that it was not to be discovered until many months after 
the accident had happened'.
32
  Bramwell however, judged it 'monstrous' to have expected 
the required care or foresight from the Waterworks company, and seems to have been 
determined to keep responsibility away from them. 
An emphasis upon personal agency and initiative, as urged here, provided the moral basis 
for limited liability argument.  From the late-1840s, it was used to justify limited 
liability's applicability to workers' organisations, and - increasingly - the status of a social 
right.  Against this, liability-conservatives generally showed more sympathy with social 
                                                          
30
 See his 23 May 1888 speech to the Institute of Bankers, in which he characterised his opponents on the 
1853 Mercantile Laws Commission as 'Tories ... who look[ed] upon any change as a very suspicious thing', 
'The Law of Limited Liability', Journal of the Institute of Bankers, vol. 9 (London, 1888), pp.373-97, 
p.376. 
31
 Rylands v Fletcher, 1868. 
32
 Blyth v The Company of Proprietors of the Birmingham Waterworks, February 6, 1856, The English 
  80 
effect, insisting that limited liability was a straightforward licence to renege on debts - a 
social effect they found impossible to ignore.  Reformists' standard answer to this was 
that individuals should be left to make up their own minds about the basis on which they 
dealt with each other, and that debts that they had not first agreed to take on were not 
debts.  (The point was made by six separate speakers in the Liverpool Chamber of 
Commerce's 1854 debate on limited liability.
33
)  Conservatives struggled with this, but 
generally accepted its validity in the context of a private contract.  They baulked 
however, at taking it as a social assumption for a population - a fault-line visible in 
argument about usury repeal.  Once usury laws were repealed in the early 1850s, some 
conceded that it no longer made sense to hold the line against limited liability's wider use: 
a high rate of interest and investment profit were much the same thing.  The political 
economist John McCulloch held out against that equation however, on the grounds that 
usury was concerned with loans, and since loans were by their nature private 
undertakings, its treatment was irrelevant in the context of limited liability.
34
  Forced to 
choose between a public parading of mental self-sufficiency and an intuitive attachment 
to connections and effect, conservatives held to the latter, and argued that profit-seeking 
individuals could not decide not to be bound.  As one lawyer, discussing the implied legal 
principles, put it: 'I cannot escape the liability by resolving in my own mind ... that I will 
not pay'.
35
 
The same framework of dispute over a public, formal contraction of moral intuition onto 
the individual can also be applied to a second way into limited liability's moral dynamic 
i.e. the weakening attachment to providential punishment highlighted by Hilton.  It 
appeared to Hilton that change took effect remarkably quickly, over just a few years at 
mid-century.
36
  To try and see what changed when, and how it affected limited liability's 
position, we need to look at what happened to the tenor of economic discussion after the 
1844 round of company legislation. 
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Economic believers 
 
When Hilton looked for a pivotal moment in a shift to the more forgiving moral culture 
that he identified with support for limited liability, he concluded that 'it was very possibly 
the Irish famine that discredited the idea of a deliberately vengeful God'.
37
  The famine 
followed quickly on the 1844 legislation, and one thing it unquestionably did was 
provoke discussion.  Faced with a disaster of Biblical proportions that had intruded into 
the modern world, individuals launched into an exchange of views about its moral and 
economic meaning. 
 
One who did so was Edward Alderson, the Exchequer judge who presided over Bligh v 
Brent and of whom it has been said that his case-list 'reads like a broad survey of the 
legal problems of emerging capitalism'.
38
  Alderson, a devout churchman as well as a 
liberal judge, managed to reconcile sympathy with individuals with continuing faith in 
divine oversight: 
'This suffering is probably intended for our cure from the wickedness which 
deserves it.  For though I do not believe that suffering as to individuals is a proof 
of sin, for it is often quite the reverse, yet I do believe that wicked nations (the 
corporate nation having no soul) are almost always punished by the infliction by 
the Almighty of temporal calamities.  The time is delayed sometimes; but unless 
delay produces repentance, the calamity comes at last.'
39
 
Here, divine retribution operated at the level of the system rather than individuals, but 
still had a place in it.  Others were however, unwilling to allow even for that.  Jerrold's 
Weekly Newspaper epitomised many of the softer mid-century values enumerated by 
Kitson Clark, campaigning for abolition of capital punishment - and arguing in favour of 
commandite.  Its response to the famine was to take up arms against Evangelical 
moralising and scorn, even ridicule, it.  Ridicule was made easier by the opportunity to 
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point out that retribution had in this instance apparently been delivered to earth in the 
form of a potato.  Those favouring this interpretation had 'no other retreat from the 
accusation of hardness of heart, save in the imbecility of understanding'.  Jerrold's targets 
included representatives of the established church, from the Archbishop of Canterbury 
downwards.
40
  Better sense was to be found in Unitarian chapels, delivered by James 
Martineau and others who spoke of benevolence and human responsibility.
41
  Divine 
retribution was a convenient place for complacent authority to park responsibility: 
'Nothing so easy as for men to lay the sin of their own indifference or selfishness upon 
Providence'.
42
 
Political economists also laboured to make sense of events.  William Hancock, Professor 
of Political Economy at Dublin University, tackled the challenge in a paper presented to 
the Dublin Statistical Society in 1848, when he took exception to an Edinburgh Review 
article by Charles Trevelyan, co-ordinator of the British government's famine relief 
effort, and known for his own attachment to a sternly-correcting Providence.  Trevelyan 
had predicted that posterity would see in the famine 'a salutary revolution', and 
'acknowledge that, on this, as on many other occasions, Supreme Wisdom has educed 
permanent good out of transient evil'.
43
  Hancock refuted the interpretation with a robust 
assertion of human capabilities.  The famine was not a divine message about agricultural 
priorities, 'laid bare by a divine stroke of an All wise and All-merciful Providence, as if 
this part of the case were beyond the unassisted power of man'.
44
  Men were capable of 
working out for themselves how to organise economic activity, and failure meant only 
that they must try harder.  Abdication of responsibility was no answer. 
As Mary Daly has shown, this was not the only time that Hancock attacked the '[vain] 
endeavour to conceal from ourselves the consequences of human folly, by representing 
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the misery and distress produced by man's neglect as inevitable dispensations of the 
beneficent Authority'.
45
  The famine represented a hard-to-dodge test of faith in the nature 
of God and in human ability to control a physical environment.  One could either attribute 
it to God (with the necessary acceptance of harsh discipline) or - as Hancock and 
Jerrold's did - take it as a springboard for assertion of human responsibility and 
capability.  Both perspectives could use deductivist terminology, but in the latter 
interpretation, economic reasoning was to be trusted to individuals, without God-given 
penalties needed to oversee the process. 
Such self-sufficient moral and economic faith, with its conscious rejection of externally-
imposed penalties, was strongly characteristic of support for limited liability, and it seems 
therefore important to try and understand the social and chronological scope of its appeal.  
In a 2008 article, Philip Williamson examined the chronology of changing attitudes, 
through an examination of 'State Prayers, Fasts and Thanksgivings'.
46
  He noted that the 
picture of religious concern presented by Hilton and others was 'usually an account of 
decline', and argued for a more nuanced view, with a succession of individuals and event-
triggers (including disease and war, as well as famine) all playing a part.  Amongst the 
variables however, he noted a significant shift in public attitude, represented by a pivotal 
refusal by the then-Home Secretary Lord Palmerston to sanction an 1853 fast-day in 
response to an outbreak of cholera.  Palmerston observed that 'it had pleased Providence 
to place within the power of man the means to check cholera', and, this being so, that 'an 
appeal to Providence to make up for human neglect is not very pious'.  This is the 
response of Hancock and Jerrold's.  Williamson cites sources to support a claim that by 
1853, it was 'increasingly common not just amongst liberal churchmen ... but also in 
serious newspapers'.  Providence and prayer were still invoked but 'operated not within 
material nature but in the moral world'.
47
 
Like changes in law, this can be seen as part of a public shift away from what might be 
termed a more 'radioactive' world, in which situational intuitions were more in evidence, 
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towards overtly self-centred concerns.  The shift was important for limited liability's 
social applicability.  In the early 1850s, with moral emphasis on self-sufficiency more 
socially prevalent, it became markedly commoner to argue for limited liability's use 
across a population.  In such a framework, limited liability could more easily be seen as a 
right, rather than a privilege. 
Such intuitions clearly varied across social groups.  Hilton, focusing on religious circles, 
considered social groups where situational intuitions were relatively prevalent.  Within 
them however, he identified support for limited liability as 'a victory for Unitarian 
perspectives' and it is noticeable how many mid-century advocates were Unitarians.
48
  
Political economist Francis Newman was one, and typical in the connection he made 
between limited liability and social concern.  He dated his own conversion to 
Unitarianism to the example of an older man's demonstration of tolerance and 'tenderness 
of spirit'.
49
  Unitarians consciously rejected the harsh form of divine discipline espoused 
by Evangelicals.  Discipline commonly involves repeated physical reinforcement (as in 
the religious tradition of scourging and less punitive forms of drilling) and in a religious 
context could be physically intuited, and its erosion physically-intuited too - as in the 
draining of power from notions of hell and punishment noted by Hilton.  Unitarians saw 
less need for constant discipline from outside sources, whether from divine prompting or 
other people.  Commercial cultures were similarly receptive to a contracted field of moral 
intuition.  Hilton alluded to this in considering that, 'in adjusting to [a] more serene 
philosophy ... fashionable thought was merely catching up with what political economy 
had long adumbrated'.
50
  One of the Evangelicals whom he quotes regretting widespread 
'disbelief in the existence of retributive justice' in 1849, went on to say, in words not 
quoted, that disbelief was especially widespread 'in regard to social and political 
questions'.
51
 
Turning to how such moral intuitions varied over time, it is important to note that they 
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tended to be validated - and challenged - in times of acknowledged common crisis.  
Several years after the famine, another such time was the mid-1850s Crimean war.  
Edward Cox, conservative editor of the Law Times, in one of his weekly critiques of 
'Joint-Stock Companies Law', urged a tough line then against French-style commercial 
liberalisation: the war threatened otherwise to produce financial as well as bodily 
suffering and 'no man can doubt that it must do so, unless he doubts the existence of a 
Providence, or denies that it is retributive equally with nations as with individuals'. 
52
  
The same internalised sense of physical punishment was being expressed about the same 
time by Christopher Bushell, the prolix wine-merchant who led opposition to limited 
liability in the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce.  He warned that Britain's commercial 
body was about to be 'weakened and dismembered to serve selfishness' by a limited 
liability 'Delilah', that would sap national strength.
53
  He then followed this up with a 
claim that 'the only true standard of 'justice' is the Divine Law'.   
Bushell was speaking in a public forum, and his example is worth considering further for 
the wider light it can cast on prevailing attitudes at mid-century.  His 1854 warning was a 
response to a recently published pamphlet by Charles Buxton, which had concluded with 
the claim that reform would show that 'God, not the devil, gave its laws to the world.'
54
  
Buxton was unusual amongst limited liability advocates in invoking divine support for 
his cause, although not unique.  Leone Levi, an authority on international commercial law 
who prided himself on being 'for years in advance of public opinion' on limited liability, 
could also end a commercial argument with claims for divine endorsement - 
'Righteousness exalteth a nation'.
55
  Statistician George Porter, another advocate of 
limited liability, invoked Providence in a commercial context too, when criticising in 
1851 a lack of faith in future economic progress, for '[imputing] a capital deficiency to 
the intention of Providence, [which] amounts to a practical denial of the power, wisdom, 
and goodness of the Almighty.'
56
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These examples are all notably beneficent - in Williamson's terms, more God as Holy 
Father than stern judge.  They are also relatively rare, and limited liability's advocates did 
not by this point usually rely on claims about Providence or divine endorsement.  
Bushell's opponent answered him by saying that if the unlimited liability Marine 
Insurance Company and Glamorganshire Bank (two well-known recent failures) were 'to 
be held up as Divine institutions', then all he could say was that God had not done well by 
their widows and orphans.
57
 
Other reformists treated divine claims similarly.  A Liverpool Chamber of Commerce 
report in favour of limited liability acknowledged that conservatives were apt to invoke 
the argument, 'very properly premised' on moral grounds, that limited liability 
contravened 'those higher laws which should govern men in their relations to one 
another'.  Its answer was to bring the issue promptly down-to-earth: 'the question resolves 
itself into one of expediency' i.e. whether a creditor could better trust people whose 
ability to pay he knew very little about, or those who had committed to a defined amount.  
Since the answer was clearly the latter, limited liability 'would neither sanction 
immorality ... nor inflict injustice on the creditor'.  Rather, it would leave responsibility 
where it belonged, in 'the conscience of the individual'.
58
  This is the intuitive response of 
Palmerston. 
The same intuitions were in evidence when Robert Lowe included a rare mention of 
Providence in his presentation of two limited liability Bills to parliament in 1856.  The 
endorsement he claimed then was firmly anchored in the individual.  The proposed 
legislation would promote individuals' own vigilance - 'that safeguard which Providence 
intended for them'.
59
  Mill, the most frequently cited public supporter of limited liability, 
was categorically contemptuous of any moralising at all on the basis of 'what is called the 
order of Providence'.
60
  This is perhaps to be expected of a moral philosopher, but there is 
evidence - beyond Mill's own pre-eminent status amongst limited liability's supporters - 
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that it accorded with wider norms for financial topics, and that divine argument did not 
by then necessarily play well in this context in any form.  The anonymous writer who 
noted in 1856 that 'belief in providence is nearly as completely effete among us as belief 
in miracles', saw the extinction already complete in capitalist contexts: 'The idea of 
providence in a counting-room or on 'Change, seems ridiculous and monstrous ... The 
man who would speak of it would be laughed at'.
61
  Limited liability was then being 
championed in the name of a distinctively self-sufficient, overwhelmingly secular form of 
economic and moral belief.  The next step is to look at who was likely to be in sympathy 
with it. 
 
'Free Trade in all its completeness' 
Key to understanding the pattern of public sympathy for limited liability, as it emerged in 
the late-1840s, is the Irish famine, which helped define a generation politically as well as 
morally.  Writing in later years of its effect, the Peelite politician the Duke of Argyll, 
recalled that:   
'When the crash of the potato famine came ... I became a convinced Free Trader.  
But it was in Free Trade in all its completeness that I alone believed ... It seemed 
evident to me that the battle of open competition with the foreigner could not be 
fought unless the skill, capital, and enterprise of our own people had access freely 
to the employment of all these resources.'
62
 
Anthony Howe has noted a similar systematising effect on Gladstone
63
, part of a wider 
formalisation that took place from July 1846, as free trade was adopted by many 
politicians as an article of faith for national guidance.
64
  The systematisation was 
reflected in a new political fault-line, drawn between an association of Whigs (willing to 
contemplate application of free trade principles to land) and Disraeli’s brand of self-
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consciously pragmatic Toryism.  On the liberal side of this line, prominent individuals, in 
Howe's words, 'left behind some of the evangelical caution of the earlier liberal Tory 
generation … rapidly [eroding] the providentialist arguments of the Liberal Tories'.65   
This re-alignment was to be important for mid-century political support for limited 
liability.  As several accounts have noted, support cut across political groups, and could 
include Conservatives, as well as those towards the radical end of the political spectrum.  
There were however, identifiable centres of gravity in the respective camps.  Most of the 
leading Peelites - including Sir James Graham, Edward Cardwell, Gladstone and Peel 
himself - expressed opposition to limited liability, as did a number of older aristocratic 
Whigs, notably Lord John Russell.  Against this, lawyer-MPs and others who gravitated 
towards Palmerston in the mid-1850s, were the most reliably supportive.  Argyll was 
unusual in being a Peelite who supported limited liability - and unusual too in being a 
long-lasting Peelite member of Palmerston's 1855 Cabinet. 
As also noted in the historiography, both sides of limited liability disputes were keen to 
claim free trade's endorsement.  Taylor has examined conservatives' use of free trade 
rhetoric, to counter the claims of reformists, but does not expand upon what prompted 
each group to adopt their respective stances.
66
  Those who claimed free trade's 
applicability to limited liability tended to have a high value for social inclusiveness.  This 
was an intuition reliably triggered by social disturbance in France.  When the 1830 
French revolution sparked English interest in commandite, the classic antithesis between 
capital and labour was first cited in the context of limited liability.  In 1834 the 
Westminster Review warned of the social risks inherent in its exclusive use, and that, 
'[u]ntil ... freedom of action [is] the rule in matters commercial, ... there is no security for 
property.'
67
  
That theme was taken up with renewed interest by financial writers in the late 1840s.  
Free trade orthodoxy held that artificial blocks led to class conflict, and when another 
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French revolution brought a burst of anti-capitalist, socialist rhetoric, the state of English 
partnership law was stigmatised as a classic block.  By favouring those who could stand 
extensive financial risk - or were too incautious to worry about it - unlimited liability, it 
was argued, worked to concentrate capital.  In the interest of social stability, capital must 
flow freely, accessible by all.  The most committed to this cause were the Christian 
Socialists, but a wider, politically-interested audience also engaged with it.  Lord Hobart, 
a clerk at the Board of Trade with an interest in Irish economic affairs, took up limited 
liability and made the same connection as Argyll did between unblocked capital and 
social progress: 
'One great proposition stands out clear and unimpeachable, viz., that pauperism 
and its attendant evils will ... disappear in proportion as capital is productively 
invested ... When "unproductive consumption" [of capital] is denounced as the 
prolific source of national suffering, it is forgotten that, however strong may be 
the desire of the owners of property for its productive investment, their 
opportunities are not always equal to their inclination.'
68
 
A socially-responsible modern state must provide these opportunities.  This argument 
made much play of social sympathy and dynamic capital.  For those, like Hobart, happy 
to project the one onto the other, limited liability was emancipatory, freeing up channels 
of investment and capital-flows.  For those readier to credit discipline, it was 
interventionist, designed to shift behaviour artificially away from tried-and-tested 
practice and the promptings of social ties and competition. 
Competition itself became a bone of contention, in another interpretative split 
acknowledged in the historiography.  In a 1976 review of James Winter's biography of 
Robert Lowe, Hilton took issue with Lowe's claim that unlimited liability was 'the Corn 
Law of the Capitalist', and argued that since limited liability protected investors from the 
consequences of their decisions it - and not unlimited liability - was the protectionist 
option.  Limited liability was 'in fact a retreat from the competitive economic model'.
69
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This needs qualification but has undeniable validity in that some of Lowe's own allies 
acknowledged that limited liability took the edge off competition, and that this might be 
problematic.  One answer was simply to agree that unlimited liability did indeed promote 
competition, but say that everyone had had more than enough of both, and would be 
better off with less.  In 1854, the pro-limited liability Leeds Times argued that: 
'Unlimited competition comes from unlimited liability, and unlimited competition 
is the curse of our social life. There would be less competition, and therefore more 
honesty and soundness, if there were fewer competitors; and there would be fewer 
competitors if there were more associations ... After all, capital and labour is in 
partnership now, and it is a better sort of partnership we want'.
70
 
Others made more of an effort to appropriate competition to their own cause.  Hobart did 
so in an 1853 pamphlet, where he acknowledged that limited liability: 
'may indeed, at first sight, seem to ignore the principle of individual competition 
...  But competition is by no means excluded from the system to which we refer, 
since the various associations may and must … compete with each other; and ... 
under the industrial arrangements which at present prevail, it is not so much the 
operative as the capitalist whom competition stimulates to exertion'.
71
   
Competition was here re-focused on associations rather than individuals, and on mental 
rather than physical exertion.  The result was an inclusive competitive model - the 
competitive model of a league rather than the knock-out cup competition of unlimited 
liability.  It was this socially-inclusive model for competition and capital that took on the 
weight of England's accumulated commercial experience in arguments made for limited 
liability in the late 1840s.  The next step is to look at how it did so. 
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Tackling tradition  
Anyone arguing for wider use of limited liability in the second half of the 1840s faced 
one long-standing, much-recited objection i.e. that the existing system had apparently 
produced exceptional success.  In 1836, John McCulloch argued that limited liability's 
adoption would mean 'the abolition of a law under which the manufactures and 
commerce of the country have grown up to their present unexampled state of 
prosperity'.
72
  Twenty years later, he was still saying the same thing.
73
 
Other factors too tended to make unlimited liability a relatively hard habit to break.  One 
was England's proverbial possession of a 'great reservoir of accumulated capital' - and an 
accompanying argument that there was little need for capital-friendly incentives.
74
  
Historians have endorsed the material grounds for this perception, finding 'remarkably 
little evidence to suggest that British industry ever found it difficult to raise capital.'
75
  
Liability-conservatives pictured the abundant capital as a store of solidity.  At the time he 
was listening to evidence in the 1843 Select Committee, Gladstone was publishing his 
confident view that Britain's 'enormous capital may waste for generations before it sinks 
to the level of equality with that of any other country'.  This being so, he saw no need to 
risk 'sudden and vast extension of credits'.
76
   
Another deterrent to change - rhetorical and structural - was manufacturing, central to 
much British economic discussion.  Britain's manufacturing partnerships had traditionally 
eschewed limited liability, with the result that manufacturing did not do much to help 
limited liability argument before the late 1840s.  Argument that looked to overseas 
example was also readily rationalised by conservatives when identified with France.  
Isaac Cory, a barrister and academic considering the issue in 1839, thought limited 
partnerships might do very well in a country 'where levelling principles have destroyed 
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large fortunes to make what in England would be but a moderate capital'.
77
  Commandite 
was: 
'applicable to a country distressed for capital ... but very inapplicable to a country 
like England, in which capital abounds ... Here, where mercantile houses are in 
the habit of drawing cheques daily to the amount of the whole capital of [French] 
petty joint-stock companies, we smile at these little doings in France, which we 
observe immediately below our eyes, and we let them alone'.
78
  
In the late 1840s, this framework was challenged by a different one, significantly less 
impressed with England's competitive position.  Faced with the body of experience 
routinely cited by conservatives, reformists argued that Britain should let go of the past, 
embrace the excitement of new technology, and recognise that this had inaugurated a 
correspondingly new and dynamic age, deserving of its own dynamic and democratic 
company structures.  As one limited liability enthusiast put it: 'that, in the progressive 
state of the country, new forms and appliances were necessary for the development of its 
resources'.
79
  Identified with the perceived dynamism, intuitively and technically, was the 
joint stock company.  Joint stock had traditionally been seen as appropriate for 
individuals or enterprises in need of help - a relatively soft option, said to be suitable for 
immature communities in need of support.  These connotations had frequently been used 
in argument against limited liability.  An 1824 letter to a newspaper complained that 
chartered companies should be redundant in England, as only useful 'in the infancy of 
commerce, and before Merchants acquired sufficient capital'.
80
  Henry Burgess 
(admittedly not an impartial observer) similarly claimed in 1830 that: 'Joint-stock banks 
are, unequivocally, good institutions in feeble or infantine communities.'
81
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With an infusion of social sympathy and a systematic approach however, these 
connotations could be interpreted more positively.  Writing twenty years after Burgess, 
George Porter saw the 'formation of joint-stock arrangements for the production of sugar' 
fostering energetic self-reliance and mental acuity in Britain’s colonies.82  Combined with 
the effects of steam-powered mechanisation, joint stock could be a recipe for powerful 
social and economic alchemy.  Social concern helped argument for limited liability in the 
context of both commandite and joint stock, but it was the latter that proved politically 
more successful.  Commandite continued to be discussed, and even posited in 
parliamentary Bills, but it laboured under the double disadvantage of too little interest 
from capitalists and too much from lawyers.  Accessible as an idea while partnership and 
France were standard terms of reference, it nevertheless depended largely upon state 
sponsorship (as it had in France and in the US) rather than grass-roots interest.  By 
contrast, limited liability enjoyed both technical and capitalist advantages in a joint stock 
context, with objections tending to focus on its social justification.  The late-1840s saw a 
significant shift in this position, with argument that joint stock, associated with limited 
liability and impressive infrastructure developments, represented the future and should be 
central to Britain’s own future.  The shift from peripheral to central concern, and from 
association with the immature to the dynamically mature, drew momentum from three 
key sources, all infused with social concern and grounded in changes brought by steam-
power.  One was a dynamic conception of capital which gained hold from 1848.  A 
second was the railways, which put argument onto a definitively national basis.  And a 
third was the United States, which - as a self-consciously commercial nation - proved a 
more persuasive incentive to change than France.  Even in the mid-1850s, France could 
still be patronised as having 'of late made great progress [but still] military rather than 
commercial'.
83
  The United States was however, developing extremely rapidly in just 
those areas of manufacturing and infrastructure where Britain was traditionally pre-
eminent.  Drawing on examples from home and abroad, writers argued that structural 
change was overdue. 
Joint stock companies were not only emblematic of modern dynamism but, as Alborn 
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identified, a receptive vehicle for anti-aristocratic moralising.  This could be a powerful 
rhetorical combination, as shown in a Daily News 1850 claim that it was: 
'almost impossible in the present state of society to exaggerate the importance of 
[joint stock] associations.  By their aid England stands out pre-eminent at least 
amongst European nations for the mighty works which, during the last twenty 
years, have been accomplished ... in spite of the most determined opposition.  If it 
had not been for the principle of joint-stock association these results could not 
have been attained; any private individual must have succumbed before that 
powerful opposition of landowners which was able for three successive years to 
defeat the endeavours of the London and Birmingham Railway Company to 
obtain their act of incorporation.'
84
 
This format had the power to eclipse achievements made under unlimited liability 
partnerships.  When, in the early 1850s the Westminster Review again took up the cause 
of limited liability, it observed - without intended irony - that, 
'It seems, indeed, almost marvellous, that commerce should have been 
successfully carried on under a law so discouraging to its prosecution; and still 
more that a nation so hampered should have attained to that material prosperity 
which England has reached.'
85
 
As any limited liability-sceptic, reading that, might have said: how very true.  The 
Westminster writer found the answer to his own conundrum 'in the frequent invasions 
which have been made upon the law.'  These invasions - joint stock companies with 
limited liability - were now credited with definitive national success, demonstrating 'the 
necessity of bending the feudal law to the wants of a later age' and changing it into line 
with them.
86
 
The next chapter looks at how this adjustment in public commercial faith took effect, 
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with joint stock made the centre of a national story.  Understanding its public appeal 
means acknowledging how moral change works.  Haidt maintains that most moral 
reflection carried out by individuals merely reinforces existing intuitions (i.e. changes 
little) but that: 'moral reasons passed between people have a causal force.  Moral 
discussion is a kind of distributed reasoning ... [M]oral judgment is best understood as a 
social process'.
87
 
To effect a shift in attitudes to a moral issue, people had to talk.  This was true of limited 
liability - always a moral issue - as of the broader cultural intuitions already considered.  
Its ability to mobilise 'distributed reasoning' depended upon people finding reasons to talk 
and moralise about capital.  In the second half of the 1840s a succession of such reasons 
transpired.  The most dramatic owed their existence to unpredictable circumstance, the 
subject of the next chapter, but before considering those, we should acknowledge one 
fundamentally important one that had been around for some time.  This was steam-
power. 
 
Steam-power 
Britain's adoption of steam-power was important for limited liability at root because 
steam-power drove mechanisation.  Large-scale mechanisation required large-scale 
capital investment, and the scale of capital focused - and polarised - disputes about 
limited liability.  
The question of the relationship between steam and capital occupied a great deal of 
public attention over the second quarter of the nineteenth century, as acknowledged by 
historians.  In The Machinery Question and the Making of Political Economy, 1815-1848, 
Maxine Berg examined some of the more formal answers found, and identified two 
pivotal moments in their development.
88
  Berg saw capital formation first becoming the 
dominant organising principle of economic theory in the 1830s (supplanting the division 
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of labour), and then a further shift occurring after 1848, as 'political economists and their 
public submitted to the all-powerful discipline of the physical forces apparent in steam'.
89
  
In a move away from a definition of fixed capital as a 'material substance', influential 
theorists built models of sustained dynamism on the legacy of David Ricardo.
90
  Faith in 
mechanisation was here conceptualised as abstract, self-regulating and limitless.  
Circulating capital had a central role to play in feeding and sustaining mechanised 
dynamism. 
Berg's analysis considers political economists who took a self-consciously intellectual 
approach to steam-powered mechanisation, but others have tried to relate cultural change 
to more concrete, experiential inputs.  In a usefully wide-ranging review of what 
economists and anthropologists have made of the historical acceptance of capitalism, 
Jack Goody, like Berg, focuses on steam-driven machinery and distinguishes the 'shift to 
machines, not commerce' as the key means by which a concept of capitalism was 
culturally assimilated in 1850s England, distinct from earlier, more personalised 
references to capitalists.
91
  When discussing the mechanics of acceptance, he cites a 
classic assertion that 'the transition to capitalism occurs when wage labour becomes 
dominant in the economy as a whole'.
92
  This is useful for timing - further reinforcement 
of the mid-century shift to financial reification that others have identified - but does not 
help for the mechanics of limited liability, since those closest to wage-labour, particularly 
in manufacturing, largely failed to value a wider role for limited liability.  As will be 
discussed, steam and capitalism took other routes to limited liability.  
Besides its implications for capital, steam-power also had a powerful cultural effect, in 
focusing attention on invention and its potential to supersede human labour.  Britain's 
industrialisation can thus be seen as a stand-out instance of the sort of social elevation of 
mind identified by Lillard.  Contemporaries were extremely self-conscious about this 
phenomenon, often taken as definitive - Simon Schaffer quotes a Manchester factory-
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guide saying that steam-power gave 'to the present age its peculiar and wonderful 
characteristic, namely the triumph of mind over matter'.
93
  As Schaffer also says, the 
emphasis on mind 'made the problem of workers' intelligence vital in political debate'.
94
  
The stakes involved here could seem very high (even after the violent clashes of the 
1830s had passed) since steam engines held out the prospect of a future world which 
might have very little use for human physical activity, given the dramatic replacement of 
human labour already seen.  As the political economist Richard Jones quantified the 
effect: 
'The force employed in various tasks by steam-engines in England, is estimated to 
be that of six hundred millions of men ... That the existence of capitalists ... has 
practically led to that result, it is impossible to doubt.'
95
  
Some were better-placed than others to cope with such a world - as too to credit 
themselves with meriting recognition and reward in it.  Given the association between 
capital and mental activity made by many professionals, it is not surprising that 
intelligence featured strongly in limited liability disputes.  It was not in itself a point of 
distinction.  All who engaged in discussion accepted the importance of mental activity in 
the industrialised nation that Britain had become.  And it was not possible to have an 
argument when one side thought there was nothing to argue about - liability-
conservatives simply dismissed the idea that limited liability had anything to do with 
mental activity either way.  Supporters of limited liability however, frequently 
emphasised its value, as they took up the cause of circulating capital in a crusading spirit.  
Steam power had changed the nation, and social awareness demanded that manual 
workers be given the opportunity to participate in a thinking, capitalist future.  They 
stressed the 'importance of affording to the artisan every inducement to develope his 
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abilities ... The steam engine being now used to perform so much of the hard labour, full 
scope should be given to the mind and ingenuity of man.'  The state of partnership law 
'crippled' this scope and perpetuated a social gulf.
96
  Company law had failed to move 
forward 'in accordance with the progress of intelligence and time'.
97
 
These arguments were reinforced by an assertion of moral intuition.  The assertion was 
not unselfish - people were voting for a world that accorded with their own social and 
material comfort - but neither was it mere cynical assumption.  Animating it was a belief 
that Britain stood in urgent social need of a new, inclusive financial model that took 
account of the central importance of circulating capital.   
This is displayed in the writings of financial commentators who argued in the late-1840s 
that the capital needed to drive a modern, mechanised nation must be democratised, and 
that limited liability might help achieve that - the subject of the next chapter.  As Saville 
identified, limited liability commonly came in for public examination when crisis 
prompted inquiry.  It was then that moral exchange, of the type identified by Haidt, 
commonly took place.  The second half of the 1840s - acknowledged at the time as a 
period of 'especial notoriety'
98
 - presented a protracted challenge of peculiar severity for 
anyone trying to make moral sense of economic events.  Famine was followed by another 
commercial crisis in late 1847, and then the capital-threatening rhetoric of the 1848 
French revolution.  We should however, begin examination of the challenge with where it 
started, in an unprecedented surge in railway investment. 
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Chapter 5: The late 1840s and the role of the railways 
 
Engine of change 
In the estimation of Shannon, the railways 'won the acceptance of limited liability' in 
England.
1
  Shannon did not however, elaborate on his claim, leaving unanswered the 
question of what their role actually was. 
The railways' role was to establish limited liability, and its attendant values, as a social 
norm.  Railway companies and their investors translated the idea of limited liability into 
familiar reality, and, emblematic of modern progress, fostered debate about a wider 
application.  Railway-development had self-evidently achieved great things, but was 
associated too with huge financial problems, feeding questions as to whether Britain was 
technologically modern but financially and socially outmoded.  The railways provided a 
touchstone for such questioning and intuitions about the answers - as too, a focal point 
round which proponents of limited liability could re-frame the nation’s economic success 
story. 
Like much else in the story of limited liability’s emergence, the association between 
limited liability and railway development dates from 1825.  That year, Parliament began 
authorising railway companies, and railway investors acquired a public profile.  Railway 
investment really took off however, - spectacularly - in the mid-1830s speculative round.  
By 1837, the general investment surge had given way to a contraction, but the continuing 
success of railway companies stood out from late-1830s depression failures.  Joint stock 
banks were still much-discussed but increasingly representative of joint stock companies 
were railway companies. 
These had been associated with limited liability from their inception.  There were at the 
outset few objectors to railway companies being given limited liability status.  This was 
to change later, with some questioning why railway companies had ever needed such a 
privilege in the first place, but the initial granting was straightforward.  As Shannon 
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points out, the question of unfair competition did not arise in a new industry, and the 
appropriation of land, together with the scale of investment involved, pointed to a 
community mandate.
2
  Importantly too, the first railway companies were not seen as 
necessarily monopolistic.  Conceived, literally, as railroads, it was envisaged that they 
would function much as roads already did, with public access granted on payment of a 
toll.  Only when they began operation did the conviction grow that a turnpike model 
would not work, and that railways should have exclusive sway over their own line.  In the 
1820s however, this belief lay in the future, and, launched in a spirit of open competition, 
the railways secured the official blessing of limited liability, to encourage investor 
participation.  The more difficult question is why they should have made it imperative, in 
the opinion of some, to encourage investors into other projects. 
Key was a combination of two attributes: railways' obvious and undeniable scale and 
their association with a distinctive set of forward-looking social values.  According to 
financial journalist David Morier Evans, the railways were responsible for 'one of the 
mightiest moral and social revolutions that ever hallowed the annals of any age'.
3
  In 
1845 Thomas Wilson, a cotton manufacturer who a few years later would begin lobbying 
for limited liability, wrote of railway development that: 
'it accelerates the march of mind, no less than of industry ... It tends to equalise 
conditions, to redress the overbearing ascendancy of great capital and capitalists; 
to raise the humble and the labourer in the social scale.'
4
 
Importantly, these changes were felt to be taking place on a national scale.  Railway 
development was supported by a whole population of ordinary investors, dealing in an 
unprecedented volume of shares.  In 1837, the reality of their and others' capitalist 
activity was recognised in the legal reification of (transferable) shares and approved 
transfer of debt-liability.  Railway investors were not however, taken to be definitive of 
joint stock investment.  Not all joint stock investors were deemed to be making a public 
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contribution, and protection from personal liability was accordingly still ring-fenced 
within officially-approved projects, judged to be in the public interest.  That ring-fencing 
was reflected in the 1844 round of legislation.  The 1844 Railways Regulation Act was 
predicated on the basis that, as Cooke has put it, 'railway companies were one example of 
a class of company which was formed under special parliamentary sanction to carry on an 
undertaking of a special public nature'.
5
  The Joint Stock Companies Act, enacted the 
same year, dealt with another type of joint stock company: commercial companies, which 
operated in the areas identified by Adam Smith as suitable for individual enterprise.  As 
Cooke also says, the pull of partnership was strongly apparent in their conception.
6
  As 
with investors in traditional partnerships, investors in these companies were not protected 
with limited liability. 
When this legislation was followed by a third burst of railway investment however, that 
line came under pressure.  The railways were not the only development to test it, but they 
brought both social sympathy and - crucially - scale into discussions, together with a 
universally-recognised forum for debate.  Through associations with national ambition 
and a body of ordinary investors, they provided the basis for a belief that not just some 
but all capitalists could represent the national interest. 
As joint stock companies - capital-raising vehicles - railway companies could represent 
messages about democratic capital.  The railways were not alone in this - joint stock 
banks carried similar connotations - and neither were they themselves uniformly 
identified with democracy.  They were however, early associated with independence 
from the City and from 'aristocratic' finance.  In 1835 the Circular to Bankers stressed 
that: 
'the Rail-way system advanced and became established in the public confidence 
almost wholly without the assistance of the Stock Exchange.  The support 
afforded to it was derived almost exclusively from the capitalists and men of thrift 
and opulence in the mining and manufacturing districts of the north of England ...  
Taking into account all the railways now in operation … not one-twentieth part of 
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the capital expended upon them was furnished by members of the Stock Exchange 
or Stock-brokers … It is useful to mark the progress of the connection of the 
Stock Exchange with this new system.  Now, if any Rail-way be advertised in 
London we would venture to suggest that applications would flow in from the 
Stock Exchange for at least one-quarter part of the whole number of shares.'
7
 
The moral of this for readers was clear: the City would always be happy to profit in self-
interested fashion from established opportunities, but could not be relied upon to show 
initiative or courage in opening up new areas of enterprise.  For that, Britain must look to 
the sort of thrifty, enterprising spirits which - in Henry Burgess's opinion anyway - were 
more likely to be found in the provinces than in the City.  Whether this thrift-driven 
picture actually bore much relation to the reality of Britain’s capital-accumulation, even 
within the railway industry, was not really the point.  What mattered was that the 
headline assessments had, in the context of railway investment, enough relation to 
perceived reality to carry social credibility and generate public sympathy.  It was this 
public sympathy that legitimised a new financial identity for a mechanised nation, built 
upon a diversified body of ordinary investors.  In the third burst of railway-speculation, 
which took off in 1845, it forced itself on the national consciousness in emphatic fashion. 
 
'Railway-mania' 
Of the three surges of public interest in railway investment which punctuated the second 
quarter of the nineteenth century (in the mid-1820s, 1834-7 and 1845) the third was by 
far the greatest, identified then and since as a 'railway-mania'.  Investor-interest took off 
seven years after the previous spate, beginning in 1844, when an investment boom 
followed a succession of good harvests.  An influx of capital created rising demand for 
shares in existing railway companies, and new companies were floated on the back of the 
rising share prices.  Paul Johnson has quantified the sharp intensification of investor 
interest that occurred the following year: 
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'in the first 10 months of 1845, 1400 companies were proposed, over 800 of 
which were registered in September and October ... Demand was so intense that 
an active market developed in letters of allotment and scrip certificates, which 
required deposits of only a small fraction of the value of the (putative) paid-up 
share'.
8
 
Investment thus came to float on credit.  Some City professionals and journalists, 
observing this, expected the bubble to burst.  When October brought a rise in the Bank 
Rate, it duly did. 
In the fall-out, it was likely that somebody would have to be to blame.  For a substantial 
portion of the press, including specialist railway publications, this was The Times, which 
'came out at a special crisis with a sweeping denunciation of all railway schemes'.
9
  The 
Times itself put the blame elsewhere, but continued to be impugned as the source of 
'nearly all the havoc and ruin which have fallen on the property of the industrious middle 
and lower classes.'
10
 
The 'industrious classes' might themselves have been another target for moralising, since 
railway investors drawn from them had not, as might have been expected, moderated 
their behaviour as share prices rose, but followed each other, sheep-like, into ever higher 
prices.  With hindsight at least, this did not reflect well on their judgment, and could 
temper the sympathy accorded them.  Many however, also saw investors as victims - 
gullible perhaps, but 'innocent mostly as well as unfortunate' and duped by those who 
knew better than they how to manipulate the system.
11
  And, deserving of sympathy or 
not, they were supporting a national enterprise, extending through a network of railways 
and provincial stock exchanges.  In the inquest that followed the 'mania' it became clear 
that investment’s reach now extended throughout the nation and society.  As the Glasgow 
Citizen had put it in June 1845, 'Everybody is in the stocks now... [A]ll have entered the 
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ranks of the great monied interest'.
12
  Litanies of investor-types were common.  For the 
first time, Britain appeared as a nation of investors. 
She was also a nation that talked more about investor-liability than ever before.  A decade 
earlier, pamphleteers had alerted joint stock bank investors to the dangers of personal 
liability, but many more such warnings were published for railway investors.  Public 
discussion had begun before the share-crash, as interest in railway shares mushroomed.  
In December 1844, the Bankers' Magazine reported that:  
'At the present time, when transactions in Railway Shares have become so general 
... we are led to believe that a plain outline of the liabilities incurred by the 
holders of this description of property ... will be both useful and interesting to a 
large proportion of our readers'.
13
 
If readers were still un-enlightened after reading this, they were advised to consult 
Farren's latest publication, The liabilities of Members of existing and future Public 
Companies and Partnerships, one of a number prompted by 'extensive alterations 
effected in the law of joint-stock partnerships by the recent Act, 7 & 8 Vict, cap110'.
14
  
Other recommendations included 'Mr. Wordsworth's very able work on the Law of 
Railways and Joint Stock Companies' and Mr. Alexander Pulling ('barrister-at-law')'s The 
Rules of Law Affecting the Formation of Joint Stock Companies, and the Rights and 
Liabilities of the Promoters and the Shareholders.
15
 
As investor activity increased through 1845, so the advice and publications proliferated.  
Most were produced by lawyers, and often directed at the general reader.  Barrister 
George Lewis's The Liabilities incurred by the projectors, managers and shareholders of 
railways and other joint-stock companies was 'written expressly for non-professional use' 
and quickly ran to several editions.
16
  Another book, by two more barristers, was 
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'intended principally for the use of non-professional persons'.
17
  Lawyers were predicting 
a nasty shock for some of these even before the share-crash.  Lewis warned that 
'not a small number of persons are in the habit of engaging in ... the "Share 
Trade", ... without being sufficiently aware of the responsibilities which attach to 
them ... [M]any of the projects now afloat are but shadows ... The shareholders in 
these Companies will have to stand the day of reckoning, and may then learn, 
what it would be well if they learned beforehand, the responsibilities attaching to 
their position'.
18
 
As one sceptical reviewer warned however, 'Cassandra prophesied without effect'.
19
 
A markedly more optimistic tone was at this point still being taken by the specialist 
railway press, chief site of inquiries and advice.  The doyen of railway publications was 
the Railway Magazine, started in 1836 by John Herapath, and issued weekly from 1839.  
Together with the other main weekly, The Railway Times (which had the largest 
circulation), it dominated comment until 1844, when a rash of other publications joined 
the field.  Both the Railway Magazine and The Railway Times were associated with 
campaigns on behalf of individual railway companies, and their editorial objectivity was 
frequently questioned.  By the mid-1840s however, some publications prided themselves 
on a self-consciously independent stance. 
In the second half of 1845, as share prices continued to rise, railway investor-liability was 
a hot topic in these and other specialist publications.  In August, under the heading 
'Liabilities of Railways Shareholders', the Bankers' Magazine quoted the Railway Times 
as saying that 'We are constantly receiving applications for information as to the 
liabilities of shareholders'.  The Railway Times judged - wrongly, as it turned out - that 
the answers to the queries were 'very simple'.
20
  The following month, the Bankers' 
Magazine published another piece, and in October 'Railway Speculation' was the leading 
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article.  Information on the liability of holders of railway-scrip drew on the professional 
opinion of Mr M.J.H. Shaw, commissioned by the Leeds Mercury on behalf of its 
readers.  On 18 October, The Railway Monitor published an article on the 'Liability of 
Original Subscribers to Railways' in which it said that, judging by letters received, the 
subject was little understood.  The Monitor warned that restrictions on liability, though 
common, might not hold good, and that 'Nothing short of an Act of Parliament can 
restrict the liabilities of partners (as in this case all shareholders are)'.
21
  This was said 
against a background of growing stockmarket jitters.  The same day as the Monitor's 
piece appeared, The Railway Times tried to steady the ship, taking occasion to observe 
that 'alarm is groundless.'
22
  This proved over-optimistic, and a week later, the Monitor's 
leading headline was 'The Crisis in the Share Market'.
23
  Railway share-prices had 
collapsed from their August peak, and, as panic-selling spread, fell still lower.  By the 
end of November, they were down more than 18% from their August high, sinking into a 
trough that was to continue for five years. 
This was the trigger for a flood of queries and articles on the subject of railway 
shareholder liability.  The interest may seem odd, given that railway investors were 
routinely accorded limited liability.  Railway companies had however, first to be set up as 
unincorporated companies, and during that stage their members had unlimited liability 
status.  For most types of company this stage was expected to be of short duration, a 
prelude to registration and incorporation.  Because of their interest in land however, 
railway companies were, like other transportation companies with the same interest, 
subject to an additional Parliamentary authorisation.  The standard two-stage process was 
to register a company provisionally (as an unincorporated company, in which investors 
could register an interest in the form of scrip - the same scrip which constituted an 
actively-traded market in itself in the autumn of 1845) and then apply to Parliament for 
approval.  The provisional registration was not in itself unusual, being the first stage of 
incorporation, but - as now became all too clear - legislators had thereby created an 
opportunity for confusion and contention.  Provisionally-registered, as-yet-
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unincorporated railway companies could draw in capital and incur expenses, but their 
participants' responsibilities, if the company should fail, were far from transparent.  One 
investor guide warned that they might be 'exceedingly onerous.'
24
  In the failures that 
followed railway 'mania', the possibility of personal liability - reasonably remote while 
companies seemed to flourish - suddenly became all too real.  When, post-crash, creditors 
presented unpaid bills to these provisional companies they were confronted with the 
ambiguous status of their directors ('provisional committeemen') and resorted to the law 
to try to hold them accountable.  The result was financial liability debate on an 
unprecedented scale. 
Contention was not at first anticipated.  In one of the first test-cases, in the Court of 
Exchequer, a stationery supplier brought an action against the Irish West Coast railway 
company, and the judge - once again, Edward Alderson - observed,  
'that no possible doubt could exist as to the liability of the [Provisional 
Committeeman] defendant.  He became responsible from the day when he 
consented to act on the provisional committee [and] was liable to all the contracts 
from that day'.
25
 
The railway press were pleased to agree.  The Railway Times thought it self-evident that 
provisional committeemen should be liable for creditors' unpaid bills, the only issue 
being how they were then to partition liability amongst themselves: 
'What can be more just? Tradesmen trust, not the Company which they are to be 
instrumental in calling into life, but the men whose names they see prefixed to it, 
and it would be a little too bad that this confidence should be rendered worthless 
by a legal technicality'.
26
 
The Times took the same line.  The provisions of the 1844 legislation were admittedly 
'confused', and 'to attempt to explain what these various responsibilities may amount to, 
would be for us as hopeless, as it will be for Her Majesty's courts of law and equity an 
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overwhelming task'.
27
  But there could be no doubt that 
'[a]t common law the liability of the promoters of any scheme, mine, or canal, or 
railway, has long been established ... [and] that every man who has signed a 
consent to have his name published on the provisional committee has made 
himself personally liable for every debt contracted by the so-called company.  
Every thinking man knew this long ago.'
28
  
The Railway Times' reference to a legal technicality gives an indication however, that all 
might not prove straightforward in practice.  All the legal advice agreed that, in principle, 
'before [a railway company's] provisional registration, the promoters are solely liable 
[and] after provisional and before complete registration, they continue still liable and 
subscribers [for shares] may [also] become [liable] by acts of interference'.
29
  Promoters' 
liability extended however, only to such expenses as were necessary for a company to 
secure registration, and in this and the definition of subscriber 'interference' (which might 
trigger liability) there was scope for interpretation.  As case followed case, it became 
apparent that a provisional committeeman who could show he had protested at a railway 
company's expenditure might get himself off the hook.  The Railway Times found this - 
and a legal argument that creditors needed to show that committeemen had agreed, as 
individuals, to pledge their credit - ridiculous: 'no man, in point of fact, gives "an actual 
authority to pledge his credit" '.  The authority was to be assumed from committee-
membership, 'and private dissent [had] nothing to do with the question'.
30
  
Creditors, of course, agreed.  'A Tradesman' wrote to The Railway Times at the end of 
1846, after some well-publicised judgments had gone against creditors, to protest against 
the implied grilling of individual committee-members that might have satisfied legal 
argument.
31
  The Times sympathised.
32
  
By now however, it had become clear that creditors might need to show that 
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committeemen had agreed to a personal contract.  In the absence of an incorporated 
company, this could be all the recourse the law afforded them.  After a year of litigation, 
this was confirmed in the view of Sir Frederick Pollock, Lord Chief Baron of the 
Exchequer, 'that there is no proof Provisional Committeemen were associations for the 
participation of profit and loss'.  To which The Railway Times responded that, 'no man 
unconnected with railway and the law' would think any Provisional Committeeman ever 
joined a Committee without profit as a main objective.
33
 
That view was repeated across the railway press.  Herapath's Railway and Commercial 
Journal also thought that 'no uninterested man of common sense and of ordinary natural 
conscience can doubt that Provisional Committeemen ought to be responsible to the 
creditors of the Company', while acknowledging that Mr. Edward Cox's recently-
published pamphlet, Railway Liabilities, took the opposite view.
34
  Cox was not alone.  
The Economist also reviewed his pamphlet, and sympathised with its argument that it was 
not enough for a creditor to show that an individual was a committee-member in order to 
prove a claim against him.  Cox argued that claimants needed to show as well that when 
an individual had become a member, he had intended to take on managing 
responsibilities.  Otherwise, since provisional committeemen were not partners, with 
relationships 'in the nature of a partnership', they could be held responsible only for their 
own contracts.  Attempts to extort money from them were 'villainy' and 'plunder'.  The 
Economist did not go that far, but thought that Cox's arguments 'seem[ed] to bring the 
law back to a question of fact and common-sense', sympathising with a view of 
committeemen as victims, the 'dupes of solicitors and schemers'.
35
 
Cox had another outlet for his views on railway liabilities as editor of the Law Times.  
Over the critical period of March-August 1846, when litigation and press interest was at 
its height, the Law Times monitored key court cases
36
 and noted approvingly the shift in 
focus away from committeemen (many of whom 'merely lent their names in the belief 
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that they were advancing works calculated to be of great public benefit'
37
) to the 
liabilities of share-allottees.  In the 9 May 1846 edition, Cox was pleased to credit 'Mr A 
'Beckett' with being the first to query committeemen's liability.
38
  Thomas Turner à 
Beckett was another lawyer who had gone into print on the subject, admitting that his was 
'not the popular view of the question', but holding his ground.
39
  Other lawyers disagreed 
and thought it '[b]etter that [provisional committeemen] should suffer than honest 
creditors be deprived of remedy'.
40
  Nor was opinion confined to lawyers.  An investment 
guide observed that, 'the only difference between an Allottee and a Provisional 
Committee-man [seems] to consist in making the latter (when not one of the concocters 
of the scheme) the principal victim'.
41
 
Blame was vigorously debated in the press, with railway publications in no doubt that 
creditors were the principal sufferers.  R.W. Kostal has carried out an analysis of railway 
court-cases, from which he too concludes that, '[t]he railway scrip which flooded the 
securities markets in 1845 was paid for, in effect by a multitude of small businessmen.'
42
  
Whether these businessmen were really such innocent victims was robustly contested.  
The Law Times asserted in May 1846, that, 'It is known that some newspapers and some 
newsagents have made out very heavy bills against the committees of different railways 
[of] at least fifty per cent. beyond the regular charges'.  Others even less scrupulous were 
engaging in an 'ingenious scheme of plunder', whereby 'a nefarious bargain [was] made 
between the creditor and his attorney', with the creditor handing the attorney all his debts, 
to collect as he might, in return for an agreed share of profits from litigation based upon 
the debts.
43
 
Provisional committeemen joined in press debate themselves.  One wrote to The Times at 
the beginning of 1847 to protest that his local tradesmen had elected 'a set of directors, 
engineers, solicitors &c' who then generated costs out of all proportion to any necessary 
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for registration.'
44
  Another self-styled 'Victim' committeeman complained that: 
'as for all the talk about poor tradesmen as third parties, that is mere gammon, put 
forth to enlist the support of jurymen ... Tradesmen's accounts form but a petty 
item in the list of enormous bills and charges sued for by attornies and 
surveyors'.
45
 
He and his fellow committeemen had accordingly 'settled all bills but solicitors' '.  Amidst 
claim and counter-claim, many could agree to blame solicitors, generators of their own 
exorbitant fees, and well-placed to exploit the system.  A network of lawyers, scurrying 
about their localities, was popularly held to be the real motor behind the mania.
46
  A letter 
to The Railway Times from a shareholder 'In Several Railway Companies', described 
how: 
'A lawyer takes a map of England in his hand, and sees a space of a few square 
miles without the intersection of a railroad.  He sets off, calls upon two or three of 
the landowners of his neighbourhood, and writes to all his friends and 
acquaintances and invites them to join the Committee.  They of course take plenty 
of shares [and] what can they do sufficiently for him?  Why they present him with 
two or three hundred shares, pay his bills without looking at them, and often give 
him a large sum of money on obtaining their Act.'
47
 
As lawyers came in for public ire, so committeemen began to slip off the hook.  In all 
three of the main classes of action brought in the wake of the crisis, the railway press saw 
the same pattern confirmed.
48
  An initial wave of moral indignation (acting in favour of 
those trying to enforce personal liability) had been followed by legal dispute, and a 
reaction in favour of higher-status individuals.  This was either a victory for clarification 
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of legal principle or - as the railway press would have it - class bias.  Herapath's saw the 
experience of the pivotal year of 1846 in class terms: when financial pressure came, 'the 
Provisional [Committeeman] protested against the notion that he was liable ... ; at the first 
declaration the judges quashed such a defence, - the wealthy man persists against judges 
in their own courts, and, it would seem, at length gains the day'.
49
  Through the disputes 
and ever-more-refined judgments, lawyers repeated the mantra of partnership. 
Few of their pronouncements matched the confident tone of Cox's Law Times.  When 
court cases first started in late 1845, The Law Magazine published a discussion of the 
personal liability of provisional committeemen, from which it concluded equivocally that, 
'although our law does not appear to favour the notion of limited liability in cases 
of this sort, still, in the absence of express contract, the jury should be left to 
decide whether credit was given to the members of the committee personally, or 
to the fund which was to be at their disposal.'
50
 
Guidance became longer rather than clearer in subsequent articles.  The following year, 
with court cases in full flood, the Magazine published a fifty-page article on 'Railway 
Liabilities', which included a review of three publications produced by lawyers for 
professional and lay guidance.  At the end of this lengthy piece, the Magazine took pious 
satisfaction in having 'added our mite to that discussion of the subject, which can only 
make manifest the law, and guide the speculator and practitioner in their thorny and 
troublous path'.
51
  One can only wonder how useful speculators and practitioners found it.  
The following year, reviewing yet another  publication on 'The Law of Partnership, 
Railway and other Joint-Stock Companies', The Law Magazine confirmed that, 'As 
regards railway projects, and joint-stock companies, the law cannot be said to be entirely 
settled'.
52
  That was something of an under-statement.  Faith in the operation of company 
law had been de-stabilised by the sheer scale of litigation.  As The Times asked in April 
1846, surveying the extent of unresolved railway-related court cases, 'Is this a state of 
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things which ought to be?'
53
  Something else had become manifestly obvious too.  As 
another Editorial pointed out, when it came to matters of personal liability, there could be 
'a vast difference between theory and practice'.
54
 
 
System failure 
Railway 'mania' raised awareness of investor liability, through a huge expansion in the 
number of investors; its fall-out raised awareness of the value of investor-protection.  The 
implications for limited liability extended however, beyond general awareness levels and 
beyond the railway industry itself.  One industry which suffered a particularly important 
knock-on effect was banking.  Banking had its own crises, and one of the most obvious 
lessons from reading through banking publications is that debate about personal liability 
ignited whenever a bank failed or when there was a need to encourage investment.  Ten 
years before railway-mania, with joint stock bank investment at an all-time high, these 
had not been common concerns.  When another Select Committee met in 1841 the 
subject of limited liability was hardly raised at all.
55
  A contemporary publication asserted 
proudly that the 'constitution of the joint-stock banks with their unlimited liability and 
their capitals publicly proclaimed, affords all but perfect security'.
56
 
The balance of opinion on these considerations changed decisively in the wake of the 
railway-share crash.  Disparities that had existed before were now felt more acutely.  
Banking industry observers complained that the scale of railway investment had 
fundamentally changed the investment game by sucking in huge amounts of capital.  
Defenders of the status quo might argue that limited liability should be used only 
exceptionally, but when deployed for something as popular as railway investment, how 
exceptional was it?  Actuary James Knight's 1847 review of London banking stressed 
that, with railway companies able to lure investors en masse with limited liability, joint 
stock banks no longer had pools of unemployed private capital that they could draw 
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upon.
57
  Henry Burgess also complained that banks now had to compete on an uneven 
playing-field.
58
  Burgess may have been sceptical about the value of limited liability for 
banking, but he did not approve either of it being made the effective preserve of the 
railways, to the exclusion of other large-scale joint stock companies.  Unprecedentedly 
popular, railway investment had distorted the system - or rather, as was increasingly said, 
made it plain that there was now a new system, for which traditional assumptions could 
no longer apply.  As was observed too in the Circular at the end of 1847, in a review of 
recent bank failures: 'It is when difficulties arise [that] the wits of debtors and persons 
disposed to litigation become sharpened.'
59
   
Bank 'difficulties' were always a highly sensitive issue, but had a particularly emotive 
tinge in the context of joint stock banks.  In the years before railway-mania, when 'calls' 
on shareholders' private assets were rare and words were cheap, it was common to parade 
bank-shareholders' liability as a source of reassurance.  An 1840 guide to joint stock 
banking proudly asserted that 'no establishment could possibly be constituted on 
principles better adapted to secure safety to the public'.
60
  In the fall-out of railway share-
collapse however, as banks passed the effects of a financial squeeze onto their 
shareholders, this position came under pressure. 
Pressure first became apparent in early 1846.  The Bankers' Magazine published an 
article then on 'Liabilities of Joint Stock Bank Shareholders', in which it confessed it had 
not expected, given 'the manner in which the Joint Stock Bank system is now carried on' 
that 'there would be occasion for questions on bank shareholder liabilities'.  'Recent 
failures' - in Leeds, Sheffield and Newcastle-upon-Tyne - had however, 'provided it'.
61
  In 
reply to a reader's query as to the extent of joint stock bank shareholder liability, the  
Magazine confirmed that personal liability continued for three years after sale of shares.  
Two banks were rumoured to be in trouble because of 'an incautious employment of 
money, in advances on railways securities of indifferent character'.
62
  Now that resolve 
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was to be tested, the Magazine had no hesitation in taking a tough line.  If necessary, 
shareholders must pay up, in the interest of wider stability: 
'We trust that other bankers ... will let these stoppages act as a strong incentive for 
them to be prepared to meet the demands upon them, at any sacrifice of present 
interest.  Nothing less will prevent the most serious calamities.'
63
 
By this time, the railway industry was contending with its own versions of this sort of 
problem, with significantly more trouble in securing funds.  Contention was especially 
rife in the area of railway scrip, where even lawyers could not discern clear legal 
principles.  George Lewis's guide to railway investment considered it illegal to issue scrip 
before provisional company-registration or deal in letters of allotment before full 
incorporation, while admitting that railway promoters did both.  Another lawyer 
acknowledged 'much difficulty in the construction of the Joint Stock Act as affecting 
railway companies, and so much doubt with regard to the transfer of scrip, [that it] 
exposes both seller and buyer to much uncertainty, liability, and probable litigation'.
64
  
The Law Magazine thought the Joint Stock Companies Act, and its multiple provisions, 
so badly worded that it was difficult to tell what did or didn't apply to railway 
companies.
65
 
Like provisional committeemen, railway investors who resisted demands for payment 
used the press to make their case.  A scripholder signing himself 'Fair Play' wrote to The 
Times to complain at 'a flagrant case of railway bullying ... a requisition received under a 
threat of legal proceedings'.
66
  The railway press urged  scripholders to stand firm against 
demands.  In August 1846, the Railway Times, discussing a projected meeting of scrip-
holders in Birmingham, gave its opinion that: 
'As the case stands, the Provisional Directors are clearly liable for every shilling 
of the expenses that have been incurred.  The scripholders will no doubt resist the 
audacious attempt to saddle them with payments to lawyers and surveyors, when 
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the law clearly says that the expenses of abortive projects shall be wholly borne 
by the promoters.'
67
 
As promoters persisted with trying to raise funds, so the advice from railway journals 
continued to be to disregard solicitors' letters.   
Meanwhile, banking articles reported continuing 'difficulties' and extrapolated from the 
particular to the general.  In October 1846 a Bankers' Magazine, piece
68
 kicked off a 
year-long debate about bank shareholder liabilities in the Correspondence section.
69
  As 
the Magazine observed: 'The unfortunate position of so many of the projected railways, 
has rendered the law relating to the liabilities of parties connected with them, very 
familiar to a large portion of the mercantile world'.
70
  The wider press made the same 
point.  Articles on liability were printed across the provincial press, from the Aberdeen 
Journal to the Sherborne Mercury, and could include a technical observation on the state 
of partnership law.  In April 1846, the Sheffield and Rotherham Independent commented 
that: 
'The Railway mania has, rather unexpectedly, forced upon the attention of 
Parliament the defective state of the Law of Partnership.  It has often been a 
subject of complaint that, in a commercial country like this ... the Law of 
Partnership should be without system ... Why not grapple with the whole system 
of partnership, and authorise persons to become partners in trade, with limited 
liabilities, similar to the French Law en commandite?'
71
   
Comment to this effect received a further boost when the autumn of 1847 brought another 
of the financial crises which periodically disrupted confidence and economic activity. 
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'Money famine' 
The 1847 financial crisis was presented in press articles as the moment when economic 
distress was brought home to many of the more financially-comfortable in England in 
terms they could feel directly: 
'[S]ome millions of cultivators in the southwest of Ireland [may] be involved, 
literally speaking, in the horrors of famine ... But ... the thing which the [British] 
commercial classes certainly did not expect is this: - The calamity has now 
reached themselves ... [M]onied distress [was] never more severe.'
72
 
Real famine had been followed by what the press termed 'money famine'.
73
  This was 
swiftly followed in turn by heated debate amongst financial professionals about what had 
caused it. 
A large part of this discussion was uncontroversial.  Everyone agreed in attributing the 
crisis in some form to the effect of two poor harvests, compounded by railways' financial 
pressures.  Less clear was why grain purchases and railway 'calls' for capital had 
produced such strains in the money market.  In the firing line were the Bank of England 
and Robert Peel's 1844 Bank Charter Act, which required the Bank to issue only notes 
covered by bullion.  Money-market difficulties had first surfaced in April 1847, with a 
sudden reversal of Bank of England discount policy.  These had dissipated relatively 
quickly but continuing high interest rates prompted a merchants' petition against the Bank 
Charter Act in June.  Money-market pressures then erupted into a much worse crisis in 
October, with a catastrophic credit-crunch and the failure of many merchants, particularly 
those dealing in corn.  Problems emerged with the bill system used by merchants to 
finance their domestic trading and (through London's Royal Exchange) dealings with 
overseas markets.  The usual practice was to take a bill, which might be for a payment 
due - say - three months hence, to a bank or other financial institution and raise cash 
against it, at a discounted rate.  In the October crisis this system was squeezed.  
Merchants who presented bills in the usual way found them refused, and those who 
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needed to raise cash found themselves in trouble.  The credit-squeeze thus set businesses 
against the financial interest - a framing that proved important.  Public meetings asked 
why monetary policy could not be 'elastic [enough] to admit of the Bank [of England] 
replacing for a time the amount we had been obliged to pay for corn?'.  Why should 'the 
whole interests of this country [be mortgaged] to the foreign trade by tying us down to 
the exchanges'? so that 'first the population must starve, and then the commercial interest 
be ruined!'.
74
 
As the government of Lord John Russell sought to stem fears and restore confidence, the 
financial press were on their mettle to account for what had gone wrong, and how to 
rectify it.  The Economist's response was to publish a stream of lectures on the 
importance of recognising the difference between fixed and floating capital.  This was a 
favourite hobby-horse, already much ridden in the context of railway investment.  In 
characteristically deductive style, the paper reported that: 
'the great and important reflection which arises out of these [business] failures ... 
is, that they give rise to a just suspicion that some essentially unsound principle 
rankles at the root of our commerce ... Does commerce, in its pure and legitimate 
course, necessarily involve such imminent risks and hazards?'
75
 
The Economist's answer, reassuring or otherwise, was that it did not.  Errors could have 
been avoided.  At the heart of the problem was floating capital, and merchants' failure to 
manage it properly - an interpretation not calculated to endear itself to merchants.  They 
had failed to appreciate the importance of convertibility of capital, and dealt in illiquid 
commodities whose value could not be realised under pressure.  The Economist 
illustrated the point with lists of what they should or should not have agreed to deal in.  
Also printed, over several pages, was a longer and sorrier list of those that had failed in 
the crisis.  Prepared by the Bankers' Magazine, it included names of well-known 
businesses, assumed until recently to be safe.  The Economist appeared sympathetic to the 
role played in this latest crisis by money-men - banking had learned in 1825 the 
overriding importance of floating capital.  The issue now was that 'what was done for 
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banking by the panic of 1825 remains to be done for commerce in 1847'.
76
  Merchants 
still had lessons to learn. 
Others saw things differently.  The Times was happy to focus on the immediate priority of 
blaming the Bank of England, responsible for the 'jerks by which ... the whole frame-
work of our commercial system is every now and then entirely dislocated', but thought 
there were also deeper-seated problems.  Something was wrong when well-placed 
railway-capitalists 'Mr. Glyn, Mr. Hope Johnstone and Mr. Hudson' could continue 
making huge demands on Britain's pool of floating capital, while 'mercantile firms with 
securities in their hands find a difficulty in obtaining, for any period, or at any rate, a few 
comparatively small amounts'.
77
  The Circular to Bankers had been making this point 
since April.  Burgess thought Glyn's actions then, 
'singularly characteristic and illustrative of the present times ... Here is ... one of 
our principal City bankers, treating a contemplated additional outlay of eight-and-
a-half millions sterling ... as so insignificant an affair that he will not recommend 
an abatement of one hair's breadth of his grasp, at a time when the Bank of 
England could not discharge her ordinary duty of paying the government's 
dividends, without borrowing money to pay them ...We are astonished to see the 
nonchalance with which Mr. Glyn treats the difficulties of the Bank Directors - 
difficulties which he and other Railway magnates have in part contributed to 
produce.'
78
 
The Circular had been predicting disaster from the combined effect of railway demands 
and Peel's 1844 Act since October 1845: 
'To our minds this Railway speculation, in its extended and extreme 
manifestation, is fraught with infinite and altogether incalculable mischief ... This 
brings us to the astounding exhibition of giving encouragement to such a system 
immediately after placing the currency of the country in fetters ... The catastrophe 
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may fall principally on Railway speculators, but it will not be limited wholly to 
that class'.
79
 
'Fetters' meant the Bank Charter Act, and when the predicted catastrophe materialised, 
the worst of Burgess's ire fell upon 'Mr. Samuel Jones Loyd', eminence grise behind the 
Act.  Burgess accused Loyd of hijacking parliamentary process through Bank of England 
Director George Norman and Chancellor of the Exchequer Sir Charles Wood.
80
  The 
effect of the Bank Charter Act had been to wreck mercantile bills, while enriching Jones 
Loyd & Co, bankers.  Blame was to be laid at the door of two men, Loyd and Peel, whose 
personal fortunes had been made by their fathers on the back of just the merchant bills 
now undermined.
81
  Burgess saw the current crisis as the culmination of 37 years' 
theorising by 'vain, clever, self-confident' men (of whom James Wilson at The Economist 
was merely the latest) who found 'ignorant statesmen' easy prey.  Its lesson must be that 
free trade and tight monetary policy did not mix.  His end-of-year verdict on 'the 
convulsion of 1847' was that 'now for the first time men have lost confidence in the 
power and use of credit'.
82
 
The 1847 financial crisis thus brought open criticism of the power wielded by large 
capitalists.  Others besides Burgess saw self-interest in 'the obstinate retention of a 
contracted currency'.  'It is for the interest of capitalists to lower the price of everything 
except money, and render it as dear as possible'.
83
  The very wealthiest, with resources to 
withstand the squeeze, were doing well from the crisis: '[t]he large fish are swallowing 
the smaller with a vengeance.  Seldom have the usurers reaped a richer harvest, and their 
laudations of Peel rise in proportion to the extent of plunder they are accumulating.'
84
  
Also aired was a notion that their influence might be offset by widespread availability of 
limited liability.  This association had a long genesis.  In 1834 the Westminster Review 
had told readers that England's partnership law favoured 'the large and skilful capitalists, 
who being able to command an extensive market, can work with less profits'.  The tone 
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was then however, quite temperate: 
'These men thrive and justly ... If under the present system all the advantage is 
with the great capitalist, then, without quarrelling with him ... the smaller 
capitalist must exert himself by such means as are in his power, to lessen the 
difference of advantage ... and the most direct way of doing that, is to join with 
others'.
85
 
Now there were accusations that large capitalists were thriving far from justly, with 
limited liability brought into the picture by some.  This was not a common concern or 
priority.  There was for example hardly any mention of limited liability in the exhaustive 
parliamentary discussion of the crisis.  The only participant to make an unequivocal 
connection with lack of limited liability was Durham manufacturer, the Quaker and 
former MP Joseph Pease.  Pease saw dangers in an over-concentrated financial system, 
exacerbated by the obstacles put in the way of joint stock banks: 
 
'I do not believe that that you could at present get any persons of capital in the 
county of Durham, to enter a joint-stock bank at any price ... and the reason for 
that is, that the indefinite liability of all parties who enter joint-stock banks 
entirely prevents a man of capital from joining them.  I want to see greater 
facilities of banking.  I do not mean cheap banking ... but I want facilities of 
banking with a limited responsibility'.
86
 
 
Pease was 'very much afraid of centralization in this country going too far', and wished to 
see 'capital and currency [made] easy'.
87
 
 
That sentiment was echoed in specialist financial publications.  A link between de-
centralisation of financial power and limited liability was not common even there, but 
some did make a connection.  Prominent amongst them were merchants and writers who 
prided themselves on international awareness.  Thomas Wilson was a Haarlem-based 
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British cotton-manufacturer who now took a distinctly confrontational stance on large 
capitalists.  In 1848 he published his views - anonymously at this point - under a title 
which highlighted the potential contribution of commandite to addressing the problem.
88
  
Like Burgess, he singled out the role in successive crises played by money-men, such as 
Jones, Loyd and Co.  Little had been learned through the crises of 1825, 1835 and now 
1847, so that, 'The old system continues unchanged to this day, with the same effect - 
failures and ruin'.
89
  Like Burgess too, Wilson had no great opinion of The Economist or 
its editor, whom he thought fixated with the notion that railways converted floating into 
fixed capital.  Wilson blamed not merchants but discount-brokers and pressures on the 
'Bill System' used for trading with remote markets.  The financial system itself was at 
fault.  England was afflicted by '[a]n overpowering money-aristocracy, with banks which 
foster the bill and credit system ... leading to commercial difficulties which constantly 
derange the whole system of business'.
90
  The problem was a  
 
'Monopoly, among a few, of the available capital of the country, employed in 
business ... This [capital] has been moved, from time to time, for the benefit of 
individuals, banks and speculators - with the result, almost inevitably to the 
detriment of the public of large, and to fair trade ... [In the credit crisis] the 
monopoly-houses engrossed an enormous and undue share of business'.
91
 
 
Wilson thought the British government should have seen this problem coming - a Select 
Committee had first identified an issue in 1833, and American credit-crises of the late 
1830s (when American rather than British businesses had failed) given due warning of 
what might happen when huge amounts of capital were controlled by 'a few [who] would 
fain monopolise everything'.
92
  A better approach was limited companies, whose capital 
was 'not to be called in at a moment's notice, to the derangement of operations on which 
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it might be employed'.
93
  Productive deployment of capital was now crucial to regional 
destinies.  England was '[p]lethoric in her wealth' and - careless of how capital was 
directed - could not have built a financial system less calculated to help the Irish if she 
had 'framed [a law] for the express purpose of preventing the improvement of Ireland'.
94
  
(Wilson ignored the Irish Anonymous Partnerships Act.)  What was needed was 
partnership reform and a 'safer and steadier and honester system of business.'
95
 
Wilson made an effort to promulgate his message amongst the influential.  He sent a copy 
of his book to Peel (which, judging from its still near-pristine state in the Senate House 
collection, Peel did not read) and to Disraeli
96
, and later submitted another to the 1850 
Select Committee on Investments.  He had more obvious success with newspaper editors, 
some of whom reproduced lengthy excerpts from his work.  Welcomed as an exposé of 
the technicalities behind the crisis, it struck a chord in mid-1848.  The Manchester 
Courier called Partnership en commandite an 'extraordinary book ... because it discards 
altogether the modern rule of expediency and tells the truth'
97
, while The Morning Post 
recommended that it be 'read by commercial, and still more by parliamentary men.'
98
  
Jerrold's Weekly Newspaper gave Wilson's book a glowing review and kept it to hand to 
reinforce subsequent argument.
99
  The Glasgow Herald likewise considered that 'we do 
not often fall in with books so full of interesting matter' and recommended it for 'attentive 
and careful perusal by merchants and political economists'.  This because 'at the present 
time there are no subjects which deserve, or which have more thought directed towards 
them'.
100
 
Another who looked at Britain's financial system as an outsider, the American economist 
Henry Carey, took a similar view to Wilson.  His opinions on England's financial crises 
were also published in England in 1848.  Most people were, he said, 
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'ignorant of the cause of difficulty; and unaware it was to the perpetual error of 
English [financial] policy ... All facility for local investment has been denied and 
capital has been forced ... into great towns and cities filled with starving 
operatives living in filthy cellars ... To add to the stagnation and centralization 
thus produced, the habit of local union among the little communities throughout 
the kingdom is as far as possible restrained by law, for the benefit of larger unions 
in the metropolis; and for that of the larger capitalists, bankers and manufacturers, 
there and in the principal towns.  Centralization is the rule'.
101
 
The answer was diffusion through free trade in capital: 
'Freedom of trade, whether in money or in cotton, goes hand in hand with 
civilization.  The bank restriction acts are a step, and a serious one, towards 
barbarism ... They tend to prevent the local application of capital, and to force it 
into London, to be driven abroad: when, if used at home, it would yield twice the 
return.  They are not in keeping with the time'.
102
  
Henry Burgess read the same anti-centralization moral into the crisis: 
'The whole of Sir Robert Peel's measures have tended to drive capital to the head 
and heart of the system, where it cannot be absorbed and again thrown off into 
wholesome circulation for the support of enterprise, industry, and trade.'
103
 
Like Carey too, Burgess considered this carried a social threat.  Frustrated workers were 
likely to ask 'why should there be a want of employment in a country where capital 
increases faster than population?'  Disturbances in 'the vital organ of circulation' had a 
dangerous effect on labourers.
104
 
At the heart of this socially-unhealthy system was the Bank of England - not a new target 
of blame.  In the previous cycle of boom and bust, ten years before, it was also blamed as 
'the creator of mercantile panic [and] the stimulator to wild and foolish and unprofitable 
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speculation.'
105
  In the wake of 1847 Carey banged this drum with force, and blamed the 
Bank for years of 'extraordinary fluctuations in the supply of money'.
106
  British 
governments had found one excuse after another for the successive crises of the past 30 
years.  Every reason, in fact, but the right one viz., that: '[t]he trade in money requires no 
more law than that of shoes.  It requires, on the contrary, perfect freedom'.
107
  The British 
were still in thrall to unlimited liability ('solidarité'), the mark of involuntary association 
and serfdom.  Ignoring commandite, Carey saw the French as even worse off in this 
respect.  Britain and France were the world's 'meddlers', exporting the consequences of 
their own flawed social and financial systems round the world.
108
  
Carey's arguments were taken up by John Stuart Mill, who quoted them in Principles of 
Political Economy, also published in 1848, where he argued that partnership reform and 
limited liability were necessary counters to financial polarisation: 'It is only by 
combining, that the small means of many can be on anything like an equality of 
advantage with the great fortunes of a few.'
109
  In Principles of Political Economy, Mill 
provided the key text for proponents of limited liability, who would quote from it again 
and again in speeches of the early 1850s.  Carey also went into particular detail on 
English unlimited liability joint stock banks, and how poorly they compared with the best 
of American banks.
110
  Along with Mill, 'Mr. Carey's' views on New England banking 
practices were to be quoted a few years later by participants in limited liability debates.
111
 
Other writers too now questioned concentrated power over capital and made a connection 
with limited liability.  The political theorist and journalist Thomas Hodgskin, a staff  
writer on The Economist, reviewed Carey's book in October 1848 and found it full of 
'valuable information, all tending to support that perfect freedom of industry, which is 
one of the general demands of the age'.
112
  Shortly afterwards, he was asked to review 
another book by an American economist, equally exercised at capital's concentration in a 
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few hands.  Edward Kellogg had been prompted by the 1837 American financial crisis to 
consider how capital-flows might be better managed, in the public interest.  Hodgskin 
rejected his suggestion of capped interest rates and looked to: 
'[t]he gradual progress of society, by which capital and labour seem more and 
more to become united in the same hands ... All the schemes that have been 
suggested in France and England for more equally distributing, by some kind of 
partnership en commandite, the produce of combined exertions, have for their 
object to lessen - and will in effect lessen - the evils that are complained of [in 
accumulation of capital in a few hands]'.
113
   
Hodgskin agreed with Kellogg that concentration of capital was likely to be a greater 
problem in the US than in the 'old societies' of Europe, where the urge to convert wealth 
into land and adopt 'aristocratic manners' had the effect of capping capitalist fortunes.  
Within a few years however, just the reverse perception was being widely aired in the 
British press.  Journalists and other writers argued that the US had democratised capital, 
while Britain persisted with socially-dangerous polarisation.  The 1847 crisis was readily 
framed as one in which great capitalists profited at the expense of others.  In its fall-out, 
limited liability had found some very useful social targets. 
 
Sea-change 
The financial pressure, court-cases and public debate of the second half of the 1840s 
made it hard to claim that investor 'calls' for capital were a largely theoretical concern, 
unlikely to materialise in practice.  A grandly dismissive assertion that 'we may treat any 
apprehension of a liability involving the whole body of shareholders to any considerable 
extent beyond the paid-up capital as perfectly chimerical' clearly pre-dated late-1840s 
stresses.
114
  At the same time, it had become obvious that payments might be hard to 
secure in practice - a combination that promised uncertainty and the worst of both worlds.  
In 1840, a supporter of unlimited liability could dismiss the 'doctrine' that nominal capital 
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might in practice prove 'a nonentity'.
115
  Ten years later, the 'nonentity' boot was likely to 
be on the other foot.  An investment guide now warned that 'in case [a large company] 
should have to fall back upon their shareholders' assistance, they would probably find 
that the great inducements held out to the public, by a large and guaranteed capital, were 
merely nominal'.
116
  And, as would be pointed out at a parliamentary Select Committee a 
few years later, a failed attempt to secure payment was in any case 'a kind of indirect 
limited liability'.
117
  Lawyers were more conscious of this than most, and legal 
publications of this period show preoccupation with the inadequacies of the Winding-up 
Acts.  If liability was not routinely enforceable, then investors were suffering uncertainty 
for no advantage.  
There was also a shift in press attitudes.  Press campaigns for limited liability would 
really take off in earnest from mid-1853, but it was in the fall-out of railway-mania that 
the press cut their teeth on the issues involved.  One particularly intense debate centred 
on The Times. 
Three men took a prominent role in this.  Frederick Spackman was the economic 
statistician whose estimate of the millions of pounds supposedly on call in railway 
companies had first been published in The Times on 17 October 1845, and was widely 
blamed for precipitating a share crisis.  Spackman, unrepentant, repeated his calls for 
solid financial quantification in his own publication
118
 and further Times articles.  He 
accused railway companies of being complicit in their own financial problems, in the 
practices John Duncan had stigmatised before Gladstone's 1843 Committee.  Finding it 
easier to suck in more new money than deliver unpalatable messages, the companies had 
failed to deal straightforwardly with investors and 'call on the shareholders to discharge 
their obligations' upfront.
119
  The results were now clear to see. 
Two other men echoed these sentiments, and led a marked change in the editorial 
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position of The Times on limited liability.  The year before railway 'mania' broke out, the 
paper was still holding firmly to its traditional line. Talk of joint stock banks perhaps 
being granted limited liability was:  
'a very startling proposition to the sound city men, who all along have clung to the 
opinion, that there can be no protection to the public from mismanagement by 
banks, unless the responsibility of the shareholders is without limit'.
120
 
A few years later, there had been a decided change of tune.  This is almost certainly 
attributable in large part to the departure of Thomas Alsager, a known conservative on 
joint stock companies, who was replaced as City Correspondent by Marmaduke Blake 
Sampson in the autumn of 1846.  Sampson emerged from this period as a supporter of 
limited liability, and later attributed the 1847 crisis to individuals made careless by 
unlimited liability, 'secure that they can ultimately fall upon the unhappy shareholders' 
and call up more capital.
121
  Alsager's departure also meant a freer hand for editor John 
Delane, who had had to share editorial responsibilities with him.  By 1848, there had 
been a complete about-turn on limited liability.
122
  Discussing a 'memorial' that called for 
its use in joint stock banks, The Times acknowledged that: 'Practical experience ... 
certainly seems to show that the establishments founded on the system of limited liability 
have on the whole been conducted with far more safety than the others'.
123
  Although the 
question of its use for banks was 'of too great magnitude' to come to any 'hastily formed' 
opinion, the paper admitted that 'late joint stock failures in England, India and elsewhere' 
had led to a 'rapid deterioration in the description of people who are now willing to hold 
shares in a bank of any kind to which unlimited liability may attach'.  Some 'remedy' was 
now needed, if unlimited liability was not to be a 'snare'.
124
 
A sea-change can also be seen elsewhere, notably in attitudes to parades of wealthy 
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individuals' names.  Spackman considered it 'very doubtful whether the public ever 
attached much, if any importance' to the strings of names listed in railway prospectuses, 
but, whatever they might have thought privately, they were now much less inclined to put 
up with the parades in public.
125
  By early 1847, it was evident that, in the absence of 
legal enforcement, provisional committeemen were likely to leave creditors unpaid.  And 
if 'names' were not putting themselves on the line in any real sense, then what were they 
but a 'sort of decoy-duck'?
126
 
That phrase became a stock expression in accounts of railway committeemen's debt-
repudiation.  Some names had been used without permission, and others fabricated, but in 
the popular estimation many 'decoys' had simply been greedy.  A letter to The Times 
argued that: 
'if a man from avarice, or facility, or from whatever other motive, allows himself 
to be used as a decoy-duck, it seems only just that he should be held fast in the 
trap into which he has been the means of inveigling others'.
127
 
Politicians also talked of provisional committeemen as 'decoys presented to the public'.  
One parliamentary discussion highlighted a railway prospectus's naming of 172 
provisional committeemen - '172 decoys in all'.
128
 
A shift in attitudes was occurring too in banking.  In January 1848, shareholders of the 
troubled North of England Joint Stock Bank met to discuss creditors' demands, and 
resolved, 'to the utmost of their power, [to] aid the directors in raising the sum requisite to 
meet the pressing demands upon the bank'.
129
  The shareholders knew what was expected 
of them, and were apparently ready to act accordingly.  Sympathy for bank shareholders' 
plight had however, been growing, under the reality of payments.  Later that year, the 
Bankers' Magazine admitted that 'opinion is daily becoming stronger, that the present 
unlimited responsibility of the shareholders of these banks is the means of inflicting a 
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serious injustice upon a considerable portion of the public.'
130
  A high-sounding principle 
had now to be balanced against investor-caution, and a growing belief that the banking 
arrangements of some northern towns was being compromised.  In Newcastle, 'the 
uncertain liability incurred by the ... shareholders [in a succession of Joint Stock banks 
that have failed] has effectually prevented all attempts at present to establish another 
bank with a respectable proprietary.'
131
  Local banker John Coulson had already noted, 
the year before, 'the inadequacy of the banking capital of the two Counties of 
Northumberland and Durham' and hoped that legislators might consider encouraging 
bank-investment with commandite.
132
  Like Henry Burgess, he believed railways' use of 
limited liability had distorted capital flows, and undermined banks' attractiveness as an 
investment: with railways granted limited liability and banks denied it, 'the distribution is 
not regular'.  Coulson hoped that a 'want so manifest, so prospectively beneficial to all, 
will not remain longer unsatisfied'.
133
  
It was against this background that Newcastle MP Thomas Headlam brought his motion 
for a Bill 'to render lawful the formation of incorporated joint-stock banks, based upon 
the principle of a limited liability of the shareholders' before the House of Commons in 
May 1849.  Headlam was a barrister committee-member of London's Law Amendment 
Society, and in November 1848 supported a motion there for a committee 'to consider the 
Law of Partnership, more especially with reference to the liability of Partners in Joint-
Stock Banks and other undertakings'.
134
  When he took the resultant recommendation of 
limited liability to Parliament, he argued that the 'retributive justice' of unlimited liability 
had been 'forced upon the Government against its own views by the Bank of England 
stipulating for its own interests'.
135
  He also stressed that times had changed.  When joint 
stock banks had first been introduced, 'men were sanguine of their success, as they 
usually are of new commercial experiences [and] [t]he extent of the liability was grossly 
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misrepresented; and it is only by degrees that experience is forcing upon the minds of 
men an accurate knowledge of what that liability really is'.
136
 
Headlam's motion was opposed by the government, and by Liverpool ship-owner 
William Brown, one of the greatest of great capitalists.  As Chairman of the Bank of 
Liverpool, Brown had attracted criticism in the aftermath of Althorp's 1834 tussle with 
private bankers, accused of trying to stifle competition.
137
  Now however, he had 
parliamentary opinion on his side.  Limited liability was always a tricky political topic, 
and - with the notable exception of 1825 - politicians never showed much appetite for 
starting on it with banks.  Brown needed to do little more than invoke the American 
chartered banks that had failed in recent memory.  Edward Cardwell joined in, arguing 
that 'if there were one business in which, more than another, they should abstain from 
giving a limited liability ... it was the business of banking'.
138
  Chancellor of the 
Exchequer Charles Wood rationalised Headlam's request as a peculiarity of Newcastle, 
'where this notion of limited liability had taken hold of the public mind'.  Headlam, as a 
Newcastle MP, was following in the footsteps of Joplin and his fellow Newcastle 
merchants.  From no other part of the country, said Wood, had he received a 'single 
representation in favour of the principle of limited liability'.
139
  Headlam's proposal was 
soon withdrawn. 
The Bankers' Magazine reported that it had excited little parliamentary debate, and that 
'[its] fate was known to be settled before it was discussed'.
140
  If politicians' doors 
remained closed however, opinion was changing amongst bankers themselves.  The 
Bankers' Magazine believed that the only reason reform was now not more 'urgently 
pressed' was because deeds of settlement had proven largely successful in providing 
investor protection.
141
  In the face of domestic pressures and some high-profile bank 
failures in India, the Magazine now acknowledged that unlimited liability might be 'in a 
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high degree illusory to the creditors, and not involve the advantage it imports'.
142
  This 
was an important shift, even if - in the absence of further crisis - 'at present we think the 
law may safely be left as it is'.
143
 
Limited liability was also the subject of debate by shipping companies, in another version 
of the complaints about railway-finance made by Burgess and Coulson.  From 1848, the 
Steam Shipowners' Association logged the 'attempts, on the part of railway companies, to 
obtain powers enabling them to become ship-owners'  and called for 'constant vigilance' 
in combating it.  If rail companies' expansion proposals were once allowed to gain a hold, 
they would 'of necessity extinguish competition'.  This, because 
'neither shipping companies, nor individuals, liable as they are to the entire extent 
of their fortunes, and possessed too of comparatively small capital, could possibly 
contend successfully with a railway company, backed by its large resources [and] 
protected by its limited liability.'
144
 
The ship-owners successfully defeated limited liability clauses in parliamentary Bills 
brought in the late 1840s by the Eastern Counties, Norfolk and Lowestoft railway 
companies.  A Bill from the Chester and Holyhead provided a stiffer challenge however, 
when it passed a Second Reading in the Commons.  This company claimed, by virtue of 
its connection with traffic to Ireland, to be a special case, but for the shipping interest this 
was the thin-end-of-the-wedge: 'the privilege once conceded to a single railway company, 
would soon be claimed and obtained by all'.  They quoted President of the Board of Trade 
Henry Labouchere saying more or less this in another context, and warned that railway 
companies were only biding their time before raising their charges and exploiting the 
public at will.
145
  Railways were inherently monopolistic.  The Chester and Holyhead Bill 
was eventually defeated by 'a very active opposition', backed by financial support from 
the General Steam Navigation and Dublin Steam Packet Companies.  Further railway 
company Bills and agitation continued through 1849, but by 1850 the issue had subsided.  
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Within two years however, it would re-surface with a vengeance.  
 
Social unrest and legacy of railway 'mania' 
One further impact of railway 'mania', significant for limited liability, was crystallisation 
of investor sympathy.  This fed off a perception that it was a mass of ordinary people who 
had lost out.  As Thomas Wilson pointed out in his 1848 recommendation of Partnership 
en commandite, the perception was factually verifiable, as - in contrast to earlier crises - 
there were now Blue Book public records to show who had invested in railway shares.  
These confirmed that more than two-thirds of investors were from 'the middle ranks of 
life ... professional men, naval and military men, small manufacturers, shopkeepers, 
clerks, tradesmen, engineers, schoolmasters, clergymen, annuitants, pensioners, placemen 
[or] their widows, daughters, or sisters'.  'These', Wilson said 'and not the great 
commercial men, risked money in such speculations.'  They were the people whose 
property - 'the bulk of the available property of the country' - had been '[s]educed by the 
names of parties of known standing, wealth and ability, advertised as the Directors of 
[railway] projects'.
146
  These were the people the system had failed. 
Suspicions that they had been manipulated by self-interested financial professionals fed 
calls for greater transparency in capital's treatment.  Capital might be plentiful in 
England, but if it was misappropriated, misdirected or simply too static it was not 
fulfilling its proper economic or social function.  To be socially useful, capital must flow, 
unimpeded, through every part of society.  Failure to ensure this could threaten social as 
well as financial stability. 
That argument gained further momentum from the revolution that broke out in France in 
early 1848, widely interpreted in the British press as 'a revolt of labour against capital'.  
Blackwood's Magazine saw in it 'the rise of the communist and socialist party, whose 
abomination is capital, whose idol is labour'.
147
  If politicians did not want similar 
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inflammatory sentiments to take hold in England they should take steps to involve 
workers in a capitalist future.  In the sort of watery metaphor that became common, 
Jerrold's Weekly Newspaper argued that the many 'must conquer not by destroying 
capital, but by sending it in fertilising streams through the greatest mass of the people'.
148
 
Limited liability would promote capital-flows. 
Such argument commonly invoked free trade, although not all advocates of limited 
liability were enthusiasts.  Wilson and John Byles, barrister-author of the successful 
Sophisms of Free Trade, were two committed advocates of limited liability but neither 
had time for free trade rhetoric.  Wilson saw it as deluded cant, periodically invented by 
economically-dominant countries to suit their own ends.  This did not stop him however, 
from thinking capital-blockages a threat to social stability: '[as] the middle classes, from 
being unable to obtain reasonable interest for their money, run into mad speculations ... 
[they] lose ... the honest feeling which once so particularly distinguished them.'
149
  And 
the effect on workers was likely to be worse: blockages in investment and wage-
circulation threatened employment, and 'out-of-work men are easily influenced by clap-
trap speeches and writings.  Can you be surprised that, when the soil is thus ready, the 
seed of Revolution should so quickly and so strongly take root?'.
150
 
Wilson had seen revolution for himself in continental Europe, but others did not need that 
personal experience to urge action, and make a connection with limited liability.
151
  An 
article in the Law Review, published by London's Law Amendment Society, reviewed 
and endorsed Wilson's Partnership en Commandite in this light.  Reform was  
'peculiarly necessary at this time ... for meeting a desire for change in the shape of 
socialism and communism, which will become overwhelming here as well as 
elsewhere, unless means be taken to allow of fit arrangements of an intermediate 
character'.
152
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The Law Review also thought, like Wilson, that 'ruthless and unscrupulous' competition 
had gone too far, and that until 'partnerships en commandite can be freely made ... [the] 
well-spring of wholesome commercial energy will not flow rightly'.
153
 
The complementary structure of commandite seemed to others a particularly apposite 
means of bringing capitalists and workers together, in the inclusive identity needed for a 
modern nation.  This format appealed especially to the Christian Socialists who, as 
Saville identified in a 1954 essay, took up limited liability after 1848 in the hope of 
offsetting the capital/labour antagonism in evidence in France.
154
  The sort of identity that 
commandite could help with was admittedly always quite a specialist one.  No one took 
an interest in it or any other use of limited liability who was not also interested in capital 
or company structure.  An interest in Britain's moral standing was not in itself enough.  
Churchmen and other professional preachers moralised endlessly about the nation, and 
even about business and companies, but they did not talk about limited liability, even 
when discussion was at its height in the mid-1850s.  Jane Garnett has noted the complete 
absence of limited liability references from morality tracts.
155
  Those who talked about it 
prided themselves on a technical grasp of national potential.  Commandite was used as a 
generic means of referring to limited liability structures, as well as more precisely, and 
could accommodate both those who saw capital as complementary to labour and those 
happier to focus on capital as a definitive social currency.  Thomas Hodgkin admonished 
political economist George Rickards in The Economist for forgetting that 'labour is the 
source of all capital', and for talking as though capital were itself the centre of all 
economic activity, yet both were supporters of commandite and of limited liability.  
Rickards' capitalist focus was increasingly common.  Henry Burgess complained in 1845 
that capital was becoming 'the God of idolatry for political economy'.
156
 
Democratic concern also helped argument for joint stock.  Managed through joint stock 
arrangements, articles argued, capital could be at once dynamic yet stable.  In 1846, The 
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Railway Times quoted approvingly from an 'admirable article' in the Daily News, which 
described how this system, as exemplified by railway investment, was supposed to work: 
'The railway proprietary is an immense body, of which the constituent atoms are 
constantly flying off and being replaced ... Among [the constituent particles] 
possible loss is distributed over such an extent of surface as to be scarcely felt by 
individuals, and thus disturbances in the general system are prevented'.
157
 
If that vision had failed in 1845, then some were convinced that the law was to blame.  
Disgusted by the turn that court-judgments had taken by November 1846, The Railway 
Times considered that 'the whole powers of the law have been called into requisition to 
defeat the course of justice, and to secure to the dishonest the whole of their felonious 
booty'.
158
  Herapath's saw judges 'split [on] the question of partnership'
159
 and the 1844 
Joint Stock Companies Act came in for particular criticism.  Spackman told the President 
of the Board of Trade in 1846 that: 'the experience of the present time is conclusive that 
[the Act] falls far short of the security required by the Public against the periodical 
recurrence of such excessive evils'.
160
  Two years later, The Law Magazine pronounced it 
a failure.  In its over-prescriptive 'mazes' and 'plentiful sprinkling of blunders', the Act 
had failed to provide the needed regulation.
161
  
Also apparent in late-1840s comment is a strong sense that it was domestic investment 
that had been betrayed.  This gained from an identification between railway-investment 
and domestic usefulness first established in the 1830s boom.  An 1838 article reported a 
local railway-investor saying that: 
'If I should succeed in diverting the attention of any capitalist from investing in 
foreign securities ... and bubble mining schemes, to projects of really useful and 
prospectively profitable character, I shall consider I have done some little good 
                                                                                                                                                                             
156
 Circular to Bankers, 22 August 1845, p.51. 
157
 Daily News, as quoted in 'Capital for Railways', The Railway Times, 29 August 1846, p.1221. 
158
 14 November 1846, p.1625. 
159
 'Liability of Provisional Committeemen'', Herepath's Railway and Commercial Journal, 9 January 1847  
p.39. 
160
 Spackman, An analysis of the railway interest, p.iii. 
161
 'Mutual Assurance Companies under the Joint Stock Companies' Registration Act, 7 & 8 Vict c110', 
  137 
for my fellow townsmen'.
162
 
That sentiment was widely voiced in the aftermath of the railway share-crash.  The fact 
that this latest crash had come twenty years after the 1825 crisis invited direct comparison 
between the two episodes.  Investors in the mid-1820s had also seen a bubble of 
speculative interest build in scrip, and, when that bubble collapsed, their holdings wiped 
out along with companies.  Had nothing been learned in twenty years?  Problems seemed 
if anything to have grown.  The 1840s bubble was self-evidently much larger than the 
1820s one and as such now seemed to define a national problem.  Overseas mining 
companies had been prominent casualties in 1825, but twenty years later, the one comfort 
was said to be that capital fallout had this time been kept at home.  This was a point 
already being made before railway share prices collapsed.  Burgess observed in late 1844 
that, 
'In a national point of view it is infinitely better that speculations should take the 
direction of railways - where, whoever wins or loses, all, or nearly all, the money 
pushed into that channel must be spent among ourselves - than in mining 
enterprises in South America or even public work in the United States.'
163
 
In the months that followed the crash, the chorus swelled.  As a speaker at one of the 
many public meetings said,  
'they had reason to congratulate themselves that the money did not on this 
occasion go out of the country, ... as no doubt it would have done after some 
foolish thing, if it had not been for the railway speculations'.
164
   
James Morrison, leading parliamentary advocate of closer state control of railway 
companies, confirmed that: 
'It has been said and repeated again and again at Railway meetings, and the 
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language has often found an echo in the legislature, that it is better that the 
country should benefit by the employment of its capital at home, than that 
capitalists should be tempted by higher profits to embark in schemes for the 
improvement of other countries.'
165
 
In the public estimation, this distinguished 1845 from 1825.
166
  Although capital had 
again been wasted, the outcome was 'not unproductive' because capital was still in 
domestic circulation.
167
   
That this was the one good thing that might be said about railway-mania became 
axiomatic, and gave limited liability a patriotic Teflon-coating against accusations that it 
might cause money to be wasted.  Importantly, warnings about speculation failed to stick 
when framed in a railway context.  This would become apparent when limited liability 
was again the subject of official inquiry in the early 1850s.  A member of the 1851 Select 
Committee on the Law of Partnership asked Bankruptcy Commissioner Cecil Fane if his 
favoured limited liability might not induce speculation and the sort of waste of public 
capital seen in railway-mania?  Fane replied that he did not think capital ever wasted, 
unless it built 'things that are of no use to anybody'.  Money lost in South American 
mining schemes was however, 
'all thrown away so far as concerned England.  Had that money been spent in 
England upon the construction of railways, even if the railways had produced no 
benefit to the individual subscribers, in consequence of their having been greatly 
deceived, still that expenditure would have been very advantageous to the people 
of England.'
168
 
Money invested in railway schemes that had built nothing had at least gone 'out of one 
Englishman's pocket into another Englishman's pocket'.  Pro-limited liability argument 
repeatedly made this point in the early 1850s.  In his 1854 call for limited liability, MP 
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Edward Warner claimed that 'the capital which has been sunk in Railway enterprises has 
for the most part only changed hands, and the execution of these great works, even when 
ruinous to the speculators, has added largely to the general wealth.'
169
 
Reformists did not have railway-based argument all their own way, as conservatives also 
used it against limited liability.  A solicitor wrote to The Times in October 1848 to say 
that limited liability should be kept for 'undertakings where the expenditure and range of 
credit, as in the case of railways, bridges, &c, is limited and defined'.
170
  Others thought 
even that a step too far.  James Morrison argued, also in 1848, that: 
'Railways, when undertaken with due consideration, are exposed to less risk than 
almost any other works which can be named ... Railways did not require to be 
fostered by the temptation to inordinate speculation.  From the very beginning 
they were popular among all classes of the community.'
171
 
Morrison dismissed too any need to incentivise domestic against overseas investment.  If 
capital occasionally went abroad in pursuit of higher rewards, 'it returns when it becomes 
advantageous that it should no longer remain abroad.'
172
  Charles Wood, another sceptic, 
pointed to 'the utter falsification of accounts, and the utter mismanagement of [railway] 
concerns', to show that companies could not generally be trusted with limited liability.
173
  
William Clay paid Wood back in kind by saying that the true lesson of the railways in 
this context, was in creditors who 'always took care that the railway companies were 
solvent before they dealt with them.'
174
    
In this way the railways took on a pivotal role in company debate.  Too big to ignore, 
they re-focused and re-defined debate in their own terms, polarising opinion on limited 
liability and fuelling calls for wholesale change.  Their effectiveness in doing so had 
more to do with heuristics and emotion than the letter of the law.  They served the same 
re-defining function for share-panics, which now seemed to be establishing a worryingly 
                                                          
169
 The Impolicy of the Partnership Law, p.43. 
170
 'Money Market and City Intelligence', The Times, 30 October 1848, p.3. 
171
 Morrison, The Influence of English Railway Legislation, pp.64-5. 
172
 Ibid., p.73. 
173
 Hansard, 3rd series, vol. 105, c139 (8 May 1849). 
174
 Ibid., c142. 
  140 
recurrent and violent pattern.  John Byles saw railway-era panics as more 
comprehensively destructive than ever before.
175
  Burgess agreed, and attributed this 
modern-day violence to the distorting effect of railways' use of limited liability: 
'all public enterprise at this epoch takes the direction of Railways, which are 
protected [by limited liability].  There is nothing like these three extraordinary 
developments of speculation in the three periods of 1824-5, 1835-6, 1844-5, to be 
found in our commercial history'.
176
  
This too became a stock argument for limited liability in the early 1850s.  Railway 
investment had shown the risk in directing capital into specific channels.  Under a system 
distorted by partial use of limited liability, financial crises were now more violent and 
involved more people, with none 'more fatal' than that of 1845.
177
  Worse, they seemed to 
be coming round about once every seven years.   
The power of that pattern was felt in the early 1850s.  When seven years was roughly the 
time that had elapsed since 'railway-mania' had broken out, some argued it was now  a 
matter of urgency to take steps to avoid a repeat.  One much-touted step was wider use of 
limited liability.  This, it was argued, would help stabilise both the financial system and 
society.  The railways had re-focused company debate and would provide the commonest 
point-of-reference for social and technical argument for limited liability in the 1850s.  
Before looking at how this played out however, there is one further important factor to 
consider.  This is the growing influence of the United States.
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Chapter 6:  The American example 
 
By the second half of the 1840s, limited liability had secured a greater degree of formal 
acceptance in the United States than in England.  Limited liability corporations were 
authorised for private, for-profit enterprise in some American states from as early as 
1811, and American states generally led the way in two key respects.  Firstly, they were 
early adopters of limited liability for manufacturing corporations (and, rather later, for 
banks).  Secondly, the introduction of self-incorporation statutes made authorisation of 
limited liability corporations for manufacturing and other designated industries 
straightforward and cheap.  The first of these changes began to take effect early in the 
nineteenth-century and the second took off at mid-century.  Self-incorporation statutes 
were usually concerned with large-scale, public undertakings, commonly transport and 
infrastructure initiatives.  Manufacturing was the exception rather than the rule for the 
type of activity covered.  They were not applied to small-scale companies, and limited 
liability had not been applied as a universal rule. 
The emergence of limited liability enterprise in American states is a huge topic in itself, 
but a review of its historiography is worthwhile for the light which a cross-border 
comparison can cast on the British experience.  This is both because the American 
example came to exert a strong influence on British arguments (even if little considered 
in the historiography) and because a comparison offers hope of extrapolating broader 
historical lessons.  These can illuminate, in turn, the powerfully attractive role that 
American success played mid-nineteenth century in re-orienting the British story. 
 
Recognising limited liability in American states 
As in England, consciousness of limited liability arose in the US with attempts to outlaw 
it, and, as in England too, public consciousness has proven hard to discern before the 
beginning of the nineteenth century.  Walter Minchinton says that before then, the 
corporate form was not 'to be resorted to' in America unless in the public interest, and that 
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'there was opposition to industrial projects being given limited liability'.
1
  Ronald Seavoy 
similarly sees limited liability reserved for 'franchise' undertakings, meaning initiatives 
given a mandate by state authorities to pursue an activity held to be in the community 
interest.  As in England too, the ambiguity of early charters provided grounds for dispute, 
once public engagement gained momentum.
2
   This took hold with the growth of 
manufacturing industry. 
Manufacturing was not a significant forum for dispute in England, with reasons for the 
disparity between the two countries unclear.  The commonest suggested explanation for 
limited liability's relatively early adoption in the US is that American manufacturing's 
need for capital was significantly greater, and certainly this was claimed by British 
observers at the time.  Manufacturing corporations (as opposed to partnerships) were also 
relatively prevalent in the United States.  Reviews of their experience have however, led 
some to conclude - perhaps counter-intuitively - that it was not their capital needs that 
drove change. 
In considering the grounds for this, it is important not to exaggerate the difference 
between the English and American manufacturing industries.  Corporations were more 
common in the United States than in Britain, but the partnership structure was still 
dominant in American manufacturing, as in English, for most of the first half of the 
nineteenth century.  However, the corporation also came to be used in eastern American 
states and, significantly, its expansion there was very marked indeed in absolute terms - a 
phenomenon which surely helped it impinge on legislators’ perceptions.  In 1809, the 
Massachusetts state legislature granted charters to as many manufacturing corporations as 
had been authorised in the preceding twenty years.  This pattern was repeated in other 
eastern states, and continued through the 1812 war with England, so that 'the growth of 
industry was accompanied by a great increase in the number of American manufacturing 
company charters.'
3
  One must be cautious in inferring too straightforward a connection 
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between this and limited liability’s spread, since Massachusetts, the state with the highest 
number of factories, also adopted a relatively conservative limited liability policy.  Even 
there however, rapid expansion of the corporation’s use clearly raised consciousness of 
limited liability (even if that then prompted reactionary laws).  Edwin Dodd concluded 
from a 1940s review of these developments that it was indeed 'primarily the cotton-textile 
industry that made the ... incorporated, limited liability joint-stock company seem 
desirable to American industrialists and thus led to efforts on their part to obtain 
corporate charters - if possible, limited liability charters.'  He did not however, attribute 
this to limited liability being essential to their operations.  Manufacturing corporations 
typically had 'a rather small number of owners' and Dodd thought it 'doubtful whether the 
development of corporations of that type and the growth of American industry through 
their instrumentality would have been greatly retarded if all the states had withheld the 
privilege of limited liability'.
4
  Kevin Forbes has also noted that 'the introduction of 
limited liability in Massachusetts did not coincide with an increase in the average number 
of incorporations in textiles'
5
 and, citing Caroline Ware’s 1931 assessment that over $1 
million in capital was amassed in unlimited liability Massachusetts textile firms during 
the 1820s, points out its absence was apparently not much of a block to investment there.
6
  
This suggests that other factors connected with the manufacturing corporation were 
significant. 
In trying to identify what these might be, Dodd’s 1948 study, mentioned here, merits 
further consideration as one of the very few accounts to have focused specifically on 
limited liability.  Dodd reviewed limited liability's post-Revolution legal treatment in 
Massachusetts (the leading American industrial state of the period) and began by noting 
that 'even in England the evidence as to what men of the eighteenth century thought on 
this subject is extremely meager and in the United States it is almost nonexistent'.
7
  
Despite this, he produced an analysis which, though restricted in geographic scope, is 
comparable to DuBois’ consideration of contemporary English experience.  Dodd saw the 
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rapid growth in Massachusetts manufacturing corporations soon provoking a 
conservative backlash, as legislators sought to eliminate ambiguity.  Dodd’s review of 
Massachusetts case-history shows that legal precedent existed there for treating a 
corporation’s debts as its own, but the corporations where this was openly endorsed were 
obvious community concerns, such as schools.  The possibility that protection from debt 
might be extended to for-profit manufacturing corporations prompted judicial desire to 
draw a line: '[a]s soon as manufacturing companies began to be formed in substantial 
numbers, the Massachusetts legislature [adopted] an unlimited liability policy, to which it 
adhered, with relatively minor modifications, for twenty-one years'.
8
 
The means of enforcing this was the 1809 Massachusetts Manufacturing Corporation Act, 
the first clear statement on limited liability by an American state legislature, and a 
conservative one which 'expressly [made] shareholders in all industrial corporations 
directly liable to creditors'.
9
  The Act did not extend personal liability to other types of 
corporation - perhaps because it was not thought necessary.  As Dodd pointed out, 'there 
was probably no great likelihood that companies engaged in so relatively riskless a 
business as that of supplying water would dissolve without paying their debts'.
10
  There is 
some evidence though, that the clearer line, prompted by expansion of private profit-
seeking, cut two ways, and that at the same time as unlimited liability was imposed on 
selected for-profit corporations, shareholders in corporations more readily identified with 
community interests were officially excused it.  Dodd mentions that 'the early practice of 
imposing substantial shareholder liability on the shareholders of canal companies was 
abandoned'.  He concludes that 'the only corporations, other than manufacturing 
companies, on which shareholder liability of a seriously burdensome sort continued to be 
imposed were banks.'
11
  Even banks were not though subject to the same liability 
provisions as manufacturing corporations.  Banking and manufacturing were both subject 
to 1818-22 debt legislation, but only manufacturing corporation-members were made 
subject to full unlimited liability.     
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Manufacturing was also singled out for special attention in other eastern American states, 
with a mixed response.  Ronald Seavoy identifies New York as 'probably [having] led the 
nation in [the] shift of attitude toward private debt'
12
, the decisive breakthrough being its 
1811 general Act for manufacturing charters.  The 1811 Act has acquired iconic status in 
some accounts, as the first Act to extend limited liability to a whole class of for-profit 
(manufacturing) corporations.  Its endorsement and subsequent importance were  
however, highly contingent.  As Seavoy makes clear in his history of New York 
corporate law, the Act was seen at the time as an exceptional, emergency statute, 
temporarily justified by war.
13
  As such, it was hedged about with constraints, and 
conditions which could trigger personal liability.  Shaw Livermore, considering these 
'unattractive features' in 1935, judged its provisions 'equivalent in practice to the ordinary 
liability of partners of shareholders in an association'.
14
 
Two aspects of the 1811 Act’s endorsement can nevertheless be singled out as 
illuminating.  Firstly, it shows the importance of patriotism in achieving formal change.  
In the eyes of the New York Convention, a threatened war against England (eventually, 
the war of 1812) 'excused' domestic manufacturing companies as patriotic, and entitled 
them to the temporary privilege of limited liability, because they supplied the domestic 
population with essentials during an embargo on English imports - Seavoy quotes State 
Governor Daniel D. Tompkins stressing that 'economic self-sufficiency was a major 
ingredient in waging a successful war'.
15
  Once the war ended, as Seavoy states, 'there 
were strong doubts about the political expediency of keeping the 1811 manufacturing 
statute in force'
16
 but it proved difficult to rescind an Act believed to have been useful in 
practice.  This highlights a second important circumstance: direct experience.  Although 
limited liability attracted considerable support in eastern American states over the first 
half of the nineteenth century, it persisted in dividing opinion sharply and breakthroughs 
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came when discussion was either kept to a minimum or something occurred to cut 
through it.  Debates could otherwise become stuck in entrenched positions.  One notable 
instance of this was to occur in 1846, when the report of the New York Convention’s 
'Committee on Incorporations other than Banks' was followed by a three-month 
discussion and two close votes, leading to stalemate and a situation where, in Seavoy’s 
words, 'the whole liability issue was in utter confusion'.
17
  Debate-stalemate is a recurring 
feature of the English experience too. 
Difficulties in this respect are seen in the vacillations over the 1811 Act which continued 
in New York state until 1821, when the Act was finally permanently enacted.  Even 
thereafter the status of the Act’s limited liability clause proved 'ambiguous', variously 
interpreted as authorising limited liability or the more conservative double liability.  
Ambiguity continued until 1828, when full limited liability was confirmed for all 
corporation shareholders (not just shareholders in manufacturing corporations) whose 
shares were fully paid-up, the one exception being for banking corporations ('a politically 
explosive issue'
18
).  Dodd shows the Massachusetts state legislature persisting with 
unlimited liability for manufacturing corporations for two further years, finally approving 
in 1830 (with the high-profile sponsorship of Governor Levi Lincoln) an Act which 
proved lasting.  Other north-eastern states were similarly indecisive.  New Jersey’s 
experience mirrored New York’s, in continuing to flirt with double liability, and, most 
indecisive of all, the Maine state legislature hopped back and forth between limited and 
unlimited liability as a standard for manufacturing corporations no fewer than nine times 
between 1820 and 1857.  When Forbes and others state that the other American 
industrialised states were 'not long in following New York’s lead' they are therefore 
presenting an over-purposeful picture, air-brushed by hindsight.
19
  It is true that once 
limited liability had been temporarily allowed for manufacturing corporations in New 
York, it proved hard to put the cat back in the bag (as Forbes notes, New Hampshire and 
Connecticut followed with their own legislation in 1816 and 1818 respectively).  The 
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New York Act was however, only the beginning of a protracted debate.  Authorisation of 
limited liability for manufacturing corporations continued to be widely controversial for 
decades and came close to being reversed in the 1840s.  Securing its formal acceptance 
across the industrialised United States took the best part of half a century.
20
 
At this point, it is appropriate to turn to a second development which distinguished the 
American experience of limited liability and which came to the fore in the second half of 
the 1840s: general incorporation statutes.  Naomi Lamoureaux supports the common 
explanation for their adoption, in citing 'Jacksonian opposition to the favoritism inherent 
in [the]system of granting charters'.
21
  Seavoy sees the 1837-44 depression as critical in 
achieving the key breakthrough, the New York State Convention’s 1846 decision to 
allow general incorporation statutes for for-profit enterprise. 
Here it was the extension to for-profit enterprise that marked a change.  General 
incorporation laws for non-profit, self-evidently socially useful organisations were a 
legacy of the Revolution, and found in most American states by the end of the eighteenth 
century.
22
  It was not until 1846 however, that their use was extended to commercial 
enterprise.  Seavoy identifies the 1838 approval of banking self-incorporation as pivotal 
to the New York Convention’s acceptance of self-incorporation generally.23  Because 
banking was a controversial industry, its fate determined, in Seavoy’s eyes, 'whether it 
was desirable or sound policy to open the privilege of incorporation to all entrepreneurs 
in those types of enterprises where the corporation was the usual form of organization.'
24
  
Self-incorporation statutes, through use of standardised questionnaires, made 
authorisation routine and cheap.  Before their introduction, a corporation wishing for 
limited liability status had to apply for an individual statute (and could do so thereafter, if 
that was the preferred route).  With the exception of grants made to manufacturing 
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corporations, the American experience of limited liability had not been so qualitatively 
different from the English, distinguished primarily by identification with the corporation.  
Even after 1846 the type of industry identified with limited liability did not change 
greatly, but the rate at which limited liability corporations were authorised did. 
Some explanation of this acceptance seems necessary, since corporations were certainly 
not regarded by Americans as necessarily beneficial.  Larger associations posed an 
obvious threat to individual businessmen, and there are numerous instances from the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries of American politicians and newspapers 
decrying corporations as aristocratic and exploitative.  Louis Hartz's study of attitudes in 
Pennsylvania says that anti-charter sentiment was then 'one of the most powerful, 
repetitious, and exaggerated themes in popular literature'.
25
  Hartz also stresses however, 
that opposition was strongest 'on the philosophic plane' rather than the economic, and 
amongst the explanations put forward as to how antipathy was overcome, perhaps the 
most convincing is that corporations were simply found undeniably useful.
26
  Minchinton 
suggests that '[the] link between the corporation and the numerous enterprises of a public 
nature that a large and rapidly developing country needed may in part explain the early 
growth of the corporation in this country, which appears phenomenal when compared 
with British and continental European experience.'
27
 
If the early experience can be termed phenomenal, what ensued at mid-century was even 
more so.  As Stuart Bruchey notes, 'nearly half of all corporations chartered between 
1800 and 1860 [in America appeared in the 1850s]', facilitated by ease of authorisation.
28
  
Massachusetts introduced a self-incorporation statute for manufacturing in 1851, but it is 
New York’s 1847-55 burst of industry-specific general incorporation statutes which is 
most remarkable.  The transport, educational and charitable institutions featured in that 
burst (listed by Seavoy in full) were notable for their number but, with the significant 
exception of the 1848 general incorporation statute passed for manufacturing, their nature 
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would not have alarmed Adam Smith.
29
  Seavoy states that it was not until long after 
1855 that 'general incorporation codes [allowing] incorporation for virtually any 
legitimate purpose [and extending] the privilege of self-incorporation to all classes of 
business for profit' were enacted there.
30
  Seavoy suggests that a franchise analogy 
(identifying for-profit initiatives with non-profit ones, both providing services of obvious 
benefit to the community) was easier to make where an industry was sparsely populated.  
Here, corporations could be granted limited liability without raising the spectre of a 
potential clash with competing, usually smaller firms. 
This suggests that the rate of expansion of a particular industry, as well as the nature and 
scale of its individual businesses, facilitated limited liability’s take-up.  Although the 
historiography considered here has little to say on the point, it seems likely that the 
relative explosiveness of industrial and infrastructure development in a vast country - not 
just in railways (which obviously enjoyed explosive growth in Europe too) but in other 
transport industries and in manufacturing - made innovation relatively easy to 
countenance.  Seavoy says that limited liability was not controversial in New York state 
for 'new businesses, …. organized as corporations from their inception.'  He goes so far 
as to claim that early nineteenth-century ring-fencing of corporate activity there, kept 
distinct from the concerns of single proprietorships and partnerships, was such that 
'[u]ntil banking instability emerged after 1811, there appeared to be no strong objection 
to general incorporation statutes and limited liability for all businesses that did not take 
land by eminent domain proceedings and did not compete with full-liability enterprises.'
31
  
He also says that '[b]anks were the great exception to this generalization' - that is, to the 
assertion that the business corporation was essentially non-controversial in New York by 
1825 - and that this was because 'the public wanted the full redemption of banknotes of 
insolvent banks from the assets of stockholders.'
32
  According to his analysis, the 
manufacturing corporation was relatively uncontroversial in New York from the second 
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quarter of the nineteenth century.  Seavoy also points out that American ocean steamship 
corporations were granted limited liability from as early as 1814, in a sparsely-populated 
sector, where such competition as existed was international.
33
   
Effectively echoing the point that change was more readily accepted in new or rapidly-
expanding industries, historians of the British experience have judged that limited 
liability met with more opposition in older industries.  Jefferys sees this as most intense 
in shipping, cotton and wool manufacture, and in the iron and steel industries.
34
  
Freeman, Pearson and Taylor claim too that liability-limitation made relatively little 
headway in manufacturing and shipping.
35
  New or rapidly-expanding industries offered a 
clearer field for new habits and less potential for clashes between individual and 
corporate enterprise.  Whenever a clash did threaten, American attitudes were seemingly 
not so different from English.  The American historiography is full of quotations from 
individuals petitioning against charters, many from the 1830s.
36
  Seavoy states that the 
New York legislature 'never incorporated a shipbuilder or canal boat transportation 
company because those businesses were traditionally full-liability enterprises and highly 
competitive.'
37
  Hartz sees attitudes shifting significantly in the 1840s and 1850s, as the 
values of individual initiative came to be associated with incorporated as well as 
unincorporated enterprise.
38
  The scope of the 1847-55 statutes suggests that scruples 
carried weight however, and that very few industries were identified as 'corporation' 
industries.  Those few seem to have been clearly defined.  Demarcation by industry 
seems to have made it possible to countenance limited liability within defined 
parameters, without prompting too many accusations of unfair competition. 
One factor which might have disrupted this relatively demarcated picture is the limited 
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partnership.  Facilities for limited partnerships certainly existed in American states, and 
Naomi Lamoureaux notes that, '[l]egislation permitting [limited partnerships] was first 
passed by the New York and Connecticut legislatures in 1822, and then by most states 
over the next couple of decades'.
39
  It appears however, to have been an economic 
footnote to the main story.  As Lamoureaux also observes, '[w]hat is most interesting 
about the limited partnership form … is how rarely it was used'.40  Dodd mentions - 
appropriately enough, in a footnote - that '[l]imited liability [became] available in 
Massachusetts as early as 1835 for inactive members of a partnership under the Limited 
Partnership Act of March 10, 1835' but goes on to say that 'very little use seems to have 
been made of that act by manufacturing enterprises'.
41
  Despite their widespread 
availability, limited partnerships were rarely used.  An obvious, but important lesson 
from the American experience is the significance of the corporation as a vehicle of 
change. 
 
Lessons from America? 
From a perhaps rather insular, British perspective, the United States' role in endorsement 
of limited liability looks like an instance of 'round-tripping'.  Eastern American states 
took up a corporate form first imported from England through colonial law, developing 
corporation law independently after 1775 and establishing its usefulness as legislative 
responsibility was devolved to state level and individual states caught the habit from each 
other.  In the middle of the nineteenth century, in discussion of American manufacturing 
and self-incorporation statutes, the results were exported back to England. 
A cross-Atlantic comparison throws up some lessons as to how this was achieved.  The 
most obvious is the importance of the corporation, since American use of limited liability 
was overwhelmingly in this context.  Many contemporary British commentators 
understood this, but engrained habits of discussing limited liability in the context of 
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'partnership' led to some vagueness in terminology and notions of the precise company-
forms in use in the US.  In April 1853, Lawson's Merchants' Magazine gave an accurate 
description of American state laws, but inaccurately attributed striking development to 
the prevalence of limited partnership.  Lawson's was written and edited by Bethel 
Strousberg, a one-man publishing phenomenon of early 1850s London (before his 
departure for the continent) who prided himself on an international outlook.  He advised 
his readers - misleadingly - that 'in the United States ... the principle of partnership en 
commandite has been carried out very extensively and with signal success'.
42
  This was a 
common error - part of a popular but inaccurate narrative arc, whereby commandite 
originated in Italian republics, spread to France, Holland and Germany, 'and finally 
reached the United States, where it flourishes with greater vigour than elsewhere'.
43
  
Some did question the accuracy of this supposed progression.  The Westminster Review, 
reviewing Thomas Wilson's Partnership 'en commandite' in 1848, thought it confused 
two company forms, and, quoting definitions given by Mill, suggested that American 
progress was better identified with the société anonyme (in which all, not just some, 
partners, enjoyed limited liability) than commandite.
44
  Francis Troubat 'of the Bar of 
Philadelphia' did understand the difference between the various company forms and 
added his own momentum to discussions with the 1853 publication of The Law of 
Commandatary and Limited Partnership in the United States.  This was reviewed in the 
English legal press, and much cited by Edwin Field, the London solicitor who was to play 
a leading role in campaigning for legislative change in the early 1850s.
45
  In a classic 
demonstration of 'the grass is always greener', Troubat argued that the US had erred in 
pursuing limited corporations, source of de-stabilising speculation, and that the best 
exemplar of steady progress in use of limited liability was continental Europe's use of 
commandite, best represented technically in France's Code de Commerce.  Field chose to 
interpret Troubat in his own fashion, and constructed a narrative in which the United 
States had adopted the 'commanditary system' from France, and - feeling its constraints - 
moved swiftly on to wholesale adoption of limited liability.  Field thereby (erroneously) 
                                                          
42
 'Our Commercial System', Lawson's Merchants' Magazine, April 1853, Footnote to p.247. 
43
 'The Law of Partnership', Bankers' Magazine, August 1854, p.424. 
44
 Westminster Review, April-July 1848 (London 1848), pp.546-7. 
45
 Francis J. Troubat, The Law of Commandatary and Limited Partnership in the United States 
  153 
expunged past as well as present unlimited liability corporations: 'America ... may now, I 
believe, be said not to have one unlimited liability share company in its whole empire.'
46
  
The US experience shows clearly that unlimited liability corporations were not unique to 
England.  Naomi Lamoureaux, reviewing early nineteenth-century American experience, 
stresses the similarities in how corporations and partnerships were then viewed, and says 
that 'shareholders often were fully liable for their corporation’s debts, just like members 
of partnerships'.
47
  In English official inquiries into limited liability in the early 1850s, 
Americans themselves were to try and counter the mistaken perception that American 
unlimited liability share companies did not exist. 
These preferences and confusions notwithstanding, the American limited liability vehicle 
of choice was the corporation.  A headline cross-border comparison suggests that 
partnership structures are largely a red herring for wider limited liability rules.  
Continental European jurisdictions with some form of limited partnership did not produce 
such a rule, while a jurisdiction which - unusually - did not have limited partnerships 
(England) did.  Economists commonly name Sweden as the first country to introduce a 
general rule
48
 (though its claim to general status has been contested
49
 - as indeed has that 
of the 1856 English law
50
) and interestingly, Sweden was one of the few jurisdictions 
that, like England, had no limited partnership facility in the mid-nineteenth century.
51
   
On this evidence, limited partnerships look to be a brake on change rather than otherwise 
- or something that only assumes importance when withheld.  Little in the historiography 
suggests American limited partnerships played a significant role. 
Another characteristic of the American experience is speed of change.  This should not be 
overstated.  Although, for example, American acceptance of corporate abstraction pre-
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dated English, Lamoureaux shows corporate 'personhood' still seen as an artificial 
construction, subject to wider moral obligations (which could include personal liability) 
for much of the first half of the nineteenth century.
52
  The American experience was 
however, marked by very rapid expansion in manufacturing and in transport 
infrastructure, leaving relatively clear fields for acceptance of limited liability.  Railway 
development is conspicuous by its absence from the historiography considered here, but 
Hartz and others have shown that it played an important role.  Explosive expansion was 
relatively common in the United States, and the infrastructure-corporation was there 
readily formalised through self-incorporation statutes.  These constitute one of the three 
key means by which the limited liability corporation established itself in the US.  The 
other two were the special cases of banking and manufacturing.  All three strongly 
influenced British perceptions of limited liability. 
  
American banking influence 
Banking is a peculiar industry where limited liability is concerned.  Evidently it could 
prove decisive, in that if limited liability could be accepted in this context (as happened in 
New York state) it might then be relatively easy to accept in other contexts.  The gearing 
cut two ways however, and if a limited liability bank failed, this could constitute an 
effective mental block.  American use of limited liability banks institutionalised just such 
a block in British perceptions.  This was set firm by the 1837 crisis, but had taken root 
earlier - Henry Burgess catalogued American joint stock bank failures from the late 
1820s.
53
  In the 1832/3 Bank of England charter debate, lobbyists for London joint stock 
banks complained that 'the unbroken faith of the Joint Stock Banks of Scotland, Ireland, 
and England are unnoticed, or merged in comparisons with some of the insolvent Banks 
of America'.
54
  American failures prompted speculation as to what might have produced 
such different results in two different locations.  One pounced-upon variable was 
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American bank charters' use of limited liability. 
Rhetorical competition between Scottish and American banking was a reasonably even 
contest until the 1837 crisis.  In 1836, when William Clay called for yet another official 
inquiry into English joint stock banks, he urged consideration of practices adopted by the 
American people, since 'none exists more sagacious, more practically wise, or more 
capable of drawing useful lessons from experience'.  Clay had examined 23 charters of 
American state banks, and found that nearly all showed limited liability.  He told fellow 
MPs that they would 'I am sure, feel how important is the lesson we may derive from the 
experience of our trans-Atlantic brethren'.
55
 
Some were of course disinclined to take an American lecture on this point even then.  
One opponent came back at Clay with:  
'Having before us the example of Scotland, we would be foolish indeed to take 
our models ... from the other side of the Atlantic ... In position and circumstances 
there is a striking resemblance between us and our near neighbours, but none 
whatever between us and the Americans.'
56
 
And not everyone willing to admit American banking virtues thought that these had much 
to do with limited liability: 'that degree of stability exhibited by American banks, which 
Mr. Clay seems to think is the result of limited liability in all probability arises chiefly 
from active competition.'
57
 
A year later, Clay's critics were scoffing at the idea that there was even any case to 
answer.  The May 1837 financial crisis affected both British and American businesses, 
and brought the failure of dozens of American chartered banks.  Interpretations of what 
had happened differed on either side of the Atlantic.  British observers were quick to see 
shortcomings in the American banking system and its use of limited liability.  The Times 
reprinted the 'Limited Liability' section of 'Mr. Gilbart's history of banking in America', 
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(written by the General Manager of the joint stock London and Westminster Bank) 
together with a flat assertion that 'Unlimited liability gives greater security to the 
public'.
58
  Americans generally blamed the British.  American journalist Richard Hildreth 
pointed to the Bank of England's rapid reversal of discount policy, which had left 
American merchants suddenly called upon to pay huge sums to 'the great English 
mercantile houses, known as the American Bankers'.
59
  Henry Carey also blamed the 
Bank of England. 
Henry Burgess thought Americans unfairly maligned by much British comment on the 
crisis
60
 but sided with Gilbart in saying that it was: 
'abundantly clear that as a whole the system of chartered banks acted upon in 
America is inferior to the system of Joint-Stock banks acted upon in Scotland ... 
No legislative enactment will ever be able to make [the American banks] equally 
efficient and trustworthy with Banks of unrestricted liability ... There is one 
astounding fact which the advocates of restricted liability will find it difficult to 
reconcile with their view of its expediency, viz. that all the Chartered Banks of a 
great commercial country failed at once.'
61
 
Others too thought that the failures confirmed their worst fears.  The political economist 
Thomas Tooke had given evidence - and a sceptical opinion on limited liability - to Ker's 
1836 inquiry.  He observed in the second volume of his History of Prices, published the 
year after the crisis (and Ker's Report) that the British system of 'unlimited responsibility' 
joint stock banks 'stands out in pre-eminently advantageous contrast to the discreditable 
exhibition of American banks, with their state charters and limited responsibility'.
62
  Two 
years later, the 1840 Select Committee on Banks of Issue asked Bank of England 
Director George Norman what he knew of American banks.  He replied that he had 
studied them 'only generally', and knew them to be 'chartered ... usually with limited 
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responsibility'.  He believed that: 
'every check that ever has been suggested, has been applied in the United States ... 
and the only check that I am aware of that has not yet been tried (though, I 
believe, it is about to be tried) is that of introducing unlimited responsibility on 
the part of the shareholders'.
63
 
Claims that the 1837 crisis had led Americans to 'retrace their steps' and adopt personal 
liability in banking became common.
64
  Those making the claims did not usually cite 
supporting evidence, but there are grounds for thinking they had justification.  Hartz 
shows the Pennsylvania authorities keen to '[define] stockholder liability in bank charters 
more rigorously than before', though the form of liability used was usually double rather 
than full unlimited liability.
65
 
Once established, a British perception that American chartered banks were peculiarly 
risky proved hard to expunge.  As Burgess predicted, the sheer number of failures was 
key.  William Brown and Chancellor of the Exchequer Charles Wood invoked this to 
counter Headlam's 1849 limited liability initiative, with Wood also quoting Gilbart.
66
  
When Clay talked again about American banks, Brown rightly said that he 'could not 
have cited a more unfortunate case for his argument'.
67
  In mid-1850s discussion of 
limited liability, reformists tried to counter this image with specifics.  New England 
banking practices were said now to be working 'magnificently'
68
 and New York state 
banks were similarly impressive.
69
  The blanket-impression of American chartered banks 
as peculiarly risky never however, entirely went away.
70
 
The 1837 crisis was followed in the US by state defaults, and a catastrophic loss of 
credibility with international investors that did not begin to dissipate until 1843.  In the 
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mid-1840s however, sentiment began to change, and when revolution once again broke 
out in continental Europe in 1848, American economic example was in a way to being 
taken much more seriously.  European revolution heightened the appeal of American 
models for the British journalist who saw a growing 'feeling of mutual respect, a spirit of 
cordiality ... as the conviction of the common interest of the two countries becomes more 
palpable'.
71
  If continental Europe had once again failed to provide a suitable model for 
social change, then a better one might be on offer in the US.  In particular, it might be on 
offer in American manufacturing. 
 
American manufacturing influence 
Importantly, Americans' use of limited liability companies for manufacturing did not 
impinge strongly on British perceptions until the late 1840s.  This meant that the legacy 
of the previous half-century was absorbed into potential British lessons in the context of a 
mechanised nation, facing challenges felt to be particular to that condition.  As seen, 
manufacturing corporations made use of limited liability in individual American states 
from early in the century, but it was not until several decades later that their technical 
structures registered with Britons as a point worthy of note.  In the 1830s and early 
1840s, British observers who compared American manufacturing with their own 
domestic experience focused on mechanical and cost efficiency, not company structure.  
In 1840, James Montgomery, a Scottish factory-superintendent who had emigrated to 
work in the Maine cotton industry, published a comparison between British and 
American cotton manufacturing practices, in which he praised the impressive 
productivity of Massachusetts factories.
72
  Montgomery thought it would not be long 
before the Americans caught up in skill and quality as well. 
In his classic review of nineteenth century American and British technological 
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development, H. J. Habakkuk claims that observations like Montgomery's became 
increasingly common in the 1840s.  Although British technology was in general still far 
ahead of American (and continued to be so into the second half of the century) British 
engineers and manufacturers noted that the Americans excelled in certain mechanical 
areas.  In seeking to account for this, Habakkuk comments that: 'It seems obvious - it 
certainly seemed so to contemporaries - that the dearness and inelasticity of American, 
compared with British labour, gave the American entrepreneur with a given capital 
greater inducement than his British counterpart to replace labour by machines'.
73
 
Comment to this effect exploded in British newspapers and periodicals at mid-century, 
fanned by the American mechanical expertise on display at the 1851 Great Exhibition.  
When John Newall urged the Board of Trade in 1852 to allow greater use of limited 
liability, he warned that 'the year 1851 has opened our eyes to the fact ... that [the 
Americans] have already excelled us in more than one of the most essential arts'.
74
  In 
July 1852, a pro-limited liability writer in the Dissenter-monthly, the Eclectic Review, 
urged the English to lose their superiority-complex about economic questions: 
'God has done more for us than we have ever done for ourselves; and among the 
chief things that we have not done for ourselves is to discover a mode equal to 
that of our neighbours of France, Italy, Belgium, America, &c, by which men of 
capital may combine together to carry out works of vast public good, adding 
largely to national and individual wealth ... The wonders of the great Exhibition 
ought to have largely diminished our national vanity.'
75
 
Commentators asked whether Britain was doing enough to foster the inventiveness which 
could drive forward a modern nation, and - perhaps even more importantly - provide for 
its social stability.  How might a modern nation accommodate the workers who had 
traditionally provided the physical impetus for national progress and might now feel 
excluded from a mechanised future? 
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On this question, it seemed to many that the United States might have much to teach.  For 
Charles Morrison, wealthy son of MP and railway-critic James Morrison, American 
workers appeared distinguished not just by physical strength but by mental self-
reliance.
76
  Morrison did acknowledge, in passing, the United States’ four million slaves, 
but chose to focus rather on her free workers.  He highlighted 'the readiness of invention, 
freedom from prejudice, and intelligence with which Americans carry on all kinds of 
productive labour, and particularly … the constant application of their minds to the 
saving of labour by every possible contrivance.'
77
  Unlike too many of their British 
counterparts, American workers accepted machinery as their friend, the means to 
respectable self-reliance.  Morrison expected this awareness 'to become more sensible 
with every advance in their own intellectual and moral state.'
78
 
Scottish publisher William Chambers took a similar view, in a work published after an 
1853 tour of North America.  He too admired Americans’ 'intelligence sharpened by 
education', and saw in 'the spectacle of well-educated, thoughtful, independent America' a 
lesson for a better future.
79
  Edwin Field may not actually have been to the US but this 
did not stop him also praising American workers' 'inventive ingenuity'.
80
  Equally 
commonplace was a view that British workers fell short in comparison.  Authoritative 
endorsement came from the great mechanical engineer Joseph Whitworth, who reported 
from his tour of American manufacturing districts that:  
'[American] combinations to resist [the] introduction [of machinery] are unheard 
of ... The principles which ought to regulate the relations between the employer 
and the employed seem to be thoroughly understood and appreciated in the United 
States'.
81
  
These views being widely shared, opinion varied only in what was thought to have 
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brought about Americans' enviable traits, and might now promote similar behaviour in 
Britain.  Manchester calico-printer Edmund Potter read Chambers' account, and though 
he agreed that British workers placed too much store by 'mere manual toil, requiring little 
thought and invention', was adamant that limited liability had nothing to contribute to 
their education.
82
  Morrison, Chambers, Field, Whitworth and others however, suggested 
that it might help release workers' latent intelligence.  It was even possible to find an 
American ready (when suitably prompted) to agree - though others found Americans 
willing to attest just the opposite.  On both sides of debate, lessons were mapped onto the 
US, and transferred to the allegedly fertile or infertile soil back home.  
There was much at stake in who might be right.  If machinery could free a nation from 
not only labour, but - effectively - labourers too, this might help chart a course through 
one of the great challenges of the age: how, safely, to admit manual workers to the 
political franchise.  Educated workers might be admitted if (as the US showed) they had 
hope of achieving a property-stake in the social order.  The prospect of granting political 
power in advance of such a stake alarmed many.  Morrison admitted that not even the US 
had tried this, employing instead a vast population of slaves.
83
  Hope was however, 
offered by a combination of Anglo-Saxon lessons.  The US had shown that it was 
possible to infuse a nation with the ambition to rise 'to be possessors of property and 
employers of labour in their turn'.  And England’s tradition showed that only 'a very 
small property is sufficient to give a man the feelings of a proprietor'.  Importantly for an 
industrialized nation, these intuitions could be felt by 'a mechanic who had invested an 
equal sum from his savings … in a Joint Stock Company'.84 
This formula offered hope of social harmony, and drew on established joint stock 
connotations.  For social and commercial liberals, the favourite exemplar of the sort of 
socially-encouraging American joint stock enterprise they admired was Lowell, the 
outstandingly successful manufacturing centre built at Waltham, Massachusetts over the 
first half of the nineteenth century and known for its predominantly female workforce 
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and distinctive, all-encompassing approach to employee conduct and governance.  
Lowell's famous factories served as a mid-century touchstone for debating the lessons of 
American manufacturing, and its use of limited liability.  Englishmen with personal 
experience of manufacturing tended to be sceptical.  William Hawes ran a well-known 
London soap factory, and took a prominent part in limited liability debate of the early 
1850s.  He was familiar with the manufacturing success-stories of Lowell and St Etienne 
in France, but did not think their lessons transferable to Britain.
85
  Potter, another 
manufacturer, also thought Lowell's example irrelevant, emanating as it did from a 
country unusually well-endowed (by virtue of its immigrant population) with middle-
class impulses.
86
  Enthusiasts of American manufacturing corporations did sometimes 
acknowledge that special conditions - hard to ignore in the case of Lowell’s female 
workforce - should give pause for thought.  Morrison owned that '[t]here are certainly 
favourable circumstances in the position of the factory population of Lowell which can 
hardly be expected to be fully equalled in the immense population of our great 
manufacturing districts.  Still', he concluded more resolutely, 'so many of the evils which 
are to be found in the latter might be removed with little or no sacrifice, that it may be 
hoped that they will gradually give way.'
87
   
Edwin Field entertained few doubts on this score.  He quoted in support from An 
Englishwoman‟s Experience of America, published in 1853 by fellow-Unitarian Marianne 
Finch.  Finch came from a Liverpool family with close ties to the US, and a tradition of 
active social reform.  Her father, John Finch, was an ironmaster and merchant who 
pursued social change amongst Liverpool's workers, inspired by his grandfather Joseph 
Priestley and by Robert Owen.  In a temperance tract published in the 1830s, he appears 
to have anticipated a time when 
'the whole population of Great Britain, Ireland, and all other countries will unite 
in forming joint-stock companies, with from 500 to 8,000 members, each having 
one common capital, and one common interest, living together [and] working for 
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each other.'
88
 
His daughter may not have displayed that degree of visionary faith, but she was similarly 
interested in joint stock's social potential.  When she made an extended trip to the United 
States, as her father had done a generation before, she, like him, published a book of her 
findings.  Making the standard tour of New England's manufacturing districts, she 
observed that their  
'manufactories for cotton are not individual speculations, as with us, but joint-
stock companies, like the railroads ... [This system] seems to recommend itself 
strongly to the workpeople, by giving them an opportunity of holding shares in 
the mills where they are employed.  Taking advantage of this organisation, they 
might gradually, and without risk, become the capitalists as well as the labourers 
....  Several who were working at the looms, were pointed out to me as 
proprietors.'
89
 
Field cited these observations, and their promise of social progress, to show how absurd 
he thought an opponent's apprehension at the British government potentially granting 
'charters to the Lancashire cotton-mills'.
90
  William Chambers was similarly impressed 
with the Lowell operatives' 'orderly behaviour', and attributed it to their 'hope of a 
permanent improvement of their condition'.
91
  Bethel Strousberg, making the case for 
commandite in April 1853, also highlighted Lowell's use of 'contributory shares'.
92
  The 
Westminster Review made the same connections, and asked 'how can the mechanics of 
London or cotton-spinners of Manchester, hope to raise themselves to a similar position 
in the scene of their toil?'
93
  Chambers too held that '[p]ractically, the [English] operative 
is without hope', whereas,  
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'In America ... hope is stimulated in an extraordinary degree...[and] there is the 
greatest possible reason for economising and becoming capitalists ... I feel sure 
that this tends to explain the superior character of the American workman.'
94
  
This connected limited liability to powerful social images and went to the heart of 
Britain's progressive national identity.  It is important to stress that the images carried 
more sway with British writers than they did with British manufacturing's own 
practitioners.  But for those observing matters from the outside at least, American 
manufacturing challenged the identification of national progress with personal liability, 
and the perception of joint stock as the preserve of the commercially immature. 
One reason for its effectiveness in doing so was the undeniable speed of American 
progress in manufacturing, as more generally.  Americans themselves were proud of this 
national characteristic.  Henry Carey portrayed his country as definitively dynamic:   
 
'Everyone feels he can go ahead if he will ... All have to work hard to keep up ... 
If they pause but for a moment they are left behind ... No capital need remain 
idle.'
95
  
 
Britons noted the dynamism, which could inform even a Law Magazine technical article 
about limited liability.
96
  Lowell was emblematic of this speed of progress, as of social 
harmony, and scarcely ever mentioned without an accompanying observation on the near-
miraculous way it had mushroomed from nothing: 'In 1815 the site ... was a wilderness ... 
It has now twelve manufacturing corporations employing 12,630 hands.'
97
  Many 
highlighted capital-association as '[the] stimulus ... which has caused it to take such 
gigantic strides.'
98
  In 1840, James Montgomery had acknowledged the Lowell 
corporations, without seeing any need to comment on their financial structure.  Samuel 
Laing, a lawyer and secretary at the Board of Trade, did the same in his 1844 
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examination of Lowell's social lessons for England.
99
  Just a few years later however, its 
financial arrangements were seen as central to the city's progress.  And Lowell was only 
the best-known of a host of such success-stories: 'Lowell, Rochester, Lockport and 
Paterson [have all] sprung into importance within a few years.'
100
 
 
In the face of such striking progress, some warned that Britain risked being left behind.  
Strousberg stressed that while Britain's 'absolute advance' since the end of the Napoleonic 
wars had been rapid, 'the contrary has been the case if we take into review the 
comparative progress made by other countries during the interval.'  The situation would 
have been worse - and more widely appreciated - had it not been for the revolutions of 
1848, which had temporarily derailed continental competitors.  The US had suffered no 
such set-back, and her progress had been 'more rapid within the last twenty-five years, 
since her general adoption of the [commandite] principle [than] in the whole course of her 
previous career as an independent power.'
101
  The Economist, not usually very impressed 
with sweeping claims about limited liability, agreed that 'it is unquestionable that much 
of the rapid development of American enterprise is owing to the facilities which [a 
commandite law] offers'.
102
  At mid-century this rapid development was especially 
apparent in infrastructure. 
 
 
 
'A common intelligence' 
The 1837 financial crisis had one other important, negative effect on British perceptions 
of Americans' use of limited liability, in that much British capital was invested in 
American infrastructure companies which failed along with American banks.  Before 
this, Henry Burgess had noted in early 1836 how 
'The Americans have found by experience that the productive and commercial 
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powers of the country would be unduly restricted, unless the public policy could 
be directed to the giving of charters of corporation with limited liability.  Few 
great enterprises, so necessary to a new country abounding with undeveloped 
resources of wealth, could be undertaken, without such protection to give scope 
and freedom to co-operative agency.'
103
 
Burgess himself supported limited liability for such 'great enterprises'.
104
 
That argument suffered a major setback in 1837.  Isaac Cory, already disposed to dismiss 
French limited companies, asserted in 1839 that: 
'the vast projects set on foot in America have dazzled us.  Their companies [are] 
upon a scale of almost reckless magnificence; and the land is covered with roads, 
canals, and public works.  In these we have deeply speculated; and upon us the 
loss is principally shifted ... America, no doubt, is benefited, but England has 
dearly paid for it'. 
Cory saw the United States as still akin to a colony - an immature economic entity which 
might itself benefit from joint stock investment, but could in the process cost investors 
dear.  He characterised the American companies as limited partnerships, and, in the wake 
of the 1837 failures, thought commandite 'something very nearly approaching to a 
fraud.'
105
 
Despite this, some persisted in asking if Britain was doing enough to support large-scale 
projects.  Prompted by the failure of the 1838 Trading Companies Bill, Burgess warned 
of 'the force of commercial rivalry springing up against us': 
 
'[T]he Americans have already grasped at the packet-trade by their "Liners", and 
at the carrying trade by their merchantmen ... [T]heir trading voyages in the 
Pacific ought to make us blush for our want of the legitimate spirit of commercial 
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enterprise and of power to combine the energies of industry with capital for novel 
and remote undertakings ... Such [limited liability joint stock] associations have 
proved the most powerful means of raising up suddenly the American Republic 
nearly to a level with England in her commercial station.'
106
 
 
American-style enterprise, and not commandite - 'the petty, trickish, miserable system of 
the French' - was where the real game was being played for limited liability.
107
  Burgess 
warned that Britons were proving sluggish in response.
108
  Americans were not only 
'intelligent, industrious, and frugal', but 
 
'distinguished for a spirit of daring and enterprise, which never suffers them to 
slumber or rest ... Hence they are rapidly outstripping the kingdoms of the Old 
World, not excepting England, in commercial connections.'
109
   
 
One reason for the greater display of initiative was said to be greater prospect of reward.  
Carey's views on this, originally published in an American commercial magazine, were 
given a boost in circulation when quoted by Mill in 1848 in Principles of Political 
Economy.
110
  Mill followed Carey in concluding that 'The best existing laws of 
partnership appear to be those of the New England States'.
111
  Carey saw England's small 
capitalists condemned to 'sell themselves for life for small fixed incomes', provided by 
government bonds and life assurance contracts, while in the US, ambitious small 
capitalists were 'the most useful of all classes'.
112
  American capital, although not as 
plentiful or cheap as English, was more democratic and more dynamic, and as such 
better-employed.  Mill, like Burgess, stressed the scale of many modern industrial 
developments, and how this had changed requirements made of capital: 
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'The progress of the productive arts requiring that many sorts of industrial 
occupation should be carried on by larger and larger capitals, the productive 
power of industry must suffer by whatever impedes the formation of large capitals 
through the aggregation of small ones'.
113
 
 
Here limited liability had both an economic and a social imperative.   
 
The same year that Mill published this, Thomas Wilson published his Partnership en 
Commandite.  Wilson saw the US using limited liability to build 'a chain of internal and 
instant communication of intelligence - commercial, political, or personal - such as a few 
years ago, before science had begun to apply herself to work for the happiness and 
welfare of mankind, would have been ridiculed as impossible'.
114
  Emblematic of this 
new age of dynamic connection was the electric telegraph, closely identified with the 
railways and - as one of its historians has put it - 'a potent emblem of the far-reaching 
influence of human intelligence'.
115
  Tom Standage considers that telegraph companies 
really took off in Britain in 1851, after the Great Exhibition.
116
  In many mid-century 
British assessments, the telegraph capped a trinity of modern, dynamic communication 
said now to be bringing people and countries together.  Burgess had waxed lyrical in 
1837 on the way in which 'railways and steamboats are beginning to break down the 
obstructions to commerce in every climate and among all complexions and characters of 
people'.
117
  Ten years later, Wilson's three icons of modern communication were: 'Steam 
Navigation, Railway intercommunication and the yet more rapid transmission of thought, 
by means of the Electric Telegraph'.
118
 
 
A progression from shipping - an area in which it was acknowledged that the US already 
challenged Britain - to other, definitively modern forms of communication had become 
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common.  In September 1851, The Economist warned that it was now 'not only in 
building and managing ships that the Americans surpass us'
119
 while Chambers' listed the 
United States' areas of pre-eminence as 'her railways, telegraphs, ship-building'.  Less 
concrete but no less important demonstrations of her practical strengths were, 'the 
universality of education, [and] the cheap diffusion of knowledge'.
120
  Americans were 
combining capital and intelligence in a productive network.  Joseph Whitworth 
considered that: 
 
'the advantages to be derived from the adoption of the Electric Telegraph, have in 
no country been more promptly appreciated than in the United States ... In the 
operations of commerce, the great capitals of the North, South and West are 
moved, as it were, by a common intelligence.'
121
 
The telegraph, symbol of shared intelligence, was used by British observers to point up a 
contrast between England's archaic partnership law and the democratising demands of 
modern technology.  John Newall lamented that 'the most extraordinary [invention] of the 
age, has in this country, to struggle under the disadvantage that all who take a share in a 
Company ... are liable "to their last shilling and acre" '.
122
  Wilson warned that Britain 
must recognise the lessons and ask herself 'why have so many useful men emigrated?'.
123
  
When he put this question in an 1852 publication, his earlier book about limited liability 
was re-advertised with an endorsement linking commandite to American progress.
124
  The 
message was driven home in his latest book: 
'America is every day getting ready to receive our mechanics and artisans, by 
offering a quiet, active use of their labour and capital, by a Law of Partnership 
which ... gives them the means of being workers and partners in the profits.'
125
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Strousberg likewise pictured British men 'of inventive and creative minds [leaving] the 
country in disgust'.
126
  Henry Colles, a Dublin barrister, told the city's Social Inquiry 
Society in 1852 that unlimited liability's 'gulf between capital and labour' contrasted with 
the 'great improvement of the habits, feelings and contentment ... of the [American] 
people in general'.
127
  Carey, remorselessly anti-aristocratic, took the argument into the 
realm of conspiracy theory, and Field also commented on Americans' instinctive 
tendency to attribute England's lack of limited liability to 'the sinister opposition of the 
millionaire'.
128
 
All these themes came together in a Times Editorial of November 1853: 
'[I]t is to be hoped that the Legislature will take up [the subject of partnership en 
commandite], and deliver this country from the incubus of a bad law, which 
presses on all its energies.  Limited liability has tended to make America what it 
is.  There almost every man is in business in one form or another.  A country does 
not prosper so much by the operation of a few capitalists as by the united 
enterprise of the multitude of men who have a little money; and in the United 
States there is full scope for such.  There half a dozen men own a ship, twenty an 
hotel, and small capitals are utilized which here lie idle; and not only the capital, 
but the energies of its owners; for under such a system men embark in concerns 
which they understand and can help to manage, and are not obliged to trust their 
money blindly to a body of millionaire directors whom they can only inefficiently 
control ... There can be little doubt that a similar law in this country would 
develope the industry of the middling class and add largely to the national 
wealth.'
129
 
Although The Times presented Americans' use of limited liability as straightforward, it 
had taken the best part of half a century to reach this point.  Relatively little had changed 
in English law over the same period, but at mid-century things now began to move faster.
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Chapter 7:  In pursuit of a capitalist community of interest, 1850-2 
 
Unusually, the next round of public interest in limited liability in England was sparked 
not by a financial crisis but an economic boom.  In the early 1850s, the economic climate 
eased and, in Hilton’s words, 'an unequivocally positive attitude to growth set in'.1  At the 
same time, the experience of continental revolution lent urgency to calls to combat social 
polarisation.  The two themes of social concern and economic momentum came together 
in April 1850 when MP Robert Slaney moved for a Select Committee to enquire into 
facilities for 'the Savings of the Middle and Working Classes'.  Justification was said to 
be the 'rapid increase in population and in wealth of the middle and industrious classes 
within the last half-century'.
2
 
Slaney was later recalled by John Ludlow, a leading Christian Socialist who had contact 
with him at this time, as, 
'a very worthy well-meaning man, but hazy-minded, so that while always 
fumbling after some good end or other he was seldom able either to see it clearly 
or to grasp the means for carrying it out.'
3
 
As Ludlow also said, Slaney's 'special hobby was commandite'.  He therefore had a cause, 
but - as yet - no witnesses to support it before his Committee.  Through two contacts, 
Henry Vaughan Johnson (a veteran of government inquiries) and the Christian Socialist 
writer and barrister Thomas Hughes, he was introduced to Ludlow, who was at this time 
a junior member of Ker's chambers - the 'only liberal' there.  Ludlow had an interest in 
France, having grown up there, and had investigated French workers' associations and 
their use of limited liability.
4
  As a specialist in incorporation law, he had relevant 
technical expertise, and through contacts with workers' associations he was now able to 
nominate working-men for Slaney's Committee. 
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Ludlow was personally convinced of the necessity of limited liability for larger 
companies.  He thought the mixed-liability regime of commandite 'exceedingly 
dangerous' in that context, citing French experience to claim that it merely resulted in use 
of men of straw.  For large companies, he said, 'you want absolutely limited liability ... It 
seems to me that the greater the capital the more necessary it is.'
5
  He thought limited 
liability of limited relevance to workers, whose 'real safety ... lay in this, that very few of 
them had anything to lose'.  'At the same time' however, he went on, 'I must note as a 
remarkable fact that, whilst the legal knowledge of English working men is generally 
very slender, we [have] found amongst them a very general fear of the unlimited 
responsibility of partners.'
6
  As David Lambourne has shown, Ludlow took practical steps 
to counter this fear, by providing a work-round based on loans.
7
 
When the Select Committee convened in April 1850, chaired by Slaney, it heard evidence 
from workers, lawyers (who included Ludlow and a reluctant Ker), one civil servant, one 
businessman and a building society actuary.  The composition of witnesses drew heavily 
on the Christian Socialists (represented by Ludlow, Hughes and Edward Vansittart Neale) 
and on London's Law Amendment Society (also represented by Vansittart Neale and by 
its founder-treasurer, James Stewart).  Vansittart Neale handed in a report, acknowledged 
by the Committee as: 'a late able Report of the Association for Improvement of the Law 
[which] has summed up the arguments on the question [of partnerships with limited 
liability], and gives the preponderance of the opinion in favour of such a change'.
8
  
Although the report had been initiated by concern for joint stock banks, it adopted a 
broader remit and, in its published form, talked largely about commandite.
9
  The 
Christian Socialist activists had also secured the coup of persuading John Stuart Mill to 
appear as a witness.  Mill had made it clear he disagreed with much in Christian 
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Socialism, but was willing to speak in support of workers' associations and limited 
liability. 
 
The Committee that assembled to hear what these people had to say was made up of 
Board of Trade officials and MPs with an acknowledged interest in industrial relations or 
related philanthropic initiatives.  The most senior Board official involved - President, 
Henry Labouchere - was of the sky-may-fall-in camp on limited liability.  He had 
recently made two parliamentary statements on the subject, both negative.  In February 
he had objected to the British Electric Telegraph Company's request for limited 
liability,
10
 and in April he objected to Slaney's request for a Select Committee.  He 'did 
not see how the present law of partnership could be altered, so as to allow persons to 
invest a limited capital on the principle of limited liability, without increasing the spirit of 
gambling amongst all classes of the community, which must lead to disastrous 
consequences'.
11
   
 
The Committee's most effective questioner proved to be MP John Abel Smith, member of 
a prominent banking family and openly sceptical as to the value of limited liability.  His 
and others' questions were primarily concerned with workers’ co-operative associations, 
with partnership law accorded support-role status as '[a]nother subject of complaint'.
12
  
Witnesses were divided as to how much benefit workers were likely to derive from 
limited liability. 
The star witness was undoubtedly Mill, whose views (published in the July 1850 
Committee Report) would be quoted repeatedly in later discussions.  In the wake of the 
1848 revolutions, financial polarisation, and its implications for social discontent, had 
become a popular topic for political economists.  George Porter investigated the grounds  
for the perceived polarisation (and disproved them to his own satisfaction)
13
 and on 4 
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April, Mill had raised the subject at the Political Economy Club.
14
  A few weeks later he 
reported to Slaney's Committee his concern about: 
'the advantages which the possession of large capital gives, which are very great, 
and which are growing greater and greater inasmuch as it is the tendency of 
business to be conducted on a large scale; these advantages are at present ... to a 
great degree a monopoly in the hands of the rich, and it is natural that the poor 
should desire to obtain those same advantages by association, the only way in 
which they can do so ... I do not think [intelligent working people] feel so much ... 
the inequality of property [as] the inequality consequent upon it, which unhappily 
exists now, namely that those who already have property have so much greater 
facilities for getting more, than those who have it not, have for getting it ...  There 
is a very growing feeling of that kind.'
15
 
 
Like Ludlow, Mill pointed out that workers were unlikely to have extensive resources 
that could benefit directly from limited liability's protection.
16
  In Principles of Political 
Economy he had argued that, 'the great value of a limitation of responsibility, as relates to 
the working classes, would be … to enable the rich to lend to those who are poor.'17  Now 
he went further, in envisaging workers also becoming entrepreneurs themselves.  He even 
thought there was 'no reason why they should not succeed', and added an important rider: 
even if 'experiments failed, the attempt to make them succeed would be a very important 
matter in the way of education to the working classes, both intellectually and morally.'
18
 
 
'Experiment' became a watchword in arguments for limited liability that had no 
downside.  Succeed or fail, the 'experiments' would be worthwhile.  Dublin barrister 
Jonathan Pim was one of many who would cite Mill, agreeing that: 
 
'workmen may be wrong in their opinion [that uniting their small capitals will 
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enable them to secure both the wages of labour and the employer's profit] but that 
is no reason that they should not have every facility afforded for making the 
experiment'.
19
 
 
Ludlow too told the 1850 Committee that workers' experimentation with capitalist 
enterprise was worthwhile even if it failed, because it 'would promote [workers'] 
submission to things as they are'.
20
  Watchmaker Joseph Millbank had more faith in 
workers' financial success, but when pushed on the point by the Committee politely 
acquiesced in a suggestion that it was important to 'make the experiment' and, if 
necessary, be 'undeceived'.
21
  Abel Smith clearly thought all such schemes a pipe dream.  
Ludlow later reported him taking Millbank aside after his evidence, to press him further: 
'Mr Millbank, surely you are too clever a man really to believe what you have been 
telling the committee?'
22
 
 
Thomas Wilson also gave evidence (and a copy of his 1848 book) to the Committee - a 
rare contribution by a businessman.  Several years on from the last financial crisis, 
Wilson argued that to steer capital into the railways and other selected large projects, 
through grants of limited liability, was to invite another - a point also made by Ludlow.
23
  
Wilson told the Committee that, 'nothing would drive out panics so much in England as 
societies en commandite ... I say that nothing will cure you but limited partnerships.'
24
 
 
The inquiry's findings were addressed in detail in the legal press.  The Law Magazine 
thought Slaney exceptionally 'fortunate' in his witnesses, and judged Mill's evidence 
(reproduced in full) 'the strength of the Report'.
25
  The Law Times reported that 'all the 
witnesses, with a single exception, strongly [advocated] a modification of the present 
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law, by permitting partnerships with limited liability'.
26
  This appeared to be in tune with 
the Law Times' own view that the current law 'takes too much care of creditors'.  There 
had in fact been two exceptions to the otherwise unanimous support for change: Sir Denis 
Le Marchant and actuary James Henry James.  Lawyer-witnesses had however, all 
supported reform and said that it was now standard practice to tell clients to have nothing 
to do with unlimited liability joint stock companies.
27
 Vansittart Neale claimed that most 
lawyer-members of the Law Amendment Society now favoured reform - it was amongst 
the commercial men that opinion remained divided.
28
  Relatively little reference was 
made by witnesses to the United States.  Ludlow disliked Americans' use of capital 'calls'  
as 'reverting to a certain extent to the principle of unlimited liability'.
29
 
 
Despite these claims, some on the Committee remained hard to convince.  Abel Smith 
disputed with fellow Committee-members John Ellis (a railway promoter) and William 
Ewart (Slaney's parliamentary ally in matters philanthropic, and a founder, with 
Brougham and Stewart, of the Law Amendment Society) whether unlimited liability 
really deterred the cautious.
30
  Abel Smith doubted that the 'spirit of enterprise, already so 
much more developed [in England] than in any other part of Europe', needed further 
encouragement from limited liability.
31
  Workers needed financial security, not 
encouragement to speculate.  The workers themselves received a good press.  In the 
months following the inquiry, the Board of Trade approved a number of charters for 
worker-related philanthropic schemes while continuing to hold the line against 
commercial initiatives.
32
  The Committee's final Report lamented the legal 'obstacles' put 
in the way of 'intelligent' workers, while avoiding much mention of technicalities.
33
  
Opinion was clearly divided on these even amongst limited liability's supporters.  Ludlow 
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had favoured full limited liability for joint stock companies, with doubts about 
commandite, while Mill had given an 'unqualified opinion' in favour of commandite and 
'an undecided opinion' for joint stock use.
34
  Limited liability had nevertheless received 
clear endorsement. 
The Committee's findings were also reported in the wider press, with extensive interest   
in the social angle, a topical concern.  Walter Cooper, a tailor who had appeared before 
the Committee as a representative of a workers' association, referred in his evidence to 
Morning Chronicle articles which had made 'a very great impression on the public 
mind'.
35
  These were the 'Labour and the Poor' series written by campaigning journalist 
Henry Mayhew and published throughout 1850.  Occasionally a newspaper ventured a 
technical opinion.  One Scottish article noted in September 1850 that: 
'The Joint-Stock Companies Act, by creating an unlimited responsibility ... and 
yet depriving them of all control over their directors, and all right of prosecution 
in the event of misapplication of the funds of the society - has had a very 
damaging effect on private enterprise.  The means of investment are narrowed, the 
opportunities of commercial enterprise frequently frustrated ... and the operative 
population are entirely prevented from reaping the advantages, which industry, 
sobriety, and union of interests might otherwise effect.'
36
 
Legal shortcomings were tied unequivocally to social polarisation: 'We are daily 
becoming more wealthy as a nation, but we, at the same time, see the chasm between the 
wealthy and the poor daily widening.'
37
 
 
Magazines and periodicals were also chiefly interested in the social implications of the 
Report - The Economist commended commandite as a 'most desirable resource for the 
savings of the industrious poor'.
38
  Ludlow contributed an article for Chambers's Papers 
for the People, in which he said again that practical experience would teach working men 
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respect for capital-management and encourage them to 'acquiesce in the existing relations 
between labour and capital'.
39
 
 
Social concern often took systematic form.  When Charles Babbage had considered 
'limited responsibility partnerships' in 1832, he envisaged: 
'many persons possessed of moderate capital, who ... might [find] out inventive 
workmen, whose want of capital prevents them from realizing their projects.  If 
they could enter into a limited partnership with persons so circumstanced, they 
might, ... by supplying to judicious schemes, render a service to the country, and 
secure a profit for themselves.'
40
 
 
This vision was now projected onto a whole population of workers and capitalists.  
Francis Newman, Unitarian and political economist, enthused about the promised 
combination of social sympathy and systematisation, and thought that: 
'no country in Europe offers so great facilities as England for thus blending and 
interfusing the elements of our national Economy ... In a moral point of view the 
law of Commandite would be of great value in England ...  Altogether, its 
tendency would be to cement opposite orders'.
41
 
With most such comment framed in the context of commandite and workers' associations, 
French terms of reference predominated but American ones were occasionally cited too.  
These were more likely to focus on competitiveness than social concern.  A Times 
leading article warned in December 1850 that Britain's merchants and shipowners were 
now engaged in a race with 'a gigantic and unshackled rival'.  This prompted 'A Banker' 
to write in to ask why 
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'Americans would seem to take such a decided lead of us in the building and 
equipment of ships? ...  May not, or does not, the evil lie in the laws which 
regulate the distribution of capital in this country? ... Why should not an 
Englishman have the same facilities for disposing of his capital as an 
American?'
42
 
 
In response, 'A Trader' wrote to ask how, if this were correct, so 'many of our most 
distinguished merchants who began life with no capital have risen to the high position 
they now enjoy'?
43
  To which, the reply came back that 'English energy and English 
industry overcome the greatest difficulties.'  This was followed by a call to action: 'let our 
laws not be such as to make capital a monopoly'.
44
 
Slaney was sufficiently encouraged by the response to his Committee to request a second, 
this time specifically to consider partnership law.  His rhetoric on making the request 
suggests he may have found time in the interim to read something by Henry Carey.  
'[T]hree millions of the most intelligent and industrious of the community' were left in a 
'state of depression and degradation' by lack of limited liability, in contrast to 'the 
splendour, the magnificence, and the luxury' enjoyed by a few.  Unreformed partnership 
law was 'cramping the energies of the people', so that, 
'hundreds ... had been eager to ... expatriate themselves to the other side of the 
globe [and] seek a livelihood across the Atlantic ...  [T]here being no easy mode 
for the investment of capital by the middle and humbler classes, it was driven into 
the great bankers' hands, and into the hands of the great monopolists, who would 
only lend it to persons of great credit and position in the country ... [The law] 
limited the distribution of money to the great capitalists, who thus absorbed the 
whole wealth of the country.'
45
 
In support, Slaney cited Mill, and his endorsement of American practices.  Men rushed 
into bubble companies 'only because they were prevented [from] embarking in really 
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beneficial schemes'.
46
 
It fell to Labouchere to respond.  He rejected all suggestion that 'the application of capital 
had been crippled' and repeated his fears of 'a paralysation of trade' were limited liability 
to be made widely available. He allowed however, that this was 'an important and a much 
controverted question'.  Unfortunately, it was not one on which he had been able 'to come 
to any very decided opinion', and authorities were 'almost equally divided'.
47
  The answer 
was clearly to hold another inquiry. 
The Committee that met in February 1851 for this purpose included several names from 
the year before, including Abel Smith.  Notable MP additions were Richard Cobden, 
George Glyn (a banker, and known critic of joint stock banks) and the independent 
Conservative Thomas Sotheron, who all took an active part in discussions.  The 
composition of witnesses was notably narrower than before.  Workers had been present in 
1850, but a year later, as Donna Loftus has pointed out, 'on the whole, the working 
classes were conspicuous by their absence'.
48
  Nominally, they were still present, but as 
tractable subjects under discussion, rather than physical presences who might speak for 
themselves.  In the absence of social cues to the contrary, professionals were free to 
assume that their abstractions represented a natural way to order and control reality.  
Absent, along with workers, was any suggestion that profits might be the moral preserve 
of physical labour.  Witnesses took the legitimacy of capitalist profits for granted, and 
when they reached for an illustrative example were likely to describe someone like 
themselves.  Cecil Fane, a Bankruptcy Commissioner cited the instance of a disappointed 
would-be investor, deterred by potential liability, who was, like himself, 'a successful 
lawyer'.
49
  James Stewart, another lawyer, simply talked about himself.
50
 
About half the witnesses - thirteen of the twenty-seven - were lawyers and their evidence 
took up nearly all the discussion time.  A further four were academics or writers: 
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Babbage, Mill, Porter (who all submitted evidence in written form) and law-reformer 
Leone Levi.  All four gave categorically-strong statements in favour of reform.  Mill did 
not do much more this time than state flatly that the case against limited liability had been 
lost, now that usury had been conceded.  To continue to hold out, and argue that 'the 
profits of business should be wholly monopolized by those who have had time to 
accumulate, or the good fortune to inherit capital' was 'evidently absurd'.
51
  Evidence was 
also provided by six merchants (whose opinions on reform were mixed) and a number of 
overseas representatives who reported favourably on international experience of limited 
liability. 
Most discussion centred on commandite.  Barrister John Phillimore thought the full-
limited-liability société anonyme 'open to great dangers' (though then declined to 
elaborate on what these might be, not having been asked in advance to look at it).
52
  He 
also took the same line as Ludlow the year before, in saying that he had 'no doubt at all 
that [had alternative investment outlets been available through limited partnerships] 
railway speculation among the middle classes would not have been carried to the 
extravagant extent to which it was carried'.
53
  Pushed by Abel Smith on whether 
economic performance had not anyway been very strong in England, and usury-repeal 
done enough to encourage it further, he gave a now-standard answer.  The nation might 
have done very well in absolute terms, but 'not in proportion to its resources'.
54
  Like a 
number of witnesses, he did not see why banking should be excluded from limited 
liability. 
In pro-reform evidence,  railway-mania was now a standard point of reference for 
warnings about the dangers in keeping capital artificially dammed up.  In the interests of 
competitiveness and social stability, it must be dispersed and allowed to flow freely.  In 
describing how this should work, City merchant John Howell, like many others, favoured 
water-based metaphors: 'it is irrigation, and not inundation, that fertilizes our fields'.
55
  
Legislators must look beyond the 'bugbear' of overtrading and recognise that they were 
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living in a new age, in 'the infancy of grand scientific discoveries'.
56
 
Howell also submitted a copy of a report drawn up by a City committee, of which he was 
a member.
57
  This had solicited the views of European and American contacts (chiefly 
lawyers) on questions framed with an eye to Slaney's inquiries.  Its clearest finding was 
lack of support for commandite-enabled workers' associations; these were only found in 
France, a product of the 1848 revolution, and unknown elsewhere.  Even in France, the 
most positive thing any professional could find to say about them was that the 
'experiment' was 'too recent to give a decided opinion'.
58
  Most judged them a failure.  
Commandite companies 'with shares' also received a decided no-confidence vote, as a 
magnet for fraud.  Commandite partnerships, with investor-partners but no transferable 
shares, were however, widely endorsed, although the full-limited liability en nom collectif 
was said to be more popular in Belgium.  An Amsterdam lawyer affirmed that  
commandite partnerships had 'produced great good and little evil', but that 'Anonymous 
societies are much more dangerous' - a view shared by others.
59
  Respondents drew 
correlations between company-forms and varying economic fortunes, with perhaps the 
most sensible coming from the Dutch lawyer who said that 'Commandite partnerships are 
proved by experience to be advantageous to the community; but are subject to the 
vicissitudes of commerce'.
60
  Limited partnerships were in use in New York, and given 
enthusiastic endorsement by lawyers there, but not in other American commercial 
centres.  The report made the caveat that limited liability's use (except in the US) was 
backed by stronger bankruptcy laws than existed in England.  There could though be no 
doubting the endorsement given commandite.  Howell said that this had convinced some 
City sceptics of the value of limited liability.  These did not include William Hawes, 
chair of the City committee and largely responsible for compiling its report.  Hawes was 
a well-connected business figure, brother of an MP, and himself a long-standing 
chairman of the Society of Arts and committee-member of the Law Amendment Society.  
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His own evidence to Slaney's Committee was more sceptical than Howell's: 'I cannot 
approve of the principle of commandite as an abstract proposition'.
61
  Greater use of 
limited liability should not be contemplated in advance of bankruptcy reform.   
Another copy of the Law Amendment Society's 1849 report on partnership law was also 
handed in to the Committee by Stewart.  Although he agreed with its pro-reform 
conclusions, he was diffident about its pedigree and suggested that if the Committee 
wanted substantiation they should interview Bankruptcy Commissioner Cecil Fane. 
Fane's subsequent evidence provided the meat of reformist argument, an eloquent 
testimony to 'everything which is calculated to unite enterprise and capital'.
62
  He had 
made his own inquiry into the 1793 Waugh v Carver judgment, and concluded it was 'not 
law, but mistaken political economy'.
63
  England would be nothing without joint stock 
companies.
64
  Railways were emblematic of modern dynamism, and 'we all know that 
railways never would have been made but for the law of limited liability'.
65
  Fane talked 
freely of '[i]nnocent creditors and innocent shareholders'.
66
  High-sounding names were 
the outdated mark of unlimited liability.  If Parliament wished to check bubble-schemes, 
it should cancel company promoters' individual liability, and make all companies subject 
to the law of bankrupts.
67
  The fact that England had managed to do so well without 
reform until now was evidence only of 'the extreme industry and vigour of our people'.
68
 
American experience was also more in evidence than a year before.  American diplomat 
and lawyer Bancroft Davis testified in person, stressing the lack of social stratification in 
American enterprise ('we are all working people there'
69
).  He wished to correct the 
impression that Lowell's arrangements were typical of New England manufacturing 
corporations (most had 'individually liable' stockholders) but, in answer to a leading 
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question, agreed that a 'stake in the hedge' worked well there and in banks.
70
  British 
banks, by contrast, were discussed in the unfavourable light of the North of England Joint 
Stock Bank failure.  Press reports had been monitoring the mounting cost of this to 
shareholders, with '£70 per share already engulphed by this awful and most distressing 
concern'.
71
  Two solicitor-witnesses, Thomas Lietch of North Shields and Edwin Field, 
now gave details of the failure, blamed by both on unlimited liability.  Lietch criticised 
bank officials for looking to 'the composition of the share list', when they should have 
been monitoring the quality of the paper in which the bank dealt.
72
  Abel Smith suggested 
the problem was not with the expected regulation, but with officials' failure to implement 
it well.  Lietch however, held his ground.  Joint stock banks should not be looking to 'the 
credit of innocent shareholders, who know nothing of what is going on'.  They needed 
their own processes and checks, not the misapplication of private bank ones.
73
  Unlimited 
liability pointed people in the wrong direction
74
 and finding reputable directors willing to 
take it on was not as easy 'as it would have been 20 years ago'.
75
  Leitch refused to be 
drawn on American banking practices, and made short shrift of Scottish banks' use of 
unlimited liability.  The Scots had always known anyway to look to paid-up capital, and 
not 'the character of persons composing the company' as the basis of credit.
76
  They did 
not need limited liability to instil good habits. 
Solicitor John Duncan, summoned to give evidence yet again, was equally forthright: 'the 
time has arrived when joint-stock companies framed under the Joint Stock Companies' 
Act ought to get limited liability introduced into all deeds of settlement for their 
formation'.
77
  As reported in the Legal Observer: 'a great majority of the witnesses 
examined ... and singular to say, all the professional witnesses, were favourable to the 
introduction of the Law of Commandite'.
78
  The exceptions were William Cotton (former 
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Governor of the Bank of England), Brougham and Ker.  Cotton took the same view of 
joint stock banks as Henry Burgess (only country bankers lent to 'useful occupations') and 
could not contemplate company-liberalisation without seeing first 'a great deal more 
intelligence among the general mass of the people'.
79
  He did not believe that investors 
paid much heed to numbers - 'most people' still only looked at names.
80
  Brougham had 
been deterred from backing reform by reading Ker's 1837 report.  Ker could not bring 
himself to contemplate more than a relaxation in the availability of charters.  He lamented 
the current state-of-affairs (the Joint Stock Companies Act was 'an infliction' and the 
Winding-up Acts 'little less than a public nuisance') but remained gloomily 'hopeless as 
regards legal reform'.
81
 
When the Committee came to issue its Report it made two clear recommendations: that 
the cost of charters be reduced, and that industrious men defrauded by a partner in small-
capital associations should have legal remedy against such fraud.  It was otherwise longer 
on polemic than commitments, with much of that polemic distinctly paternalist.  The 
wealthy were the 'best guides for their humbler and less experienced neighbours' and their 
names in prospectuses 'afford[ed] security that the enterprise ... was likely to be well 
conducted.'  Charters should be granted 'under the supervision of a competent authority', 
with double liability also used.  This was a Board of Trade preference, and Board 
influence was more apparent in the Report than in the evidence-sessions.  This latest 
Report referred back to the Board's 1837 Report, 'where opinions entitled to great weight, 
were almost equally divided'.  The reality of usury-reform was acknowledged, in 
allowing that lenders should be able to lend money for twelve months at an interest rate 
varying with the rate of profits.  Partnership reform and limited liability were however, 
postponed for consideration by a proposed Commission 'of adequate legal and 
commercial knowledge'.  It was important to guard against 'undue or undeserved credit or 
encouragement to speculation'.  This conservatism reflected the editorial oversight of 
Edward Cardwell, rather than Labouchere, 'prevented by a domestic calamity from 
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attending this Committee'.
82
  Cardwell proved a like-minded substitute: 'I was able to be 
present only at the preparation of the Report.  I succeeded in rejecting every thing 
proposed by Mr. Slaney in favour of limited liability'.  Cardwell favoured 'the high 
authority of Mr. Cotton' over the opinions of the twenty-five people who disagreed with 
him.
83
  The Report trod a cautious line, and repeated verbatim Labouchere's earlier 
statement that 'the best authorities are divided on the subject'.
84
   
Whatever may have been the truth of this, supporters of limited liability were - in modern 
parlance - now 'on message', and putting out predictably consistent statements.  The most 
obvious source of these was the Law Amendment Society, making efforts to live up to its 
name.  The Society was not universally popular amongst London lawyers, some of whom 
thought it elitist or the vehicle of a self-righteous cabal.  The Legal Examiner complained 
that 'the real business of the Society is in the hands of a few individuals' and was no more 
complimentary about the Society's quarterly Law Review ('full of twaddle') which tended 
to publish more discursive pieces than were found in other legal publications.
85
  A 
reformist element had now been pushing the cause of limited liability in Society 
discussions and publications (and occasionally beyond) since the General Meeting of 
March 1849.
86
  It had to contend with significant disagreement on detail, as well as the 
opposition of die-hard conservatives.  Prominent amongst these was John Elliott, a 
merchant-member with a recognised interest in bankruptcy law, who could be relied upon 
to decry limited liability and its associated intuitions at any opportunity.  Elliott's 
physically-intuited sense of punishment was in evidence at an 1856 General Meeting, 
when he told Henry Mayhew (also a member) that his hopes of abolishing capital 
punishment went against 'the just and natural sentiment of vengeance, which ought to be 
encouraged in the heart of everyone'.
87
  A Society of Arts debate about flogging saw him 
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take on Slaney and 'the effeminate and diseased sentimentality which was [now] too 
common': juvenile offenders 'must be hurt'.
88
  He voiced similar sentiments at an 1852 
Banking Institute discussion of partnership reform
89
, and told Slaney at another 1854 
Society of Arts session that it was socially irresponsible to go about saying partnership 
laws were made for the rich.
90
  Limited liability was peddled by 'theoretical dreamers'.  
Elliott was in a minority in the Law Amendment Society, albeit a persistent one.  Pro-
limited liability reformists could usually count on resolving discussion in their favour, 
with opposition consigned to a statement of protest or qualification.
91
  The Society was a 
largely metropolitan entity, though it made efforts to establish connections on a national 
scale.  It was particularly proud of its merchant and politician membership, drawn from 
beyond the world of practising lawyers.  Robert Lowe became a member at this time, 
before his 1852 election to Parliament, and took an active part in discussions.   
Beyond the Society, limited liability was also now widely supported in the legal press.  
The Legal Magazine took a self-consciously even-handed stance,
92
 but the Legal 
Observer (edited by solicitor Robert Maugham) joined the Law Review in backing 
reform.  Even the Law Times was at this time approving, though, as discussion moved 
beyond headline proposals to detail, that was soon to change. 
Limited liability was also now benefiting from intellectual connections.  Arguments 
about initiative and national dynamism tied it to the campaign for patent law reform, and 
in his 1851 evidence, John Duncan made a direct connection in saying that partnership 
law was the 'chief oppression' to which an inventor was exposed.
93
  Both issues played 
off the social threat that loomed behind stifled initiative, and could still scare property-
owners in the aftermath of 1848.  The Law Review's first detailed consideration of limited 
partnerships recommended them as a way of  'meeting a desire for change in the shape of 
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socialism and communism, which will become overwhelming here as well as elsewhere, 
unless means be taken to allow of fit arrangements of an intermediate character'.
94
  
Patent-law correspondence in the Journal of the Society of Arts carried similar 
warnings.
95
 
There was also now a standard argument about systemic fault.  Arthur Scratchley was a 
'consulting actuary', employed by a number of large insurance companies, and a 'well-
known writer on building societies'.
96
  He published a book on associative investment in 
1851, in which, like others, he traced: 
'the cause of many a monetary crisis ... to the contracted nature of existing 
investments, so that, when a new speculation arises, the promoters of which 
succeed in ... obtaining unusual facilities by an expensive charter or special act, 
there is ... an unnatural rush to the new outlet.'
97
 
Companies were 'in the hands of reckless speculators, whose unlimited liability is good 
for nothing'.  The answer was to administer a 'great impetus to the institution of superior 
trading companies' through commandite.
98
  In support, Scratchley cited The Times.   
All these represented professional concern, but there are indications that interest could 
spill over into the public.  On 27 October 1851 local MP William Fox gave a well-
received talk in Oldham in support of Slaney and partnerships en commandite (which he 
erroneously said were 'very frequent indeed in America').
99
  A more contentious instance 
occurred in London on 10 September, when promoters of the new Marylebone Gas 
Consumers' Company ran into flak at a 'densely crowded' meeting of local ratepayers, 
held in a pub.  The Marylebone company was one of a new breed of metropolitan gas 
companies, which promised consumers the chance to take control of their own gas-supply 
(and its pricing) and in the process attracted vociferous opposition from rival gas 
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companies.  Order - of a sort - was being kept at the meeting by a police presence
100
 
when trouble was triggered by a question 'as to the liability of shareholders', put by one 
well-informed ratepayer, a Mr. Burgess (apparently no relation to Henry or the rival 
companies).  The Marylebone company Secretary attempted to deflect the resultant 
'uproar' with a flat statement that 'the liability of the shareholders is to the amount of their 
shares and no more'.  This however, failed to wash, as later reported in the press. Mr. 
Burgess quoted the Joint Stock Companies Act, section 66, to him, and was unimpressed 
by 'an opinion given by three first men at the bar'. 'Was it not true that ... the Great 
Central [Gas Consumers'] Company applied to Parliament, at the expense of many 
thousand pounds, to get an act to limit the liability of shareholders to the amount of their 
shares'?  When told that the Marylebone company had no intention of applying for such 
an act, he said that he 'had known many people ruined by such partnerships, and ... 
confessed that he should not like to take shares after the feeble explanation which had 
been offered.'
101
 
This meeting ended in two men shaking their fists at each other and trading insults, egged 
on by hecklers.  No doubt the ratepayers of Marylebone enjoyed their evening's 
entertainment, but underlying the company officials' discomfiture was a judgment call 
that threatened to come unstuck.  Underlying the judgment call was some complicated 
law.  As Mr. Burgess said, joint stock companies were still governed by the 1844 Act, 
now as amended by further Acts of 1845 and 1847.
102
  The 1845 Act had made general 
provisions for joint stock a matter of statute.  As Cooke describes it: 'Parliament no 
longer had to deal with the joint stock aspect of a public utility company [but] only with 
the powers that should go into the special act for the specific purpose concerned ... 
[I]ndividual companies might need a statute ... letters patent ... or merely registration' 
according to which 'clothing of corporate privileges' they were thought to need.
103
  The 
choice of those depended upon more law and not a few conventions, but even lawyers did 
not agree on how these worked.
104
  Gas companies who applied for limited liability could 
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usually expect to be granted it but were not necessarily thought to need it, since they were 
not traditionally thought to need protection from creditors.
105
  It emerged at the 
Marylebone meeting, under questioning, that the Great Central Gas Consumers' 
Company had applied for a parliamentary Act because the Commissioners of Sewers had 
insisted on it.  Mr. Burgess's conclusion was that if the Marylebone company failed to do 
likewise, 'we can have little confidence in them'.
106
 
A few months after this rumpus, Ipswich MP John Cobbold told a Parliamentary 
committee that times had indeed changed.  Telegraph companies, such as the one he had 
recently joined, had formerly been able to raise money without a guarantee of limited 
liability, but now:  
'[t]he money market and capitalists generally had objections to advance money to 
companies of this description without a proviso of limited liability.  It was a 
comparatively easy thing for the old Electric Telegraph Company, whose liability 
under their act of Parliament was not limited, to raise their capital, but it was a 
very different and difficult thing for a second company to do, in the face of a 
confederated monopoly.  Many instances might be mentioned of joint-stock 
companies failing for want of limited liability.'
107
 
Telegraph companies were usually associated with railway finance - an area in which 
limited liability was the norm.  Men associated with railway capital feature heavily in 
limited liability disputes, from John Duncan, a 'speculating solicitor' with an interest in 
several railway companies, to Samuel Morton Peto, chairman of the Eastern Counties and 
Chester and Holyhead railway companies, and deputy-chairman of the Commission of 
Sewers at the time that the Great Central Gas Consumers' Company was negotiating its 
way through contracts.  All three of these companies aroused controversy, some of it 
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remarkably bitter, about their use of limited liability.  A common complaint was that they 
would use capital-raising clout to establish a monopoly, beginning with artificially-low 
rates but only waiting to clear the field of competitors before putting up prices.  The same 
accusations - and some of the same names - were to feature in the next round of 
parliamentary agitation about limited liability.  Meanwhile, from the other end of the 
social spectrum, a social threat continued to be invoked.  In December 1851, the Daily 
News warned that: 
'Already in France a fierce war has broken out between capital and labour.  
England likewise has felt the shock ... Old institutions are powerfully assailed; 
and who shall say that a new era may not be at hand?  Capital is denounced as the 
tool of selfishness.  Its interests are painted as hostile to those of the mass of 
mankind ...What device can be more seasonable and more salutary than the 
conversion of the workmen into fellow capitalists with the master?  What can 
consolidate so firmly a community of interest between those whom the tendency 
of the age is apt to array in direct antagonism to each other?  Partnership en 
commandite seems admirably adapted to bring about these valuable results.'
108
   
Not everyone was so inclined to rate the chances of a company-structure averting 
revolution.  The Morning Chronicle was 'sceptical as to the validity of the grounds on 
which [reform] is deprecated', but nevertheless backed Mill.
109
  
This was the context at the beginning of 1852, when Slaney decided to try again for 
action.  In February, he moved in Parliament for 'a Standing Committee or unpaid 
Commission' to examine 'obstacles' in the way of investment by the 'humbler classes'.
110
  
Seconded again by Ewart, he invoked Porter, Mill 'and several other intelligent persons' 
to make his case.
111
  In response, Labouchere confirmed that he 'still remained averse to 
any such great fundamental change'.  He had taken advantage of a recent Bill to reduce 
charter costs by 'one-fourth', and would allow that it was regrettable that the 1844 Joint 
Stock Act should - inadvertently - deter workers' associations.  It was a pity it was not 
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possible merely to repeal those aspects of the Act that affected workers' associations, but 
the law was constructed in such a way that a broader review was needed.  He hoped this 
could be done without overturning unlimited liability, a business-standard 'suited ... to the 
circumstances and habits of the country'.
112
 
This position was immediately attacked by MPs Cobden, Headlam and George Moffatt, 
who all said that the weight of evidence was against Labouchere.  Cobden then went on 
to say considerably more.  He 'could never see why any given number of gentlemen, 
because they had capital, power, and influence enough in that House to carry their Bill, 
should obtain a privilege which they denied to humbler individuals'.  The effect of the 
current law was to give protection to City men who did not need it.  It could hardly be 
surprising if William Cotton had shown himself 'hostile' to reform, in the recent inquiry 
in which they had both participated.  City opposition was however, characterised by a 
'total absence of argument' and typical of men 'accustomed to decide the course of the 
market by their will and word, and not accustomed to give reasons for what they did'.  
Cobden finished with a standard call for free-flowing capital: limited liability 'would 
diffuse capital in this country'.
113
 
In response, Abel Smith and Sotheron said that limited liability would not help workers, 
whose real grievance was the lack of a forum for resolving their disputes with 
commercial partners.
114
  In the various exchanges it was evident that there were two 
points at issue - workers' associations and limited liability - and that each had its own 
sponsors.  Labouchere did his best to smooth over the differences between them and 
recover his own position, with the promise of another inquiry and an assurance it would 
take an open-minded approach.  He had merely been stating his own position on limited 
liability.  Urged on both sides to accept the promise of a Commission, Slaney withdrew 
his motion.   
The prospect of another official inquiry into limited liability, however hedged about by 
the Board of Trade, drew another flurry of comment from lawyers.  A Law Magazine 
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article, arguing for limited partnerships, stressed the dynamism of modern capital.
115
  
Matthew Begbie, yet another barrister interested in the topic, wrote a clever piece for the 
Magazine, reprinted as a pamphlet, which claimed to show how commandite investment 
could be achieved under current law.
116
  (Legal press reviews gave him marks for effort, 
but did not agree he had managed it.
117
)  Solicitor and parliamentary agent John Newall 
published a pamphlet in the form of an open letter to Labouchere.
118
  Partnership reform 
and limited liability had now been discussed so many times without action, he said, that 
'at last the mercantile community begin to despair of any measure being adopted'.
119
  Too 
many workers were being tempted across the Atlantic, and when the next wave of 
speculative investment came, it too would be heading to the US.  Newall's assessment of 
the 1844 Act differed from Labouchere's: 'I believe I may assert, without fear of 
contradiction, that a more unpopular piece of legislation was scarcely ever passed'.
120
  
Newall called for a straightforward general company law, lower fees for Special Acts, 
more access to limited liability, the introduction of commandite partnerships (with 
registration requirements for commanditaires' capital), and a forum for resolution of 
partnership disputes.
121
  The Law Times 'approve[d] most heartily' of his suggestions, and 
added its own criticism of the 1844 Act.
122
 
Whether the promised inquiry would have proved any more conclusive than its 
predecessors was destined to remain unknown, as before it could materialise, the 
government of Lord John Russell fell.  On 27 February 1852 it was replaced by a new 
administration, led by Lord Derby.  For Ludlow and the Christian Socialists at least, this 
signaled a turning-point in their fortunes.  Ludlow had become increasingly frustrated 
with the lack of political support for a proposal to give workers' associations liability-
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protection under the Friendly Societies Act, and repeated attempts to promote a draft Bill 
had come to nothing.  The latest blow was a discouraging interview with Labouchere in 
January.
123
  Now however, 'in place of an effete Whig Ministry which had shilly-shallied 
with us through two sessions, we had a dashing Tory one, anxious to curry favour with 
the working class'.
124
  By early March, the Christian Socialists' cause had been taken up 
by a 'Cabinet Minister',
125
 and a further Select Committee - on Friendly Societies - was 
convened on 30 April.  This presented a confused picture on limited liability. One witness 
reported that 'lawyers consider that the [current] Friendly Societies Acts give to any 
society enrolled under them the same privileges as a charter [including] a limited 
liability'.
126
  Another described how a group of clergymen had explicitly made 
themselves personally liable in order to underwrite a mutual association.
127
  The case for 
reform was meanwhile given a boost by W.R. Greg's 'Investments of the Working 
Classes', published in the Edinburgh Review and as a pamphlet, and widely discussed in 
the press.
128
  Greg was more interested in workers' associations than limited liability per 
se, but nevertheless favoured commandite.  He advised politicians to stop worrying about 
workers losing their savings ('it is the birthright of Britons to play at ducks and drakes 
with their money'
129
) and maintained that though their associations had had a bad press 
overseas, they were more likely to succeed in Britain.
130
  Britain's workers were no 
longer children and should be given scope to invest, in accordance with their 'power' and 
'intelligence'.
131
 To withhold this was to invite class enmity and Socialism. 
The Christian Socialists had expected the parliamentary Bill that resulted from this debate 
to include limited liability but, as Ludlow later reported, 'the enemy [then played] a trick' 
by inserting a clause which applied unlimited liability.  After Hughes and Vansittart 
Neale went to see Slaney and Sotheron, two of the Bill's sponsors, the clause was revised, 
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though not to Ludlow's complete satisfaction.  '[A]ll we could eventually obtain was a 
limitation of the liability ... to two years after a member's ceasing to belong to the society, 
being one year less than in joint stock companies'.
132
  A last-ditch attempt by Samuel 
Carter to add limited liability to the Bill at its third Commons reading came to nothing.
133
  
The Daily News, which saw the Bill as 'a step, but a very short step, towards amending 
the law of partnership', thought the lack of limited liability a fatal flaw, which would 
mean the resultant Act would 'not be productive of the benefit to the working classes its 
benevolent author intended that it should'.
134
  Ludlow however, accepted the compromise 
and told workers' associations they should not let it deter them.
135
  The 1852 Industrial 
and Provident Societies Act permitted workers’ organisations to be formed on a trustee 
basis, and effectively marked the end of Christian Socialist sponsorship of partnership 
reform.  There is widespread agreement in the historiography on this point.  Cottrell, 
Hilton and Saville all consider that the momentum which limited liability gained by 
association with co-operatives and working-class investment was largely offset by the 
1852 Act.
136
 
Other avenues to public interest were however, still open.  One was banking, where 
continuing difficulties ensured that shareholder liabilities remained an ever-present 
concern.  In October 1850, the Bankers' Magazine had noted that the 'principle of 
unlimited responsibility of the shareholders shows its efficacy with terrible earnestness' in 
the latest bank-failure.
137
  Bank shareholders were effectively being singled out for 
payments 'not exacted from any other class of proprietors'.
138
  In November 1851 the 
failure of the Monmouth and Glamorganshire Joint-stock Bank prompted another round 
of gloom.
139
  It also prompted a pamphlet by John Bailey Brown, which called for limited 
liability for bank shareholders and blamed the 1847 crisis on lack of it.
140
  Brown echoed 
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Carey, in saying that 'the law shuts out small capitalists, who are ... the class who most 
require safe investments'.
141
  In April 1852, his pamphlet was discussed by the Bankers' 
Magazine, which offered some guarded recommendations of its own.
142
  Brown then 
wrote in to say that 'in my humble opinion ... [these] do not grapple with the real evil we 
have to contend against, viz., unlimited liability'.  Respectable men recoiled 'in perfect 
horror' from taking this on, and without reform 'all attempts to ensure good banking ... 
will only end in disappointment'.
143
  A Swansea bank manager wrote to join in debate, 
which rumbled on through several editions.
144
  Meanwhile, a July ruling by the Lord 
Chancellor in a North of England Banking Company case again highlighted difficulties in 
holding shareholders liable.
145
  In November, a correspondent wrote to complain at the 
'continual process of degeneracy' that personal liability had produced in banking, thereby 
setting off another dispute.
146
 
Books also weighed in with argument.  In July 1852 journalist John Lalor published 
Money and Morals: A Book for the Times, which included a section calling for 'Reform in 
the law of Partnership.'
147
  Lalor was closely-connected to some of limited liability's 
strongest supporters, a friend of both Mill and Field.
148
  He was also a convert to 
Unitarianism, editor of The Inquirer, and his arguments had a strong social content.  
These were governed by an overriding desire to avert socialism.
149
  Lalor cited Babbage, 
Mill and Greg in support of his belief that workers should be free to make their own 
economic mistakes, and so 'grow both in wisdom and in charity'.
150
 
Thomas Wilson also published another book at this time, now under his own name.  
England had been guilty of 'wild, reckless and wicked trading' in 1847 and must reform 
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her financial system if she wished to retain the respect of her trading partners.
151
  
Memories of the 1847 crisis loomed over discussion.  As David Morier Evans had 
predicted in its immediate aftermath, 'commercial distress .. cannot fail to carry ... 
disagreeable remembrances'.
152
  When Dublin barrister Jonathan Pim now urged adoption 
of limited liability, he too recalled how in 1847: 
'The world was surprised by learning the weakness of many whose solvency it 
had considered as indubitable, and by finding that business to such a vast extent 
had been carried on with such a disproportionate amount of capital.'
153
 
Pim blamed this on unlimited liability and concentrated financial power, which needed to 
be diffused.  Apprehension that it might otherwise flood and again de-stabilise the 
financial system meant that amongst the myriad metaphors about free-flowing capital 
were others more concerned with pinning capital down.  Brown's pamphlet argued that 
limited liability would institute 'a permanent in place of a floating capital' in banks.
154
  
John Howell warned the 1851 Select Committee that in the absence of reform, 'the capital 
of the country is becoming a floating capital by bills of exchange'.
155
  The sort of anti-
City language used by Cobden was increasingly taking on the colour of conspiracy 
theory.  A Law Review article saw vested interest propping up the status quo: 'the great 
capitalist profits by the present law, [which] driv[es] away from home, or keep[s] ... 
dormant, capital which would ... be brought into competition with his.'
156
  The Times now 
claimed that 'the rich dread the competition of the associated capital of the poor'.  
Unlimited liability was 'a high protective duty in favour of the virtual monopoly of 
accumulated capital ... which in so many trades a few large capitalists notoriously 
possess'.
157
  This has the ring of Lowe, who had begun writing Times leaders in April 
1851, and used them to make the same points as in Parliament - some of them 
uncompromisingly personal. 
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No one reading such rhetoric in the wake of the 2008 sub-prime crisis can fail to be 
struck by modern-day parallels, or the sense of being let down by high finance.  Events of 
the late 1840s had helped generate the moral context for change, even if those most 
interested in social change failed themselves to produce any movement on limited 
liability.  That would take more robust personalities and organisation than had been 
mustered by Slaney.  It also took another round of instability, although this time it was 
political rather than financial.  In July 1852, just months after taking power, Lord Derby 
dissolved Parliament. 
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Chapter 8: The push for parliamentary action, November 1852 - July 1856 
 
The election which followed the July 1852 dissolution of Parliament produced relatively 
little obvious political change (a continuing minority government was still led by Derby) 
but an unusually high proportion of lawyer-MPs - a parliamentum doctissimum.  This 
was much-commented upon by lawyers themselves.  The Legal Examiner thought it 
'quite clear that the amendment of the law must now occupy a much larger share of 
public attention than it has hitherto done', and looked forward to 'great and radical 
changes ... under the guidance of the Profession.'
1
  In anticipation, the Law Amendment 
Society held a 15-17 November 1852 conference to discuss mercantile law reform, and 
invited participation by Chambers of Commerce from across England, Scotland and 
Ireland.  The conference's main theme was the assimilation of mercantile law across the 
different jurisdictions, but partnership reform was also urged in a report circulated by the 
Liverpool Chamber
2
, and a paper by Leone Levi, another Liverpool figure.  The Law 
Review was optimistic about prospects for change: 'we shall indeed be surprised if in the 
important law reform session about to open, a bill is not brought in, fully discussed, and 
probably carried, establishing ... the principle of limited liability in partnership'.
3
 
At first it seemed that surprise would be called for.  On 22 November the Marquess of 
Clanricarde took advantage of a Lords discussion of the Great Exhibition's charter to 
express disappointment that partnership reform was not on the agenda for the new 
session.  This was regrettable, as the Board of Trade's oversight of charters was governed 
'by no fixed rule whatever.  That was a great grievance because it gave to large 
capitalists the power to enter into speculations ... whereas a large number of small 
capitalists who were inclined to invest their money ... were unable to do so'.
4
 
                                                          
1
 17 July 1852, p.425. 
2
 Report of the Special Committee on Mercantile Law Reform and Tribunals of Commerce, read at a 
special meeting of the Council, and ordered to be printed 16th August and adopted by the Council, Sept 
6th, 1852.  Liverpool Chamber of Commerce. (Liverpool, 1852), p.13. 
3
 'Limited Liability in Partnership', Law Review, November 1852 - February 1853  (London, 1853), pp.350-
60, p.360. 
4
 Hansard, 3rd series, vol. 123, c276 (22 November 1852). 
  200 
Two weeks later, contention moved sharply from the general to the particular, when 
William Brown - ship-owner, Liverpool MP and consistent opponent of limited liability - 
again raised the subject in the Commons.  On 7 December he tabled a request that all 
papers relating to a recent charter-application by the London, Liverpool and North 
American Screw Steam-ship Company - a 'body of Speculators'
5
 - be made public.  
Brown had been surprised, he said, to learn that City of London MP John Masterman had 
accompanied the company's deputation to the Board of Trade, and could only suppose 
this to be a routine courtesy.
6
  As in the past, Brown invoked the 1837 crisis, and claimed 
that Americans were now moving away from charters with limited liability ('these shrewd 
people were retracing their steps from known evils'
7
).  He sympathised with the Board's 
difficult task, in contending with the 'contradictory views impressed' on it, but trusted that 
it would uphold the principle of unlimited liability in a field well-served by private 
enterprise, refuse the charter and maintain 'unrestricted competition'.
8
 
Board of Trade President Joseph Henley clearly felt his hand was being forced by 
Brown's request.  Expressions of sympathy would be more convincing, he said, if not 
accompanied by actions which made the Board's task still more difficult.  Brown should 
either have waited for a decision or asked 'the House to rescind [the Board's] power ... to 
grant charters altogether'.  They could then have debated the question 'on its general 
merits'.  He disagreed with Brown's tactics and his interpretation of this particular case: 
he had 'hardly condescended to notice [its] exceptional character ... until he [Henley] 
called [Brown's] attention to ... the Company's proposal to open a steam communication 
with Canada.'
9
  While the case was sub judice, no papers would be released. 
 
Other MPs weighed in on either side.  New Liverpool MP Charles Turner claimed the 
North American company directors wanted a charter 'simply to raise their shares to a 
premium in the market' and turn a quick stock-jobbing profit (a charge they later 
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refuted
10
).
11
  Other speakers took a more general interest in limited liability.  They 
included Lowe, caught unawares by Brown's request but ready to offer a direct challenge 
in return.  He 
 
'thought it rather too much, when gentlemen came to the House and asked them to 
interfere with the important duties of a department of Government, in order to 
prevent a competitor being introduced into the field of enterprise, [and then] to 
colour such a Motion with the name of "unrestricted competition".  It was 
precisely the reverse'. 
 
Lowe trusted that the 'day was not far distant' when the Board of Trade would be relieved 
of its 'invidious and annoying duty' in having to temper the injustice of unlimited liability, 
- not, as James Clay had just suggested, by bringing charter-authorisations back to 
Parliament, but by leaving people free to make their own decisions.
12
  Nearly all speakers 
sympathised however, with Henley's position, and Brown withdrew his motion. 
 
From Board of Trade records and newspaper comment, it is possible to trace how conflict 
over the proposed North American company had reached this point.  The original list of 
provisional committeemen submitted to the Board on 16 October 1852 gave only five 
names, but six weeks later these had been joined by a further fifteen.  They included 
Robert Lamont, a Scottish Liverpool ship-owner who brought with him a Canadian 
shipping contract, and experience with screw-propellers.  Ship-owner Samuel Cunard 
protested to the Board that the company had 'only introduced this Canadian contract ... as 
a pretext for obtaining the charter, which they could not ask for on any other grounds'.
13
  
The charter-application included a proposal to operate screw steamers on a number of 
Atlantic routes, notably between New York and Liverpool, where Cunard had hitherto 
enjoyed a monopoly, backed by a British government mail contract.  Cunard's objections 
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were supported by the Liverpool press
14
 and memorials from other ship-owners and 
Chambers of Commerce.  Some of these said that they did not object to a charter in itself 
if its privileges were made available to all.  This was the stance taken too by The Times, 
which, two days after the Commons debate, was arguing that 'it is by the uncertain, and 
not by the general and impartial bestowal of charters, that private enterprise is 
damaged'.
15
  (It said too that, 'In the United States the law of limited liability prevails, but 
it has never been complained of as a check to individual enterprise' - a claim 
demonstrably untrue.
16
)  Others supported the charter-application, and claimed that 
Cunard had orchestrated a campaign of opposition.  Both sides engaged in personal 
attacks, and both accused the other of seeking a monopoly. 
Cunard pulled no punches in his attempts to combat the new company.  He may well 
have felt moral as well as commercial antipathy towards it - Crosbie Smith has argued 
that, in his frequently-expressed attachment to Providence and trial, Cunard came 'to 
identify with the evangelical faith of his Scottish partners', brothers David and Charles 
MacIver.
17
  Cunard told Henley that the North American company's 'grasping directory' 
was nothing more than a 'monopolising squadron' bent on destroying him
18
 and that he  
would have 'no confidence in running in opposition to such a company, with limited 
liability'.
19
  In contrast, he talked of his own 'duty' in fulfilling a government contract.
20
  
Running through the claims and counter-claims was railway-capitalism, and its attempts 
to expand into sectors connected by steam or infrastructure.  Cunard complained that the 
projected company had 'received a subsidy from an American railroad company', and was 
himself required by Henley to answer allegations of having injured the Great Western 
Steamer company by aggressively reducing rates.
21
  Peto's activities were also pulled in, 
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in the form of the North of Europe Steam Navigation Company, which had recently 
requested (and been refused) a steam ship charter of its own.  Lamont submitted evidence 
to support a claim that ship-owners had only previously mobilised opposition when 
threatened by railway interests - concerns with enough financial clout to scare them.  
Eleven charters had recently been granted to ocean-steamer companies, and none been 
opposed.  Spoiling tactics only came into play with companies who could offer serious, 
lasting competition. 
The North American Screw Steam-ship charter dispute thus represented a clash between 
two generations of capitalists.  This was partly a straightforward question of age: Cunard 
was 56 at this time, Brown 68, and Lamont a relatively youthful 33.  It was still more a 
question however, of two business generations, with different interests, habits and 
expectations.  One was represented by shipping traditions, and the other by practices 
associated with railway-finance.  With hindsight, it is not surprising to see the clash 
brought to a head in a shipping dispute.  Although the sector displayed relatively little of 
the overt social concern which characterised preceding discussion of limited liability (the 
only workers to feature were the emigrants who might be better-accommodated by new 
steam-ships) it did involve a host of the other justifications and concerns commonly 
invoked: national and colonial development, notions of public service, Ireland,
22
 
American competition, large infrastructure companies and technological efficiencies 
driven by steam.  It also made plain the difficulty in keeping limited liability ring-fenced 
in an international context.  The North American company argued that the only effect of 
withholding a charter would be to deliver traffic into the hands of Americans backed by 
limited liability, or even the French.  And as the company dug for more mud to sling at its 
opponents, it became clear that some of those - including Brown - already had personal 
interests in overseas shipping companies with limited liability.
23
  Above all, the sector 
involved very high stakes.  Moralising featured in this as in every other discussion of 
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limited liability, but it was ultimately capital that forced the issue.  Specifically, the huge 
amounts needed for the ever bigger shipping companies looking to exploit new 
technology.  For all Cunard's protestations of unrestricted competition, it was widely 
acknowledged that these were unlikely to be committed without some reassurance.  The 
North American company framed their charter-request as a counter to Cunard's 
government-contract, and said that if they had been subsidised by such a contract they 
would not need to request a charter.
24
  In response, Cunard broke their proposal down 
into its constituent parts and argued that each was well within the reach of private capital.  
Liverpool newspapers sympathised, and reported that Brown's antipathy towards limited 
liability was of long-standing and as such deserving of respect.
25
  Lamont took on this 
'opposition expressed by the Liverpool press generally' in letters sent to newspapers.
26
  
The Liverpool Times printed the letters but stuck by Brown, calling Lamont's arguments 
'altogether fallacious': 
'it does not appear to us desirable to build up the screw-steam interest of 
Liverpool upon so uncertain a foundation as a chartered joint-stock company, got 
up chiefly in London ... If limited liability is necessary in such schemes, it is 
because no one has much confidence in them when set up in opposition to the 
prudence and economy of private enterprise'.
27
 
Lamont said in response that 'private enterprise [was] much more likely to be destroyed 
by enormous payments of [Cunard's] kind than by limited liability'.
28
  Cunard and the 
American Collins line (for which Brown was the Liverpool agent) were trying to enforce 
a cartel: '[the] violence of their opposition stems from knowledge that failure to obtain a 
charter would ensure them a near-monopoly'.
29
  Lamont emphasised the huge demands of 
modern technology: 'the fact is, that no ocean steam company requiring a capital of half-
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a-million of money ever has been or can be established ... unless either on the one hand a 
return for the capital invested is made certain by a large public grant, or, on the other, the 
liability of the shareholders is limited'.
30
 
One further factor in the mix was Henley, who was apparently happy to authorise more 
Board of Trade charters than before (even while repeating the official line on the prior 
claims of private enterprise).  James Taylor has shown how the volume of charter-
applications increased in the early 1850s: 'in the three years 1850-2, the Board received 
sixty-two applications, one more than ... for the entire period between 1837 and 1849'.  
This reflected increased economic activity, but fed too off raised expectations, with the 
Board 'granting limited liability to eighteen out of the thirty companies that applied 
during [Henley's] brief tenure of office'.
31
  An expectation that the North American 
company's charter was about to be granted seems to have prompted Brown's move.  Ten 
days after the Commons debate, Cunard wrote to Henley to express his '[mortification] 
that the present Government have ... expressed so strong a determination to injure me'.
32
  
It seems that Henley gave verbal approval for the Canadian line at least.  The North 
American company held out however, for a charter covering the full package of routes 
requested, including the contentious New York/Liverpool route.  This strategy came 
unstuck.  On 19 December, just two days after Cunard's letter, Derby's minority 
government fell.  It was replaced by a coalition government led by Lord Aberdeen, and 
Henley was replaced at the Board of Trade by Edward Cardwell, an intuitive conservative 
on limited liability (and, until the recent election, a Liverpool MP).  Against mounting 
complaints at the delay - especially from Lamont - he re-opened discussion about 
whether private enterprise could reasonably be expected to supply the routes listed in the 
charter-application.  Cunard renewed his protests with fresh purpose, and on 22 February 
1853 the North American Screw Steamship company's charter was refused. 
By this time, the company was anticipating rejection.  Rumours had reached them of 
Cardwell's intention to suspend charter-grants in favour of a broader policy review, and 
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though they had protested that this should not affect their application, the continued delay 
did not augur well.  Cardwell had set out his position in a 14 January memorandum to the 
Cabinet, which communicated his wish to resuscitate Labouchere's proposed 
Commission, while making clear his personal aversion to limited liability.
33
  He also 
acknowledged that '[a]t present the chief demand for charters is that of steam-boat 
companies [who] allege the great advantage which they would derive from establishing 
themselves on a gigantic scale'.  Cardwell allowed there to be some truth in their 
assertions, but thought giving way to them would 'lead to an irresistible claim for similar 
concessions' and effective abrogation of the law.
34
  Since he agreed with the spirit of the 
current law, he wished to avoid this.  In a separate letter to Aberdeen he admitted that the 
'high authority of the Attorney General', Sir Alexander Cockburn was against him on 
this.
35
  'High' was Cardwell's favourite adjective when evaluating opinions on limited 
liability, and he was also pleased to report that fellow-Peelite Henry Goulburn had given 
him 'the high sanction of his entire concurrence'.
36
  Goulburn, a former Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, was by this time too old to participate in government but Cardwell also had 
the support of Gladstone, the current Chancellor.
37
  He had less luck with the new Home 
Secretary, Palmerston, who, high or not, sent him a robust contradiction of the position 
set forth in his memorandum.  It had not 'altered the opinion which I have long 
entertained that the present law of Partnership is unwise and unjust, and the principle of 
limited liability would be the most consistent with reason and justice, and the most 
conducive to the encouragement of Industry and to the development of our Natural 
Resources'.
38
  Palmerston then moved swiftly on to the personal: 'the principal objectors 
to Limited Liability are the great capitalists whom you mention in your paper; and 
naturally, for they wish to avoid competition'.  The question was one 'between monopoly 
and Free Trade' and, if it did not prove possible to introduce reform in the near future, he 
hoped Cardwell would at least exercise 'liberally' the discretion vested in him over 
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charters. 
The new government thus included diametrically opposed views on limited liability.  No 
one had any objection to a Commission of inquiry however, and on 21 February, backed 
by Cabinet approval, Cardwell announced in the Commons his intention of reviving 
Labouchere's promise.
39
  In answer to a friendly question as to how the proposed 
Commission might affect applications already before the Board, he confirmed a 
conservative line.  While the Commission was pending, he thought it 'desirable to be 
guarded, and not to give a limited liability where the object could be accomplished by 
private competition'.
40
  The following day, the Board of Trade rejection letter was sent to 
the North American company's solicitors, and Cardwell re-iterated his position with 
rejection of another charter request in the Commons.
41
 
The refusal of the North American Steam-ship charter had several repercussions.  The 
immediate one was that the company re-submitted its charter-application (as originally 
prepared by Ker) with an added proviso that it would not operate in areas relating to the 
contentious New York/Liverpool route without the Board of Trade's prior consent.  This 
was refused.  A further application, in the name of the hastily-formed Canadian Steam 
Navigation Company, then requested a charter for the Canadian route alone - something 
the applicants said Henley had already approved, as the default option.
42
  This was also 
refused, on the grounds that they had earlier said it would not be feasible to pursue the 
Canadian route in isolation.  Lamont then faced the challenge of fulfilling his Canadian 
contract without a charter from the British authorities or - when a technicality made it 
clear that the company was not eligible in its current form - the Canadian.  This he did by 
turning the Canadian Steam company into a private partnership and persuading 'some of 
the wealthiest men in England' to join it, in the expectation that a Canadian charter would 
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be confirmed once the company was re-structured and the technicality ironed out.
43
  He 
later recalled that the abortive English charter applications 'cost me individually several 
thousand pounds' for nothing (for which he blamed Cardwell) and was too furious at his 
treatment to take it lying down.  In a later memoir, he recorded his response, when still 
'smarting under the injustice': 
'[I]mmediately after the refusal of the charter, the author and his solicitor, the 
eminent and well-known Mr. E. W. Field, of Lincoln's Inn, formed a league at the 
cost of many hundreds of pounds to the author to agitate the country and 
Parliament for an alteration in the law of partnership.  This league, to which the 
author acted as honorary secretary, was composed principally of members of 
Parliament and men of genius.  A systematic agitation and education of the 
mercantile community, by means of newspaper articles published periodically in 
all parts of the three kingdoms, and also by the circulation of pamphlets upon 
limited partnerships, was resorted to'.
44
 
In a letter he sent to the Board of Trade in later life, Lamont gave further, colourful 
details of the league's formation, and how it now proposed to go about its task: 
'Mr. Field told Mr. Cardwell in my presence, when the latter communicated his 
decision [to refuse the Canadian Steam Navigation charter] to me, that he would 
never rest until the law was altered, nor until every Briton had freedom to trade 
with his Capital - as was his Birthright, just as he pleased - with Limited or 
unlimited liability ... Mr. Field and I commenced an agitation on the day Mr. E 
Cardwell refused me the charter, by together going down to the House of 
Commons, and forming a league comprising some of the geniuses of the Land - 
who were to send to me in Liverpool each at least once a month a paper on 
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Limited partnerships, I undertaking to get the same inserted in the leading papers 
in the United Kingdom, from John O'Groats to Lands End and from Belfast to 
Cork.  This I did, and Lord Palmerston had one on his Breakfast Table every 
Monday morning - [until] we fell foul of Mr. Cardwell and Mr. W. E. Gladstone 
on the subject - for Gladstone was as far behind the age as his Peelite brother 
Cardwell (sneaks all, in my opinion!) ... This agitation continued for four or five 
years, costing me at least £500 - aye more - although no one - except Mr. Field 
and Mr. Robert Lowe ... knew who was pulling the strings and paying the 
expenses.'
45
 
The Canadian charter-refusal thus brought a capitalist, a lawyer and a politician together 
in a concerted effort to achieve change.  Something of the effect has been noted by 
historians, who have noticed how press and other comment increased from this time.  The 
league was not however, about to be content merely with increased noise-levels.  Lamont 
claimed that 'when completed [it] comprised many MPs', of whom he named Joseph 
Hume and Sir Seymour Fitzgerald, one a radical and the other a Conservative.  Hume 
said soon after this that he was a relatively recent 'convert' to limited liability, and as such 
must be excused a convert's zeal.
46
  He had however, long been convinced that 
commercial law reform was too important to be left to commercial men ('fully as limited 
in their views, fully as selfish as the landed interests'
47
).  Fitzgerald, a barrister, was one 
of the 1852 intake of lawyer-MPs.  Not all league-supporters were MPs or lawyers - 
Lamont also named brewer 'Fowell Buxton',
48
 by which he almost certainly meant 
Charles Buxton, son of the anti-slavery campaigner Thomas Fowell Buxton and his wife 
Hannah, a member of the Quaker Gurney family.
49
  Buxton's 
nonconformist/philanthropic background was typical of many who took an interest.  The 
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most important however, was undoubtedly Lowe, who 'on many occasions met with' 
Field and Lamont and 'gave most valuable assistance' to the league - a version of events 
later endorsed by Lowe himself.
50
 
The league's formation is a useful point at which to take stock of the task they faced, and 
the state of opinion on limited liability in the spring of 1853.  Within London, they 
already had widespread support within the legal profession.  Some senior figures 
continued to resist limited liability in principle (and more would dispute detail) but they 
were now few in number.  Brougham seems to have revised his stance about now, and 
conceded that usury-repeal made continued opposition untenable.
51
  The Law 
Amendment Society was effectively managed by Field, and the league could also count 
on the support of the Legal Review, the Legal Observer and many in the financial press.  
The Economist's acknowledgement of limited liability was generally restricted to the 
correspondence column, or a studiedly cool passing notice, but this was more a question 
of tone than any inherent objection.  Banking continued to be a tricky forum for debate.  
The Banking Institute, set up in 1851 by John Dalton (editor of the Bankers' Magazine), 
had recently held three discussions of limited liability, led by Institute solicitor George 
Shaw, Levi and then Dalton himself.
52
  Dalton's premature death at the end of 1852 had 
however, also cut short the life of the fledgling Institute, which folded about this time.  
Banking articles continued, but it seems the league now set out to mobilise a wider circle 
of interest.  John Forster, editor of The Examiner, acquired a comprehensive set of 
pamphlets sent by league-supporters (as too, once their campaigning took effect, copies 
of the counter-blasts supplied by their opponents).
53
  Of London's newspapers, the 
Morning Chronicle and Daily News had already lent support, but the bastion from which 
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regular broadsides were launched was The Times, where editor John Delane allowed 
Lowe to push a forceful line in leaders, supported by Sampson in the City column.  If 
Edward Cox is to be believed, The Times now blocked any attempt to publicise an 
opposing view in its pages.
54
  The league was therefore in a strong position to control a 
message within London - something which annoyed opponents, who argued that it gave a 
false view of opinion.  They had less influence within the City, but this is unlikely to 
have worried them unduly.  Some City figures did support limited liability, and the 
opposition of 'great capitalists' was now in any case the dominant theme of lobbying.  
The league also had mixed success with political economists.  Together with opposition 
from well-known City names, this left them open to criticism from anyone inclined to 
credit technical authority or City status.  Amongst political economists, Nassau Senior, 
Thomas Hodgkin and George Rickards had joined Mill in support of reform but Tooke 
and McCulloch continued their opposition, while others failed to express any public 
opinion.  The announcement of a government inquiry had brought yet another discussion 
of limited liability by the Political Economy Club on 3 March, with Lowe now in 
attendance as a member, but we do not know what was said.
55
  The league's main concern 
within London is likely anyway to have been MPs.  For all the claims to superior 
reasoning, reformist public pronouncements show little concern with the niceties of 
economic argument.  They were primarily concerned to emphasise, over and over, the 
headlines of a case.  In their desire to win, others besides Lowe were prepared to deliver 
personal attacks, and they had the advantage of organisation and a secure metropolitan 
base from which to work.   
They faced a much stiffer task in their ambition to 'agitate the country'.  Provincial press 
articles that did more than report parliamentary debate on limited liability are rare before 
this point, and when parliamentary interest waned, so did press coverage.  The league 
evidently took steps to address that, but its main challenge outside London was the 
indifference or active opposition of businessmen wedded to a partnership tradition.  
There is no sign that the league ever occupied itself with smaller businesses, whose 
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representatives had a history of conservatism on debt issues.
56
  These were not in any 
case much-represented in Chambers of Commerce, which provided the main forum for 
debate beyond the press.  Chambers were a well-established phenomenon (by 1840 there 
were at least sixteen) but some, including those in the major industrial centres of 
Birmingham and Leeds, had become dormant during the second quarter.  They revived 
however, in the economic expansion of the early 1850s and together with the Manchester 
Commercial Association, provided the main outlet for opinion.  In a 1990 thesis, Daphne 
Glick reviewed six English chambers' documented interest in partnership reform, which 
shows no recorded engagement by Birmingham, Bristol or Leeds before this time.  Of the 
others, the Bradford Chamber, dominated by the wool trade, had invited Levi to give a 
talk in 1852 (which included promotion of limited liability) and then printed 2,000 copies 
for members.
57
 And the self-consciously high-profile Liverpool and Manchester 
Chambers had already expressed forceful opinions.  The Manchester Chamber was of 
unusually long standing, founded in 1820, and had a correspondingly long record of 
opposition to limited liability.  From the late 1830s, it maintained a vigilant guard against 
its use in private Bills, and sent protests to parliament.
58
  Asked by Gladstone's Board in 
1843 for its views on joint stock companies, it reported that it did not see how 
shareholders' obligations could be lessened without danger to the public.  This it saw 
confirmed in the experience of local joint stock banks, observing with grim satisfaction 
that thanks to 'the immense sacrifices to which shareholders in Banks in this town have 
been subjected ...depositors ... have been held secure'.
59
  Both the Chamber and the 
Manchester Commercial Association disregarded an 1851 suggestion by a local 
businessman that they might consider commandite.
60
  Scottish and Irish chambers had 
also already shown interest in limited liability, as had the Dublin Statistical and Social 
Inquiry societies.  Irish discussions generally came out in its favour (the Belfast Chamber 
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produced a pro-reform report at this time
61
) and Scottish against.  The Glasgow Chamber 
had produced a strongly anti- report on limited liability in 1851.
62
  Commerce would 
prove problematic for the league.  Many of its representatives - especially manufacturers 
- proved as conservative as Hume would have expected.  Searle has observed that 'it took 
businessmen a long time to make up their minds as to whether they wanted limited 
liability' and many never in fact did so.
63
 
The great exception to this picture of widespread commercial indifference in England 
was the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce, already engaged in active lobbying for reform.  
The Liverpool Chamber was as elitist as any, dominated by ship-owners, wealthy 
merchants and insurance-brokers.  Membership also reflected a wider social split in 
Liverpool between more socially-conservative Anglicans (who included the Gladstone 
family) and Unitarian radicals, who exercised disproportionate influence on the 
Chamber's Council.  That influence had almost certainly been felt in the response to the 
North American Steamship charter dispute.  The Council had refused a request from 'one 
of the Directors' to petition the Board of Trade against the granting of shipping charters.  
After 'the fullest consideration', they concluded that 'the question of limited partnerships 
... should be approached with the utmost caution', deferring the matter 'until the Council 
can fulfil its intention of taking up the entire subject'.
64
  Board of Trade papers thus 
include a protest from the Liverpool Ship-owners' Association, but none from the 
Liverpool Chamber, to set alongside those from other shipping-oriented Chambers.  The 
decision not to memorialize the Board was flagged at the Liverpool Chamber's February 
1853 annual meeting, which took place while a decision on the North American charter 
was still pending.  The meeting's Chairman, merchant Thomas Bouch, commended the 
recent report on commercial law reform prepared by Council-members Charles Holland 
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and Edward Heath (as circulated at the November Law Amendment Society London 
conference) and said that, like its authors, he personally also favoured limited liability.
65
  
Present at the meeting was Brown, who, moving for adoption of the annual report, then 
took the opportunity to say that he did not favour limited liability - now, he said, 'a matter 
of serious discussion with shipowners'.  Brown also gave details of his past experience 
with joint stock banks, which make it clear that some Manchester bankers at least had 
favoured limited liability.
66
  His anti-limited liability stance on this occasion was 
promptly countered by merchant Alfred Powles who, seconding the report's adoption, 
said that he also did favour it.
67
  This split was to carry on through subsequent 
discussions. 
Back in London, the Law Amendment Society seemed resolved to keep up pressure.  On 
14 March 1853, Brougham asked Aberdeen in the House of Lords about the status of his 
pet project of mercantile law assimilation, as too of partnership reform.  The two issues 
had been associated since their airing at the previous November's Law Amendment 
Society conference.  Brougham said that Derby had then expressed support.  Would the 
new government now honour that commitment?  The subsequent parliamentary 
interchange, with its references to multiple lordships and inquiries, confused 
parliamentary reporters, but Aberdeen confirmed willingness to pursue both law-
assimilation and partnership reform.  Little then seems to have happened however, and 
Lamont records that the league sent a deputation to Palmerston in May, to urge action.
68
  
On 1 June, Palmerston appointed Commissioners for the promised inquiry. 
 
The inquiry's remit was law-assimilation and partnership reform, a twinning which the 
Legal Examiner thought supporters of limited liability might have cause to regret.  It 
thought the Commissioners better-equipped for law-assimilation and 'not quite the sort of 
persons to whom exclusively we should desire to commit the inquiry into the subject of 
partnership'.  It would have preferred to see the inclusion of someone versed in 'political 
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and social economy' and workers' issues.
69
  Slaney agreed, and asked to be included as an 
unpaid member of the Commission, a request that was refused.
70
  The eight 
Commissioners were: Thomas Cusack Smith (Irish Master of the Rolls), Sir Cresswell 
Cresswell, John Marshall (Lord Curriehill, a Scottish judge), George Bramwell, James 
Anderson, Kirkman Daniel Hodgson, Thomas Bazley and Robert Slater.  The first five 
were lawyers and the last three businessmen and financiers.  Most were in their late 
fifties, with Bramwell and Hodgson rather younger at 45 and 39 respectively.  In the 
name of the Commissioners, Secretary William Fane sent out 152 questionnaires 
(including some  overseas), soliciting opinions from individuals and Chambers of 
Commerce, and then awaited replies.  These came in between October 1853 and February 
1854.   
In the meantime, public discussion continued.  Parliamentary time was now increasingly 
taken up by the possibility of war, but charter requests ensured that limited liability 
continued to be raised.  In July, railway-involvement in steam shipping again triggered  
debate, in a House of Lords dispute over a South Eastern Railway Bill.
71
  Objecting to its 
limited liability clause, Lord Monteagle (formerly, Thomas Spring Rice) catalogued the 
history of such steam/rail disputes since 1847.  Board of Trade Vice-president Lord 
Stanley of Alderley then re-interpreted the same catalogue in favour of the Bill and 
limited liability.
72
  Other speakers emphasised either the steamship element (if against 
limited liability) or the railway (if in favour).
73
  A week later, Cardwell was asked to 
justify his criteria in granting a charter to the Australian Direct Steam Navigation 
Company.
74
  His response drew on 'precedent' and a now-standard argument that 
privilege was justified by mail contracts.  The Times had already made clear its opinion of 
this line, by declaring the withholding of limited liability 'wholly inconsistent with the 
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practice of granting enormous subsidies in the shape of postal contracts'.
75
  Cardwell took 
refuge in the ongoing official inquiry and 'trusted that before long the system would be 
placed on a better footing'.
76
 
Outside Parliament, the 1 August release of Board of Trade papers on the North 
American charter dispute provided an opportunity for another burst of agitation in The 
Times on 4 August.
77
  The following day the paper printed a letter from the North 
American company's Chairman which it said added to complaints about Board conduct.  
Cunard had apparently had sight of the company's communications with the Board, while 
they 'did not know until last week that Mr. Cunard had addressed a single letter to the 
Board of Trade'.  They had only been made aware of objections in general terms.  Had 
they been shown the substance of Cunard's communications, they could have refuted the 
allegations.  Indignant at Cunard's preferential treatment, they trusted that Cardwell 
would be able to 'satisfy the House of Commons and the public' as to the propriety of his 
actions.
78
  The same day, yet another charter request raised the subject in the Commons.
79
  
On 10 August, Norwich MP Edward Warner followed up with a Commons question as to 
whether the government intended introducing a partnership reform Bill in the next 
Session.
80
  Cardwell reiterated his view that it would be 'manifestly improper' to make 
any declaration in advance of the current inquiry's report.  Meanwhile, he hoped 
parliament and the Board would follow 'established precedent'. 
It also seems that league-members were going about their task.  Lord Hobart published a 
generally well-reviewed pamphlet at this time, calling for limited liability.
81
  Mill, sent a 
copy by the author, commended its 'closeness of reasoning'.
82
  Hobart had stressed the 
volume and speed with which capital might fly away in the modern world, if denied 
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outlets at home.
83
  He took railways as the definitive exemplar of modern investment and 
said that to withhold limited liability was to argue that railways could have been built 
without it, 'a proposition which (it is believed) has never yet been advanced'.
84
  Others 
were to put him right on that. 
 
Hobart's pamphlet was followed by an October article in the Westminster Review which 
attracted still more favourable notice.
85
  Along with Mill's 1850 evidence it became a 
standard point of reference for reformists.  The same month, the Legal Examiner 
published a similarly comprehensive piece, which made it clear how much a vote for 
limited liability was a vote for companies: 'Everything leads us to believe that trade will 
henceforth be more advanced by the steady and sustained energy of ... associations than 
by individual enterprise'.
86
  A November leader in The Times called attention to 
American progress, and tied unlimited liability to the 'dirty, ignorant and depraved state' 
of England's labouring classes.
87
  Other nations might not have attained the heights of 
Britain's economic eminence but neither had they 'sunk to her degradation'.  Banking 
articles also addressed the issue.
88
  
 
Comment also now extended beyond London.  Some of this was in the nature of free gifts 
- the Times November article was picked up in the provincial press
89
 - but there are signs 
too of more pro-active efforts.  A detailed letter to the Manchester Examiner took issue 
with the newspaper's American correspondent and his criticism of limited liability, and 
recalled arguments traded in the letter columns of The Times three years before.
90
  It also 
recommended Levi's and Wilson's books, in the sort of cross-referencing and would-be 
educational tone now typical.  In Dublin, a call for the local Chamber of Commerce to 
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support reform in its questionnaire-response to the Royal Commission recommended the 
'first number of Mr. Sullivan's Journal of Industrial Progress' for anyone who wished to 
educate themselves further in the topic.
91
  The Leeds Times also recommended this and 
another 'clever' recent article on limited liability.
92
 
 
One significant boost to reformist hopes owed nothing to league efforts.  On 6 February 
1854 the great mechanical engineer and entrepreneur, Joseph Whitworth published his 
Report on the New York Industrial Exhibition.  The Report had been anticipated in the 
press for some time and was now widely discussed.  Whitworth had travelled to the US 
as an officially-appointed British Commissioner to the New York Exhibition, but a six-
week delay in its opening presented him with an opportunity to tour American industrial 
districts, where, 
'the law of limited liability affords the most ample facilities for the investment of 
capital in business [and] the intelligent and educated artisan is left equally free to 
earn all that he can.'
93
   
Whitworth saw a particularly close connection between limited liability and 
inventiveness, supported by a lack of bureaucracy: 
 
'If a company, or even a private individual, should propose to build a telegraph 
line, and can show that it would be beneficial to the public ... he may obtain an 
Act authorising him to proceed, as a matter of course ... With a celerity that is 
surprising a company is incorporated, the line is built, and operations are 
commenced.  Similar facilities are also afforded ... by general laws authorising the 
construction of railways.'
94
  
The 'trifling' cost of incorporation was highlighted, in stark contrast to Board of Trade 
fees.  In one instance of American cut-price initiative, 'where the capital of the company 
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amounted to $600,000 (£120,000), the total cost of obtaining the act of incorporation was 
50 cents (2s 1d)'.
95
 
That sentence was reproduced in British newspaper articles, sometimes embellished with 
incredulous exclamation marks.  Also quoted were the reports of Whitworth's fellow 
Commissioners, Wentworth Dilke and art-educationist George Wallis.  Dilke was 
impressed by the growth of American 'special partnerships',
96
 but Wallis's views were 
much more cautious.  Coming from a native of Wolverhampton, they were of especial 
interest to the Birmingham Gazette, which reprinted them verbatim.
97
 Wallis kept faith 
with Adam Smith, in arguing that 'the true basis' of industrial management must forever 
be 'a distinct interest, combined with full powers and complete responsibility'.  He was 
anxious to counter the 'erroneous impression [that] appears to exist in England as to the 
extent of the responsibility of all shareholders or partners in the joint-stock manufacturing 
companies of the United States', arguing that 'limited responsibility is wisely confined to 
the non-managing shareholders'.  Limited partnerships had proven useful in the US - 
exceptionally - 'as a means of developing the individual powers and natural resources of a 
new country'.
98
 
 
American lessons were a popular theme in early 1854.  Charles Morrison's Labour and 
Capital (considered in chapter 6), which covered much of the same ground as Whitworth, 
was published at this time, and what it had to say about limited partnerships and social 
progress 'excited [the] deep interest' of penal reformer Matthew Davenport Hill.
99
  Hill 
was yet another Law Amendment Society activist, a member of the Committee that had 
produced the Society's 1849 report. 
 
Another to draw a direct connection between Americans' 'greater self-reliance, energy, 
morality and intellectual qualifications' and limited liability in early 1854 was Edwin 
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Field, late with his league homework.
100
  Field admitted he had been meaning to commit 
pen to paper for some months, but was happy to see that the Westminster Review and 
Francis Troubat had recently covered much of what he wished to say.
101
  He found plenty 
of alternative material however, in charter costs.  Like Lowe, Field was also prepared to 
issue a personal attack, and criticised Cunard and Brown
102
 (which brought a letter from 
Brown
103
) and businessmen he thought lacked objectivity in the face of a threat to 
profits
104
 (which brought a pamphlet from William Hawes, who, in return, had something 
to say about lawyers
105
).  Field saw 'ambition among working men now altogether stifled' 
in Britain and stressed the dynamism of labour and capital in the modern world.
106
  In his 
conception, capital was the very antithesis of a fixed substance, searching out opportunity 
across jurisdictions with lightning speed, in a universal, scientific system which 
combined the attributes of a fluid and an electric telegraph: 
'the fugitiveness of capital as to its place of application, and the electric rapidity 
with which it transports itself over the entire globe, from domicil to domicil, is a 
phenomenon of commercial science quite as wonderful as any that natural science 
can produce.'
107
  
Chambers of Commerce were also now engaging in discussion, in response to Mercantile 
Law Commission questionnaires.  The Liverpool Chamber was predictably quick to 
engage, with a Special Committee reporting strongly in favour of change: 'what is 
claimed is simply freedom of action', needed as a 'general principle' and to dispel 
working-class notions 'that there is a necessary antagonism between labour and 
capital'.
108
  Also prompt was the Leeds Chamber, which held a seven-man Council 
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meeting on 11 January to consider its response.
109
  Cloth merchant Charles Bousfield 
spoke 'at some length' against change, and made the unexpected claim that limited 
liability would work to accumulate capital in a few hands (a claim he admitted was 'just 
to the contrary' of the Commissioners' suggestions).  Against this, Edward Irwin, another 
merchant, thought some change in the law a 'necessity', and was in favour of limited 
liability joint stock companies - a view supported from practical experience of American 
companies by William Firth.  Since opinion was divided, and the Commission had asked 
for two submissions and 'the individual views of the members rather than the collective 
view of the whole body', the Chamber fulfilled their brief by submitting the opposing 
views of Bousfield and Irwin.
110
  The Chamber's minutes were reproduced verbatim in 
the Leeds Times, now lining up in support of limited liability against the opposition of the 
Leeds Mercury.
111
 
The Leeds minutes were also reproduced in the Journal of the Society of Arts, taking its 
own interest in the topic.
112
  On 30 January, the Society held a London conference, 
widely discussed in the press, to address the topical concern of 'Strikes and Lock-outs', 
and asked whether these might be averted by limited liability.  As Loftus says, the 
conference had the ambitious aim of improving employer/worker relations by taking 
them 'out of the workplace and into a civilized public space'.
113
  Few judged it a success 
on this score.  Employers refused invitations to participate, and largely left the floor to 
workers' associations and politicians.  The workers were happy to agree that limited 
liability might improve their position but, in common with others present, thought this 
had little to do with the fraught question of strikes and combinations.  Many were 
sceptical as to the value of limited liability for manufacturing.  Here, under a real threat to 
social order, it seemed that optimism ran out.
114
  The conference triggered further debate 
about limited liability in the Society's Journal.  A piece on commandite  made extensive 
reference to the US, with no mention now of France.
115
  Railway engineer William 
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Bridges Adams (a stalwart of the Correspondence section) wrote to say that he saw no 
reason why workers should not 'have a small share in a mill as well as in a railway'.  His 
view of a limited liability future was notably visionary: 
'As time rolls on, and as artificial difficulties are removed, the principle of 
shareholding now applied so largely to public works, such as railways, will be 
more and more largely applied to every kind of machine-facture, and all our best 
workmen will grow up into a race of small proprietors - not of land, but of shares 
in mills and machines.  The result will be such an increase of wealth as the world 
has never yet beheld, such a bonded nation as to be impregnable to external 
circumstances.'
116
 
Barrister Thomas Webster added support
117
 while Leone Levi wrote to say that he was 'in 
favour of introducing partnerships with limited liability ... but[did] not conceive they 
would work well in factories or mills' (where he thought the divinely-instituted relation of 
master and servant bound to prevail).
118
  Press coverage of the conference cited 
Whitworth in support of argument that limited liability would off-set strikes
119
 and noted 
that 'on one point [the conference attendees] seemed to be unanimously agreed - that an 
alteration in the law of partnership would be beneficial'.  Faced with the intractable 
difficulties of industrial strife, this was a default option on which conference attendees 
could agree.  A closing resolution 'in favour of a law for limited liability in partnership' 
was 'carried unanimously'.
120
 
One other now-prominent theme is worth noting here.  In its conference coverage, the 
Society's Journal counseled readers to take comfort in the fact that agitation at least 
showed that England's workers were 'not serfs but freemen'.
121
  Such references were  
increasingly common, fed by the looming likelihood of war with Russia.  Woodforde 
Ffooks, another reformist lawyer who went into print at this time, argued that partnership 
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law showed that 'much of the debris of feudalism [had] yet to be swept away'.
122
  Edward 
Warner struck the same note in a pamphlet which also took a side-swipe at the 'old Patent 
Law'.
123
  Warner was another of the league's MP collaborators, a reliable contributor to 
parliamentary discussions, and he made clear what he thought the priorities.  An official 
Commission was all well and good, but 'not likely to result in much practical good, until 
public opinion is formed, and can be brought to bear upon Parliament'.
124
  In preparatory 
notes for his own pamphlet, Charles Buxton identified the same need to overturn 'the 
gross ignorance of Parliament and of the nation'.  He accordingly planned to distribute his 
publication to all MPs and 'very freely' beyond.
125
  Warner was particularly vociferous on 
the subject of Russia - Britain might now be about to regret the loans made to 'a not over-
scrupulous [Russian] despot'.
126
  Limited liability, the mark of self-reliance, would reduce 
national dependence upon loans, and reform thus concerned 'the internal stability of the 
political system, and, it may be, the destinies of the empire'.
127
  Such rhetoric became still 
more pronounced once war was declared on 27 March. 
War also coloured debate at the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce, which held a meeting 
to discuss limited liability a few days after the declaration.  When the Chamber had 
received its Commission questionnaire, its Council appointed a 10-man committee to 
consider the response.  This reported in favour of limited liability by seven votes to three 
(one of those three being Brown) but the Council was clearly uncomfortable at this being 
taken to represent the Chamber's views.  At a meeting on 23 January, they resolved to 
consider the report for another week, and then referred it for further discussion at the 
imminent annual General Meeting.  When held on 6 February, this proved, as The Times 
reported, 'of unusual interest'.
128
  It was enlivened by Cunard's associate, Charles 
MacIver, who by his own admission had never previously attended any Chamber meeting 
but, incensed at the copy of the committee report he had seen reprinted in local 
newspapers, arrived at this one 'to stamp my foot upon the report as not being the opinion 
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of the Chamber of Commerce'.
129
  MacIver called partners who wished to invest without 
liability 'pickpocket[s]' and took personal offence at government contracts being 
presented as equivalent to limited liability.
130
  Defending the report in response, Charles 
Holland effectively singled out Brown, as the only member of the committee who had 
been unable to separate the question before them from self-interest.
131
 The Chamber 
'would all probably recollect the debate which took place ... upon the question of a 
charter about eighteen months ago'.
132
  He had predicted at the time that, if the Chamber 
protested against the charter ('which he was happy to say they did not') the company 
would simply be set up in Canada instead of Liverpool - like the 'thousands' now 'got up 
in France' and 'trading in this country under fictitious colours'.  The divisive report was 
referred back to the Council who again discussed it 'long and earnestly' at two special 
meetings on 20 and 27 February.
133
  The Times reported after the second that 'the 
attendance of directors was larger than usual, and the council sat three hours and a half, 
during which a very animated and interesting discussion took place'.
134
  The Council then 
resolved by 12 votes to 8 to follow Holland's procedural recommendation and refer the 
report to the full Chamber. 
The result was three discussion sessions, held at the Liverpool Exchange's Cotton 
Salesroom on 29 and 30 March and 1 April.  These displayed a certain self-consciousness 
about Liverpool's status as a pre-eminent commercial metropolis, now called upon to 
debate 'this great question', and included further blunt exchanges, but were mostly good-
humoured, and notable for the numbers who attended.
135
  73 were present for the first 
session, and though this had declined to about 45 by the third, it still represented the 
largest assembly to address the issue outside London.  Chairman Thomas Bouch began 
by noting the recent history of limited liability's consideration, marked by division.  He 
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expected - correctly - to find opinion still divided.  The committee-members who then 
launched a defence of their report did their best however, to present a picture of near-
uniform agreement on limited liability.  Reform, they argued, was now opposed only by 
isolated voices such as the Law Times (which had recently declared against the 
'monstrous doctrine' of limited liability'
136
) and the Liverpool Times (where editor 
Thomas Baines took the same line as older brother Edward Baines at the Leeds Mercury).  
Speakers at the sessions were evenly split between 11 in favour of limited liability and 10 
either equivocal or against.  There was no obvious distinction in age or occupation 
between the  two sides.
137
  Lamont was one of those to speak for change.  He dated 'the 
beginning of the question now before the meeting' to the refusal of his Canadian 
charter.
138
  He was, he said, proud that the Chamber had resisted the request by Robert 
Rankin (Chairman of the Liverpool Shipowners' Association) to memorialize the Board 
of Trade against it.  MacIver then took occasion to list all the ship owners who had 
objected to the charter, including William Lamport.  Lamport however, 'reminded Mr 
MacIver that he had already avowed a change of opinion on this subject'.
139
  The session 
ended with reformists pushing for a vote by those present.  This was successfully 
challenged by their opponents who rightly judged that a general poll would prove more 
conservative.  When taken later, it recorded 107 votes in favour of limited liability and 
209 against.
140
 
The Liverpool debate attracted considerable press interest, both at the time and when  
speeches were printed a few months later as a pamphlet.  The Hull Packet 
141
 and the 
Derby Mercury
142
 joined the Law Times ('honoured' to be cited in debate
143
) in opposing 
limited liability, but most published comment favoured reform.  Liverpool was unique in 
holding such a debate.  The Manchester Chamber dealt with the Commissioners' request 
summarily, by leaving it to four board-members to submit their views.  These and 
opinions from eight other Chambers (Belfast, Dublin, Dundee, Edinburgh, Glasgow, 
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Huddersfield, Leeds, Leith) and from the Guild of Aberdeen and the Manchester 
Commercial Association, were included in the Mercantile Laws Commission Report, 
published at the beginning of July. 
By the time the Commissioners' Report was officially published, it had been widely 
leaked and discussed in the press for weeks.
144
  It was thus already known that the 
Commissioners had pronounced against limited liability, with three dissenting voices 
from their younger element, in Bramwell, Anderson and Hodgson.  72 questionnaire 
responses had been received from individuals within the United Kingdom (and another 
sixteen from abroad, mostly from lawyers) with views on limited liability that can be 
broken down as follows:
145
 
Merchants:   23 14 in favour, 9 against 
Lawyers:   17 13 in favour, 4 against 
Bankers/brokers:  12 1 in favour, 11 against 
Bank of England directors: 7 4 in favour, 3 against 
Writers/academics:  5 5 in favour, 0 against 
Manufacturers:  4 1 in favour, 3 against 
Other:    4 3 in favour, 1 against 
At one end of the spectrum, lawyers and professional political economists gave clear 
support for limited liability, and at the other, bankers and manufacturers were clearly 
against it.  All six of Manchester's representatives (merchants, manufacturers and a 
banker) voted against - as had Commissioner Thomas Bazley, a Manchester cotton-
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spinner and President of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce.  Merchants were 
divided as a group but came down largely in favour - a result reinforced when taken 
together with the opinions of the merchant-directors or former directors of the Bank of 
England.  We may also note here the unsolicited letters that the Board of Trade received 
direct from merchants in 1853-4, urging limited liability.
146
  The questionnaire-
respondents were all men and, successfully established in life, generally middle-aged.  
Those voting against limited liability tended to be older.  Their average age was 60, while 
the average age of those voting in favour was 50.
147
 
Journalists, politicians and other commentators gave their own breakdowns and 
interpretations of the Commission's results.  For limited liability's supporters, the most 
important point was that a group of conservative Commissioners had overridden a 
majority vote in favour of change.  Slaney, given sight of an advance copy of the Report, 
gave a talk at the Society of Arts at the end of May, at which he said this result was 'just 
what might have been expected' from a group drawn from 'eminent lawyers, a few great 
merchants, but ... no statesmen or representatives from the industrial classes' i.e. a report 
'hostile to limited liability, though in favour of charters at a cheaper rate'.
148
  Opponents 
of limited liability were 'timid men, unwilling to move at all, or great capitalists', who 
gave credence to 'names and authority' rather than 'acts and reasons'.
149
  Slaney's talk 
provoked prolonged debate so that, as in Liverpool, a further session was needed to 
accommodate it.  Edward Heath, one of the authors of the Liverpool Chamber's 1852 
report, and Hobart were amongst those who attended.  Opposition was led by Elliott and 
Hawes.
150
 
The most important clash occurred however, in parliament, where reformists organised 
an attack on the Commissioners' conclusions.  This was led by Robert Collier, another of 
the 1852 intake of lawyer-MPs, and at 37 already in command of a considerable legal 
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reputation.  Collier had a particular interest in commercial law.  In February, he had 
proposed reforms for the Stanneries courts used for mining litigation, and at the same 
time proposed making this a pilot test-case for limited liability.  If successful, it could be 
rolled out through 'the whole kingdom, and he would not shrink from the consequences 
of that'.
151
  Other MPs had then lined up in predictable fashion, with Hume and Moffatt in 
favour, and Brown against.  Viscount Goderich, Christian Socialist sympathiser and son 
of a former prime minister, showed himself a convert to the limited liability cause, 
revising the position he had taken in the Canadian charter dispute.
152
  Cardwell urged 
reliance upon the 'eminent legal and commercial men' of the Commission.
153
 
That position unraveled in the Commons debate held on the evening of 27 June.  Collier 
proposed a motion 
'That the Law of Partnership, which renders every person who, though not an 
ostensible partner, shares the profits of a trading company, liable to the whole of 
its debts, is unsatisfactory, and should be modified as to permit persons to 
contribute to the capital of such concerns on terms of sharing their profits, without 
incurring liability beyond a limited amount.'
154
 
This was seconded by Goderich and supported by a string of others.  Collier questioned 
the authority of Waugh v Carver ('frequently doubted by eminent lawyers'
155
) while 
Richard Malins - yet another new lawyer-MP from the 1852 intake - attacked the 
confused legacy of the 1844 Act.
156
  In response, Cardwell asked for time to consider the 
Report, and quoted Tooke's conviction, from an earlier report, that limited liability was 
self-evidently 'a privilege [without] the shadow of foundation in natural right'.
157
  This 
proved a miscalculation of the House's mood.  The idea that the question of partnership 
                                                          
151
 Hansard, 3rd series, vol. 130, c309 (7 February 1854). 
152
 Goderich supported Cunard in the Canadian charter dispute (to Henley, 13 November 1852, London, 
Liverpool, and North American Screw Steam Ship Company, PP 1852-3 (730) xcv 89-90) but a year later 
had changed his stance (to Henry Austin Bruce, 3 December 1853, British Library, Add. MS 43534 f11). 
153
 Hansard, 3rd series, vol. 130, c314 (7 February 1854). 
154
 Hansard, 3rd series, vol. 134, c752 (27 June 1854). 
155
 Ibid., c753. 
156
 Ibid., c786. 
157
 Ibid., c768. 
  229 
reform might not yet be 'ripe for consideration'
158
 when it had 'been before the country 
more than twenty years'
159
 provoked derision.  The subsequent rout provided 
parliamentary reporters with better entertainment than they were accustomed to get from 
this subject.  The Manchester Guardian thought it unfortunate that the government 
'should have devolved on Mr Cardwell the task of dealing with Mr Collier's proposition': 
'as the debate proceeded, it became evident that there really was but one opinion 
among men of the most varied schools and parties... [A]ll gave in their adhesion 
to Mr. Collier's doctrine; even Mr. Glyn, the representative of London capital, 
only hinted a modified disapproval'.
160
  
Collier signaled his willingness to accede to government requests from Palmerston and 
Attorney-General Sir Alexander Cockburn (both declared supporters of limited liability) 
to wait for debate by a fuller House and 'general concurrence'.
161
  MPs' objections 
showed however, that there 'was no ground for his being content with empty praise when 
solid pudding was within his reach'.  Declining to 'waive the victory which was already at 
his feet', he secured a resolution 'without even the formality of a division'.
162
  An 
amendment extended it to Ireland. 
The Commons debate was a gift for newspapers.  The Manchester Examiner told readers 
that it was about 'the letting in of the little man, which of all things the great men 
dislike.'
163
  Limited liability was being resisted - as the electric telegraph and corn-law 
reform had been - by those with a vested interest in the status quo.  Besides Collier, the 
star of most accounts was Cobden.  The Leeds Times described his clash with 'six or 
seven great capitalists who were sitting close to him', and agreed this was an argument 
the capitalists could not win: 'in offering an opposition to us, you are using the best 
possible argument against yourselves'.  The capitalists had 'all risen to speak at the same 
time as Mr. Cobden, but only one of them, Mr. Glyn, ventured to rise after Mr. Cobden, 
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and he had only a few words of submissive deprecations to offer'.
164
  Cobden had faced 
down opposition by lambasting capital's 'tendency to accumulate in great masses and in 
few hands' as 'one of the social blots in this country'.
165
  The Leeds Times thought his 
speech 'magnificent' and endorsed its conclusions.  'If associations of £50 shares for a 
railway, why not associations of £5 for a mill or a workshop?  There is no difference in 
principle'.
166
 
The day after the debate, The Times swung into action.  Given the 5-3 vote of the 
Commissioners, it expected it to take time to push through reform, but judged that the 
current law could not now stand long: 'the question is now settled'.  Manufacturing must 
follow the railways' lead, and governments give up trying to 'spare us the trouble of 
thinking for ourselves'.
167
  Slaney followed this up with a letter to the Editor
168
 and Lowe 
with a characteristically categorical editorial.
169
  This ridiculed Board failure to support 
the attempt to connect Liverpool and Canada by steam -'one of the noblest applications of 
capital which could possibly have been suggested'.  A Commission which continued to 
think charter-discretion should be left to an arbitrary tribunal was clearly out of touch.  
'We cannot pretend to attach much weight to the opinion of such a Commission'. 
The wider press was overwhelmingly in agreement.  The Leeds Mercury stood by its 
belief that people should not invest in companies if not prepared 'to keep a vigilant eye on 
their management', but most coverage agreed with The Times.
170
  The Morning Chronicle 
thought 'that the strong feeling evinced by the House of Commons will lead to the speedy 
removal of [this] legal restriction'
171
 and the Bankers' Magazine also thought it 'quite 
certain that the law as it now stands is doomed'.
172
  The Examiner however, advised 
reformists not to get ahead of themselves: 'the capitalists, we may be sure, are not going 
to give in yet'.  The Commons debate had not provided a serious test of likely opposition: 
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'[A]lthough, in a thin House ... no one was found sufficiently bold to declare 
himself openly against the manifest feeling of the majority ... neither of the 
members for Manchester, nor indeed (with the exception of Lord Goderich) for 
any of the large manufacturing towns [supported] the proposed reform, while Mr. 
Glynn, so largely connected with the interests of large capital, preserved a strict if 
not a hostile neutrality ... We must not expect that a question which has equally 
divided the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce, will be finally disposed of by an 
abstract resolution of the House of Commons'.
173
   
Comment extended to a wide range of publications.  London weekly The Era, a trade 
publication for the entertainment industry, expected to see the issue 'discussed again and 
again before the matter is ripe for legislation'.
174
  In the Bankers' Magazine, James Knight 
and  J.W. Gilbart re-iterated their now-familiar stances for and against limited liability for 
banks.
175
  The Law Times was willing to allow for liability-protection for dormant 
partners whose names were not used publicly, but anything more would be 'the most 
daring violation of the cause of justice and morality ever proposed in this country'.
176
  
The Law Review enjoyed giving full rein to rhetoric: large capitalists - 'those flourishing 
pets of the reporting Commissioners'
177
 - had received a clear message from MPs.  
Unreformed partnership law that treated workers as 'the mere serfs of capitalism' could 
not stand long.
178
  Limited liability was now 'feared by the capitalist, as the repeal of the 
Corn Laws was by the landed proprietor'.
179
  The Legal Observer agreed with the 
sentiment but, like others, anticipated disagreement as to the exact 'mode of 
proceeding'.
180
 
Opinion had now divided into two camps.  On the reformist side, Bramwell was added to 
the roster of supporting authorities, while Manchester manufacturers had emerged as a 
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centre of opposition.  One of them, Henry Ashworth took the opportunity presented by 
discussion of the recent Preston strike to re-iterate his opposition to limited liability - an 
assault on 'the absolute freedom which the English capitalist demands'.  He also attacked 
the 'impertinent' Society of Arts conference of the previous January, which, he said, had 
produced an entirely predictable result.  The 'literary men present risked nothing' in 
supporting limited liability - unlike the 'master manufacturers whose capital it was 
proposed to put in fetters'.  Proposals to share commercial power in partnership with 
workers were 'impracticable and useless'.
181
  The Economist, whilst it had backed 
Collier's motion and reform
182
, also thought worker-conciliation claims for limited 
liability futile.  William Pare's suggestions, in a paper for the Dublin Statistical Society, 
were summarily dismissed.
183
  
Meanwhile, the expectation of legislation had produced an uncertain state of affairs for 
charter applicants, unsure whether to press ahead with an application or await reform.  In 
July, Manchester MP John Bright asked Cardwell, on behalf of a Manchester and 
Liverpool steam-ship company, if the government intended to bring in a Bill in the next 
parliamentary session?  It was 'not a very easy task to get at the information'.
184
  Cardwell 
again played for time: when the matter had been 'fully considered, then the determination 
of Government would be known'.
185
  In October another company was told that Board 
charters had now been suspended, pending expected legislation.  
A briefing paper for government 'determination' was being prepared by James Booth, 
fifty-seven year old Secretary to the Board of Trade, and widely believed to be opposed 
to limited liability.  Field, who had addressed his pamphlet to Booth as an old friend and 
colleague, said that he was aware he was there attacking 'theories which I fear you 
approve'.
186
  In the Confidential Report delivered at the beginning of November, Booth 
largely fulfilled those fears.  He believed it:  
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'impossible in a trading community such as that of this country to frame any 
system of limited liability which will not have the effect of opening the door 
widely to uncertainty, fraud and litigation ... I feel very strongly that the cry for 
limited liability in general, whether in the way of commandite ... or of joint-stock 
association, should be resisted.'
187
 
If however, 'the cry ... should prove too strong to be resisted in the House of Commons', 
then the double liability used for colonial banks might 'very considerably mitigate 
[limited liability's] evils'.
188
  He also recommended that joint stock companies should be 
required annually to make good their nominal capital.  Booth's overriding concern was 
however, to minimise use of limited liability, as he argued that the burden of proof lay 
with those wishing to introduce change.  Overseas experience was rejected as 
inapplicable to England's situation, and the Mercantile Commissioners' Report mentioned 
only for Overstone's comments on the unreliability of company accounts.  Booth thus 
ruled out the possibility of a general limited liability rule (on the grounds that there would 
not then be an option in practice) as well as the need for reform for very small businesses.  
He also dismissed arguments about workers' grievances, and thought government should 
'[endeavour] by its legislation rather to discourage than to encourage the poorer and less 
educated classes from risking their money in enterprises that must necessarily be 
hazardous or doubtful'.
189
  Commandite was criticised as a flawed compromise, in which 
neither managing- nor investing-partners would feel the necessary sense of ownership.  
Such exceptions as Booth was prepared to suggest were confined to large joint stock 
companies, showing the influence of American rather than French example.  This was not 
however, followed up with a recommendation for American-style industry-specific 
statutes.  Booth acknowledged the particular interest in charters shown by shipping 
companies, and ruled out making any change in banking and insurance, but otherwise 
made little reference to industry discrimination.  Rather, he recommended an across-the-
board line for qualifying joint stock companies (which would still have to secure a 
charter), in a minimum capital requirement of £500,000 for shipping companies and 
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£200,000 for others - a size-based demarcation which was to prove important. 
In preparation for the expected government proposal, the Law Amendment Society held a 
meeting on 6 November at which Andrew Edgar, a bankruptcy specialist, reviewed the 
case for reform.
190
  This was followed by resolutions which set out proposed 
requirements (and showed that they were unlikely to be satisfied by Booth's 
framework).
191
  These included a recommendation that any commanditaire partners 
should be required to register their capital-interest.  This was not in itself surprising, 
having first been recommended in the Society's 1849 report
192
, but was to provoke 
controversy.  Meanwhile, with still no government announcement, The Times was soon 
talking of '[w]ell-founded complaints' at the legislative delay.
193
  It had 'never expected 
that [a] manifestation of the growth of public opinion in favour of a broader principle' 
would result in no action, a suspension of the 'palliative provision' of Board of Trade 
charters, and an even worse state of affairs than before.  The seriousness of the situation 
was exacerbated, it said, by the 'anxieties of the war' - a company that hoped to make 
paper from flax (as opposed to the hemp previously supplied by Russia) was unable to 
secure a charter.
194
  The Journal of the Society of Arts reprinted the comments in 
support
195
 - and prompted a reply from John Elliott, saying that it was no loss if joint 
stock companies were 'in abeyance' and only 'lawyers, philosophers, litterateurs, poets 
[and] painters' wanted limited liability
196
.  In late December The Times noted 'fresh 
remonstrances' made to the Board about the need to act, and renewed the call in its New 
Year editorial.
197
  Hopes appeared to be realised when on 23 January Cardwell gave 
notice to bring in 'a bill to amend the law of partnership'.
198
  This was tabled for the 
following Monday, 29 January, but wider events then took a hand.  When the Monday 
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came, the expected parliamentary business was postponed, as the government was 
besieged by questions about the war.  Aberdeen's Ministry fell under the pressure of a 
threatened inquiry into the war's conduct and, as Taylor has put it, Cardwell's Bill was 
'lost in the wreckage'.
199
  
Taylor's account is also notable here, for its questioning of Hilton's belief that Aberdeen's 
departure now marked a turning-point in limited liability's fortunes.
200
  Taylor argues that 
this overlooks the Aberdeen government's concrete attempt to introduce change, with 
Cardwell's Bill.  This is no doubt fair enough, but the end of Aberdeen's ministry was 
surely still a turning-point.  The new prime minister, Palmerston, was a declared 
supporter of limited liability, and his ministry saw the departure of several Peelites and 
other intuitive conservatives.
201
  Over the first few months of the new administration, 
Gladstone and Sir James Graham, as well as Whigs Lord John Russell and Sir Charles 
Wood - all known opponents of limited liability
202
 - left their Cabinet posts. 
Cardwell was still at this point in place at the Board of Trade.  The press continued to 
anticipate the re-presentation of his Bill,
203
 although nothing was tabled.  Meanwhile, a 
split had developed in the Law Amendment Society over investor-partner registration, as 
recommended in the resolutions that followed Edgar's presentation.  Field was adamant 
that this represented a wrong-turn.  In a 26 February presentation to the Society
204
, he 
took on opponents, and after a protracted tussle 'over five evenings', secured a narrow 
victory, confirmed in a further set of resolutions on 7 May.
205
  Field's was now the 
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Society's official position. 
Field was supported in his stand against registration by Cecil Fane, who chaired the 7 
May meeting and published his own hard-hitting pamphlet about this time.  As Edgar had 
done, Fane drew a distinction (without any supporting evidence) between sectors that 
were and were not affected by lack of limited liability.  Manufacturers could afford to 
oppose reform because they were not personally short of capital.  Other enterprise was 
however, being deprived by the self-interest of 'wealthy capitalists' - a 'large and 
influential class, [who] believe limited liability to be hostile to their interests, and [have] 
surrounded [the question] by a halo of delusion'.  But, said Fane, 'knowledge of the truth 
[has spread] and resistance to the supremacy and exclusiveness of the mercantile 
magnates is beginning to prevail.'
206
  
Fane could point to good grounds for his claim, but opposition now included lawyers 
with doubts about the detail of partnership proposals, as well as established sceptics.  A 
Law Magazine article recommended a 'breathing pause' before legislating, and rejected 
Field's advocacy of non-registration arguments from the US ('of all countries, [that] 
whose example we should least readily follow').
207
  The more categorical opposition of 
Manchester manufacturers was energetically represented by Edmund Potter, a successful 
calico printer in his early fifties, who now published a pamphlet under his own name
208
, 
and sent letters to the press as 'A Manchester Man'.  His pamphlet was generally well-
received, although The Economist did not think it would do anything to stop demands for 
reform.
209
  In urging personal responsibility for business debts, Potter knew whereof he 
spake, since his early career had included a failed partnership, whose debts he later 
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discharged.  This did not however, feature in his public statements on limited liability, 
more concerned to reject American lessons for British manufacturing.  Britain did not, he 
said, need props suitable for nations in their infancy.  Americans were now coming to 
realise that limited liability was 'rather a bar [to prosperity] than otherwise' and changing 
their own ways, as they matured.
210
  This was a common narrative-structure amongst 
liability-conservatives.  Another, Swinton Boult, told the Liverpool Literary and 
Philosophical Society that the US was now approaching the point when it might do 
without limited liability.
211
 And Boult had some other robust rejoinders for reformists.  
Arguments that unlimited liability had a detrimental effect on joint stock banks were 'a 
mere fiction'
212
, and claims to social concern, merely 'self-interest [taking] the guise of 
consideration'.
213
  Ship owners too were continuing their battle with railway interests, 
with a petition to block the Manchester, Sheffield and Lincolnshire railway's move 
(backed by limited liability) to charter steam vessels.
214
 
With Board of Trade charters suspended, the only possible route for such a move was a 
private parliamentary bill.  The Times reported that the flax-paper company had had to 
resort to the 'trouble and expense' of one
215
, and a letter to The Economist complained at 
the continuing 'indefensible' delay by 'our "aristocratic" government'
216
.  On 22 March,  
with the paper company's Bill raising questions in the House of Lords, Lord Derby asked 
Board of Trade Vice-President, Lord Stanley of Alderley if the government had any 
intention of acting.  Stanley said in response that a Bill should be expected shortly after 
Easter (8 April).
217
  This was not to be presented by Cardwell, who left the Board on 31 
March.
218
  He was succeeded by Stanley, with Edward Pleydell-Bouverie becoming 
Vice-President.  After one more false start and last-minute postponement
219
 - and yet 
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more questions about the paper company
220
 - a Partnership Amendment Bill and Limited 
Liability Bill were finally put before Parliament for a First Reading on 27 May. 
 
Legislation 
The 1855 Partnership Amendment Bill
221
 sought to allow individuals to invest in small 
partnerships without personal liability (but with registration) while the Limited Liability 
Bill
222
 provided for investment in companies of a minimum capitalisation of £20,000, 
with shares of £25+.  Banks and insurance companies were excluded - as too was 
Scotland since, as was confirmed in answer to a parliamentary question, the proposals 
used the 1844 Act's registration 'machinery', and this covered only England and 
Ireland.
223
  The Political Economy Club marked the Bills' presentation with one of its 
traditional airings of the topic, with Bramwell in attendance.
224
 
It was not until late June however, that the House of Commons had the opportunity to 
debate the Bills, in a 'thin' House.
225
  (This despite there being, according to one 
participant, 'probably no subject of domestic legislation which attracted more general 
attention'.
226
)  By this time, the session was 'practically over except as concerns the 
Limited Liability Bills', so that there was little of domestic political interest to distract 
attention.
227
  The Bills were introduced by Bouverie, in a speech that made all the usual 
references to Ireland, inventors, the railways and French and American example. The fact 
that companies were set up abroad to circumvent the law showed, he said, the 'futility' in 
trying to restrict capital.
228
  A Board of Trade review had revealed the arbitrary nature of 
past awards, and confirmed that the Board had been given a duty it was 'not competent to 
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perform'.
229
  People cited fraud as an argument against reform, said Bouverie, because 
they noticed fraud cases, and not the honest majority (an emphasis on the aggregate 
which was to be a recurrent theme).  The best protection against fraud was to ask people 
to protect themselves.  Bouverie disowned the Mercantile Commissioners' efforts as 'very 
meagre and unsatisfactory', and urged reform in the name of free trade and free 
competition.
230
 
This was supported by Collier, who said, in common with other speakers (and The 
Times
231
), that the Limited Liability Bill was the more important of the two.  He asked 
that the government reduce its minimum capital requirement to £10,000, with shares of 
£10, and also asked them to cancel the Partnership Bill's provision imposing unlimited 
liability for failure to comply with registration requirements (to which Bouverie agreed).  
He urged MPs not to block the Bills if, like him, they thought they should go further.  It 
was important to secure a vital principle in law.  The country's greatest undertakings were 
owing to limited liability and the proposed reforms would 'bridge over the gulf which 
divided capital and labour'.
232
 
Opposition was led by Glyn, who warned MPs not to rush into rash legislation - a request 
which brought the predictable riposte that 20 years should have been enough time for 
collective reflection.
233
  Glyn backed registration for investor-partners, as did some 
supporters of the Bills, including Richard Malins.
234
  Hugh Cairns, yet another fast-rising 
lawyer from the 1852 intake, anticipated that the Partnership Bill would fail because of 
such contention.
235
  He also thought the Limited Liability Bill the more important, and 
that its capital requirements should be reduced.  Cardwell recommended his own earlier 
Bill for government consideration,
236
 with a lengthy disquisition that gave Lowe the 
opportunity to score points at his expense ('you could hardly tell on which side the right 
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Hon Gentleman argued with greater cogency'
237
).  Lowe himself urged a more 
comprehensive re-definition of partnership - the end of the Usury laws had cleared the 
way, and the Partnership Bill would not work in its current form.  He disagreed with 
Collier's claim that the Bills would combat labour antagonism - the Limited Liability 
Bill's minimum capital requirement favoured the rich, and 'Had any hon Gentleman ... 
given a shadow of a reason for conferring on a Joint-stock Company an advantage which 
was not given to a grocer's shop?'.
238
  Brown and Archibald Hastie added their opposition 
to Glyn's, and Liverpool MP Thomas Horsfall asked that the Partnership Bill be left to 
the next parliamentary session. 
In the sessions that followed, rhetoric resolved into conservatives' insistence that the Bills 
were unwanted by commerce - purely 'theoretical'
239
 - and reformists' counter-claims that 
they were wanted by MPs and the wider community.  John Bright reported that 'wherever 
he went he met with the most anxious enquiries with regard to the passing of the Bills'.
240
  
Following a proposal by Goderich, the Commons scrapped the Limited Liability Bill's 
minimum capital requirement in Committee (and reduced the minimum share-price to 
£10).
241
  This was applauded in the press - 'as [MP] Mr Henley pertinently asked, does 
Free Trade stop at 20,000l?'
242
  Cairns' attempt to reduce the minimum number of 
company members required by the Limited Liability Bill from 25 to six was however, 
narrowly defeated in a division.
243
  Another Cairns proposal - for an alternative Bill that 
made every joint stock company a corporation - met with some technical approval 
amongst his peers but also failed.
244
  Much press comment agreed with Lowe that the 
Partnership Bill was a poor compromise, but registration continued to divide opinion.  
The Law Review printed a piece that argued against the stance of Field, Fane and Lowe, 
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but backed them in its own editorial.
245
  The Legal Observer agreed, and summarised this 
position as 'Repeal Waugh v. Carver and leave the rest to Nature'.
246
  Field's victory at the 
Law Amendment Society had been followed by appointment of a committee (which 
included Lowe), charged with '[waiting] on the Vice-President of the Board of Trade, to 
urge upon him the importance of excluding all provision for compulsory registration from 
the Bill now ... in preparation'.
247
  By the time the deputation visited the Board on 16 
June,
248
 preparation was complete, and Field quoted Troubat to Stanley of Alderley and 
Bouverie in order to try and convince them to amend their existing Bill.
249
  This was 
followed by a Memorial to the Commons, presented by Edgar, Field, George Hastings 
and William Hawes.
250
  As Cairns had predicted however, the Partnership Amendment 
Bill sank under the weight of registration difficulties (and lack of time) and was 
abandoned.  When the Limited Liability Bill was sent to the Lords, Stanley of Alderley, 
as the government representative there, faced committed opposition, led by Monteagle.  
Stanley's own affiliation to the league was apparent - Lamont's Canadian case had first 
convinced him of the 'very objectionable state of the law of partnership'
251
 - and he cited 
the 'almost universal opinion of the country, as indicated by the public Press' to counter 
objections.
252
  He failed however, to withstand pressure for additional 'safeguards'
253
 and 
indeed seems to have felt from the outset that a cautiously-constrained measure was the 
wisest course - this to avoid antagonizing 'shopkeepers' in the Commons, and 
Conservatives who might otherwise take the 'weighty authority of great Commercial 
Names' as an excuse to oppose the government.  If opposition proved as weak as 
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Palmerston anticipated, minimum requirements could later be reduced.
254
   
The Limited Liability Bill was thus sent back to the Commons with a string of 
amendments, deplored by government supporters there but largely accepted as the price 
of pushing through legislation.  Following government pressure and what the Daily News 
called a 'burst of patriotic lava' from 'a sudden and menacing eruption of Mount 
Palmerston', the Bill passed its third Commons reading on 11 August.
255
  The resultant 
Limited Liability Act 1855 confirmed limited liability for members of companies of 25+ 
shareholders (holding at least 75% of the nominal capital, with at least 20% paid-up) who 
were willing to sign up to the prescribed terms of a deed of settlement.
256
 
Chambers of Commerce had taken a close interest in proceedings throughout.  All 
approached matters from a partnership perspective, with even the Manchester Chamber 
conceding there was 'no doubt that some amendment [to partnership law] is needed'.
257
  
They were unclear however, as to what this might be, beyond an insistence upon investor 
registration.  This focus might have been predicted, since the compulsory registration of 
all partners was a long-standing request, independent of limited liability.
258
  The newly-
revived Birmingham Chamber gave an unconditional endorsement of the Partnership Bill 
(on the understanding it included registration), but a lone Council-member who proposed 
that the Limited Liability Bill be similarly endorsed could not find anyone to second it.
259
  
The Chamber sent a petition asking that it be postponed.
260
  The Glasgow Chamber, 
supported by local MP Alexander Hastie, sent Memorials against both Bills.
261
  Leeds 
also asked for amendments, despite apparently having concluded by early July that the 
Partnership Bill would not pass in the current session.  A petition asking the Lords to 
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postpone the Limited Liability Bill arrived too late.
262
  The Liverpool Chamber's 
President optimistically hoped that feelings might have cooled since their last discussion 
('differences of opinion which then existed, I think I may say, are lessened now')  but the 
reformist Council could not bring itself either to represent views with which it disagreed 
or to take on a conservative Chamber-membership, and resolved the dilemma by opting 
out altogether: 'the Directors have considered themselves precluded from using the 
influence of the Chamber on the bills brought into Parliament'.
263
  The February 1856 
General Meeting noted a member's comment that it was regrettable if politicians 
legislated on commercial questions without 'the cognizance and consent of such an 
important commercial body as this', and that 'more might have been done'.
264
  The 
Manchester Chamber thought all the bills' proposals, other than servants taking a profit-
share without incurring liabilities, 'so subversive of that high moral responsibility which 
has hitherto distinguished our Partnership Laws, as to call for their strongest 
disapproval'.
265
  Edmund Potter, now on the Manchester Chamber board, went with a 
delegation to London to petition against both Bills (Stanley quoted press comment to 
them, in return
266
).  An attempt to involve other Chambers in this came to nothing.
267
  
Undeterred, Potter, Bazley and Ashworth mustered local support from beyond the 
Chamber, and sent another petition, from the 'Bankers, Merchants, and Manufacturers of 
the City of Manchester', to the House of Lords.
268
  The Manchester Commercial 
Association, less rigidly conservative, sent petitions 'cordially approving' (subject to 
amendment) the Partnership Bill, but anticipating 'much injury' to the public from the 
Limited Liability Bill's support for joint stock.
269
  Potter continued too his personal 
campaign to overturn the weight of press opinion: another pamphlet re-iterated his view 
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that '[n]either a domestic household nor a mill can answer conducted as a republic'
270
 and 
said that the Preston strike should have taught workers that a limited liability-enabled 
share in business was 'not so apparently valuable'.
271
  A letter to The Economist urged the 
railways to adopt the unlimited liability standards of manufacturing partnerships.
272
 
This was in marked contrast to opinion exhibited in the press, where each round of 
parliamentary opposition was met with a blitz of comment - notably a display of 
sustained chutzpah from Lowe in The Times.  Messrs 'Muntz, Glyn, W. Brown, Strutt, 
Spooner, J. Forster, Mitchell and Hastie' - 'all capitalists' - were pilloried as the block to 
reform: 
'it does really seem to us a most invidious proceeding that a dozen wealthy men ... 
should come down to the House in a body for the purpose of debarring the man 
with small means from using those means to the best advantage, except at the risk 
of everything he has in the world ... This evident conspiracy of capitalists, 
unbecoming and suspicious enough in itself, wears a still uglier aspect when it 
resorts to the pettiest mode of opposition [and exploits] the forms of the House.'
273
 
This was a reference to a Lords procedural objection, interpreted by their opponents as a 
stalling tactic, designed to see that the Bills would run out of time.  Palmerston dealt with 
that by threatening to sit through September.  The press claimed the result as a victory for 
'[p]ublic opinion', although 'the secret hostility of the capitalists is not the less active'.
274
  
Disraeli ridiculed the amount of government time devoted to limited liability - a 
distraction, he said, from the war
275
 - and even those who supported reform thought 
Palmerston's pose partly 'an electioneering squib'.
276
  The pro-limited liability Daily News 
sympathised too with questions raised by Cairns and Samuel Laing (another lawyer who 
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had entered Parliament in 1852) - not to be confused with 'the stupid commercial 
Toryism' of Archibald Hastie.
277
  Pushing through change undoubtedly became a test of 
government competence
278
 but also gained popular momentum, of which press reports 
give a flavour.  When the half-yearly meeting of the London, Brighton and South Coast 
Railway was told that Laing had been unable to attend, because of 'his anxiety to be in 
the House during the reading of the bill for limited liability', the announcement was 
greeted with 'cheers'.
279
  Reformists enjoyed taking rhetorical pot-shots at 'decoy ducks', 
'commercial feudality' and Lord Overstone.  
Against this background, the Limited Liability Act was seen on all sides as an 'instalment' 
only.
280
  The Legal Observer had anticipated that some 'expiatory ceremony of 
registration' might be necessary to secure a limited partnership Act, but was disappointed 
to see no such Act at all.
281
  Parliament had, in its view, 'passed the wrong Bill; though 
perhaps ... the most pressing'.  The task now was to address the 'defects'.
282
  Edward Cox 
attributed the new Act to some 'insulting' and 'disreputable' parliamentary tactics
283
 and 
considered that the law had departed from 'righteous' rule.
284
  He nevertheless advised 
people to engage with the results, and ensure they obtained whatever protection was 
available.  Barrister George Sweet, who had earlier argued that the law had erred in 
making limited liability 'routine' for railways
285
, said the same and now published a guide 
to the new Act's provisions.  In it, he made plain his belief that these had been foisted on 
the public by 'a well organized agitation by some capitalists and speculators, who have 
been unable to obtain charters from the Board of Trade'.
286
  These had, he said, never 
intended that the Partnership Bill should pass.  He was not alone in thinking this or in 
blaming organized agitation - Potter also said that '[t]he whole thing was in the hands of 
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the lawyers and certain capitalists in London'
287
 while the Liverpool Daily Post stated 
bluntly that 'the demand for the new permissive law originates in those who have found 
the Board of Trade insufficiently flexible in conceding charters'.
288
  Sweet was answered 
publicly by Field's ally at the Legal Observer, Robert Maugham, who said - sarcastically 
and probably disingenuously - that the idea of agitators having co-opted 'a large portion 
of the public press' was news to him.  Mr. Sweet must know better of course, since he 
gave his opinion so confidently, but he preferred to think that reform had come about 
because 'a masterly argument [by] Mr. Bramwell [seemed] to a majority of the 
Legislature, unanswerable and conclusive'.
289
   
Hopes of a more comprehensive law now largely rested with Lowe, who had replaced 
Bouverie as Vice-President of the Board of Trade during the latter stages of the Limited 
Liability Bill's passage.  A new Partnership Amendment Bill and a Joint Stock 
Companies Bill were published on 1 February 1856, and the following week, Lowe 
tabled limited liability for discussion at the Political Economy Club.
290
  On 18 February, 
the Law Amendment Society set up a committee to consider its own response. 
Those impatient to see broader change clearly felt they had the right man in Lowe.  The 
Bankers' Magazine welcomed the appointment of 'the most thoroughly practical trade 
minister the country has for many years seen' and applauded the 'boldness and 
comprehensiveness of conception, combined with a mastery of detail' shown in his 
Commons presentation of the two Bills.
291
  Lowe now had like-minded support at the 
Board of Trade, in secretary Thomas Farrer, working with parliamentary draftsman 
Henry Thring and Bramwell.
292
  This inner circle evidently relished taking on Cardwell 
('mercilessly chaffed') and Overstone, labeled by Lowe the 'Common Vouchee' - a 
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(lawyer's) dig at Overstone's known propensity to be absent when a parliamentary debate 
reached a critical juncture.
293
  Lowe took what Farrer called a 'characteristic' approach to 
the Partnership Amendment Bill, in deciding the only thing needed was to reverse Waugh 
v Carver.
294
  The Bill thus contained just one stipulation i.e. that, for all trades other than 
Banking, advancing money to an undertaking would not make an individual liable as a 
partner.
295
  The Law Amendment Society congratulated itself (and Field) on this being 'in 
accordance with the recommendations of the Society made last year to Parliament and the 
Government'.
296
  Lowe presented the clause as a corollary of usury reform - as a 
parliamentary sympathiser put it, he simply wished to call a creditor a creditor.  If he 
hoped thereby to bypass the traditional calls for registration however, he was 
disappointed.  The Leeds
297
, Birmingham
298
, and Bristol
299
 Chambers all sent petitions to 
say they could not support the Bill without this, and the newly-formed Wolverhampton 
Chamber soon followed suit.
300
  The Manchester Commercial Association, having now 
got the registration-bit firmly between its teeth, marshaled support from a dozen 
Chambers for inclusion of registration in the Bill and as a general partnership 
requirement.
301
  Those lending support included the Liverpool Chamber, which had 
responded to the rebuke of the previous year, by appointing a committee to consider both 
Bills.
302
  This had still to report when the Chamber held another, February discussion of 
limited liability, dominated by conservatives.  (Bushell's speech took up six pages of the 
printed report.)  Edward Heath, Charles Robertson and Lamont proposed a string of 
reformist-motions, to try and counter the tenor of the meeting, but lost these and a final 
                                                          
293
 A. Patchett Martin, Life and Letters of the Right Hon Robert Lowe, Viscount Sherbrooke, vol. II 
(London, 1893) p.115. 
294
 Ibid., p.119. 
295
 Partnership Amendment.  A bill to amend the law of partnership. 19 Vict. I February 1856. 
296
 'Special General Meeting of the Society, 18th February, 1856',  Law Amendment Journal, vol. 1 
(London, 1856), p.3. 
297
 Memorial of 27 March 1856,  ref no 618, 'Registration of Partnerships.  History of agitation and 
attempted legislation', BT 22/34/3. 
298
 Meetings of 19 February and 20 June 1856, Birmingham Chamber of Commerce, Midland District 
Minutes, 1855-61.  Petition dated 31 July 1856, ff119-20. 
299
 'Law of Partnership and Joint Stock Companies', House of Commons Petition. Appendix to Report and 
Proceedings of the Bristol Chamber of Commerce at the half-yearly meeting of the members, held in the 
Commercial Rooms, Bristol on Wednesday the 30th July, 1856 (Bristol, 1856), p.16. 
300
 Record of the Wolverhampton Chamber of Commerce, 1856-1956 (Wolverhampton, 1956), p.55 . 
301
 Meetings of 6 February, 6 March, 23 April, 11 June 1856, Minutes M8/7/1. 
302
 Liverpool Chamber of Commerce, 1857.  7th Annual Report of the Council presented to the Chamber at 
the General Meeting, held February 2, 1857 (Liverpool.1857), p.6. 
  248 
vote on a conservatively-worded petition by a ratio of 2 to 1.
303
  Heath's last-ditch request 
that a dissenting statement from those in favour of limited liability be included with the 
petition also failed and after 'a very protracted sitting', reformists conceded defeat.
304
  
Charles Holland, as Chamber President, was thus required to sign a petition that must 
have gone sorely against the grain, asserting as it did that limited liability in partnership 
was 'unwanted by the great mass of the mercantile community' and 'fraught with evils of 
the greatest magnitude'.
305
  The Manchester Chamber Council, untroubled by internal 
dissent, simply repeated its petition of the year before
306
, with added vehemence, and 
asked the Mayor to organise a protest meeting at the Town Hall.
307
 
Registration was also raised in parliament, where the pull of personal obligation was 
apparent in insistence that 'a partnership ought to resemble as much as possible the 
individual replaced'.
308
  A suggested amendment that a lender not be able to recover 
money until after creditors' claims had been satisfied (resisted by Lowe even though 
recommended by Field
309
 and adopted by the Law Amendment Society
310
 and Liverpool 
reformists
311
) proved a sticking-point.  A long, well-attended Commons debate on 4 July 
saw Lowe lose a divisional vote on the point by three votes.  Those voting for the 
amendment included Cardwell and Goderich, as well as the predictable Glyn and 
Muntz.
312
  Lowe had already intimated that the Bill might be given up, and although 
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Palmerston and Stanley of Alderley considered it still worth pursuing in its amended 
form,
313
 further proposed changes and another narrow divisional defeat on Gazette 
notices forced its abandonment at the third reading on 14 July.
314
  
The Joint Stock Bill met with an easier parliamentary reception, with most comment 
focused on administrative detail rather than principle.  The Lord Advocate's claim that 
'Everybody knew that a Joint-stock Company was not a partnership in the proper sense of 
the term [but] a combination in which the stocks and not the partners constituted the 
principal objects' apparently held true.
315
  The Law Amendment Society questioned the 
Bill's seven-person minimum (as too high) and the winding-up provisions, and asked that 
these use the Bankruptcy courts, rather than Chancery.  Despite jibes that this last point 
was being urged by the 'solicitor who enjoys the largest bankruptcy practice in 
London',
316
 it was adopted at the Bill's Committee stage, after meetings with Stanley and 
Lowe.
317
  Resistance to the Bill was left to Monteagle and Overstone, who registered a 
formal Lords protest at its 'immoral course'
318
 (dismissed by the Law Amendment Society 
as 'unreasoning prejudice'
319
) and presented further petitions from the Manchester and 
Glasgow Chambers.
320
  The Manchester Commercial Association also sent a petition, and 
a deputation to protest that the new Bill was even worse than the 1855 Act it replaced.
321
  
Stanley said these views were at odds with those of the wider commercial community, as 
evidenced by the fact that Manchester and Glasgow MPs had not received or voiced 
objections (a now-standard line).
322
  He admitted the current Bill did not contain the 
'restrictions and safeguards' of the previous session's Act (a reference to publicity 
requirements now omitted) but contended these were 'of no value whatever'.
323
  Edward 
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Cox recorded his disgust in the Law Times - Lowe had learned from his time in Australia 
commercial principles fit only for 'a convict colony'
324
 - and local newspapers reported 
the Manchester and Liverpool Chambers' discussions in detail, thereby ensuring 
conservatives some publicity.  They were otherwise conscious of again being outgunned 
in the press.  After one mauling too many in The Times
325
 Overstone wrote to Lowe to 
protest, and complained to the government's Leader in the Lords, Lord Granville that it 
was 'perfectly easy for two or three Writers, having connections with the Press, to get up 
a very fallacious appearance of public opinion'.
326
   
Despite the protests, no one seems to have doubted that the Joint Stock Companies Bill 
would pass.  The MP William Lindsay, a ship-owner, elicited Cobden's support for a 
March pro-limited liability pamphlet
327
 and Edward Moss, a solicitor with an extensive 
joint stock practice, published another
328
 but public debate had peaked the year before.  
On 14 July 1856, the Companies Act 19 & 20 Vict. c47 became law.  It repealed the 
Companies Acts of 1844 and 1847, as well as the Limited Liability Act of 1855, and 
ruled that Winding-up Acts of 1844, 1848 and 1849 should not apply to companies 
registered under it.  It thus sought to make a break with earlier confusion.  Seven or more 
persons could now set up a company with limited liability by subscribing to a 
Memorandum and Articles of Association (which replaced the deed of settlement) and 
complying with their requirements.  Banks and insurance companies, and anyone who 
particularly wanted limited liability in the form of a partnership, would need to wait 
longer, but the general availability of limited liability, as a standard feature of a registered 
company, had been confirmed.
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Conclusion 
 
The 1856 Companies Act did not end debate about limited liability, either in the 
immediate aftermath of the legislation or in the longer term.  Although legislative faith in 
limited liability has generally held firm, each new financial crisis has brought a fresh bout 
of questioning, with 2008 no exception.
1
  The failure to pursue commandite has also had 
an extended after-life, periodically lamented as a missed opportunity.  City merchant 
John Howell was one of the first to take this line in 1856, complaining that the 
government had been led astray by 'ultra-theorists'.
2
  Another financial crisis in 1866 only 
confirmed his poor opinion of the approach taken.  Guilty of 'wanton liberalism', Lowe 
had shown too much faith in 'human wisdom', too little in authority and 'failed to see that 
discipline belongs to man in commerce as well as in social relationships'.
3
 
Howell thought that if the government had been unable to push through a Bill for limited 
liability in partnership ('consonant with natural justice'
4
) before one for joint stock they 
should have dropped both.  It is perhaps not difficult to see why the government, 
bedeviled by dispute about registration and offered a relatively straightforward path for 
joint stock, failed to pursue this course in 1856.  Historians have however, puzzled over 
why the 1856 Act took as liberal an approach as it did, and in particular why it was quite 
so ready to abandon publicity requirements - a move that subsequent legislation would 
counter.  Cottrell has agreed with Howell that Lowe here contradicted his own 
previously-declared faith in publicity.
5
  Taylor has seen in the abandonment a devious 
attempt to boost shareholder activism, by making it necessary for shareholders to attend 
meetings in person in order to obtain information not available otherwise.  This seems to 
owe more however, to a broader argument about the persistence of traditionally 
personalised conceptions of companies, than any evidence or logic, and such 
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Machiavellianism can surely be discounted.
6
  Hein suggests that abandonment of 
publicity should not appear so unexpected in itself, with a precedent in the 1847 repeal of 
the 1844 Act's prospectus-registration requirements.
7
  Parliamentary draftsman Henry 
Thring provided a possible insight into the thinking of Lowe's inner circle, in the 
commentary on the 1856 Act that he published at the end of that year, in which he talked 
repeatedly of regulation-evasion, and argued that 'no system of accounts can be devised, 
that will protect shareholders from dishonesty'.
8
  No other communication appears to 
have survived that might clarify the government's thinking further, and perhaps the 
declared aim to simplify the 1855 Act together with insistence upon self-reliance were 
sufficient reason in themselves for a sweeping approach.  Any assessment has also to take 
account of Lowe's characteristically robust approach to pushing through reform.  Lowe 
was avowedly suspicious of refinements proposed by 'scarce concealed enemies' who, 
like Cardwell, professed themselves in favour of limited liability but were somehow 
never quite ready for it.
9
  He would have been extraordinarily obtuse not to have realised 
by the time he arrived at the Board of Trade that talking about limited liability clauses did 
not generally help progress matters.  The more people talked about limited liability, the 
more strongly they tended to feel, and by the mid-1850s, debate had polarised into well-
rehearsed oppositions.  Some people did change their minds on the question.  Samuel 
Laing changed his at some point between youthful assertion that 'the best practical 
security' for joint stock banks 'must always consist in the knowledge that the business is 
conducted by men of wealth ... who have their all at stake in it' and participation in 
parliamentary debates ten years later.
10
  Brougham and ship-owner William Lamport also 
evidently revised earlier objections.  They are rare exceptions however, and even rarer is 
the individual who, like the sole participant in the Liverpool Chamber 1854 debate to say 
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so, changed their mind through the course of a discussion.
11
  Most took a view on limited 
liability and held to it, some with remarkable obduracy.  Gladstone was still calling the 
1856 Act a mistake in 1893.
12
 
This meant that acceptance of limited liability was largely a question of generation, as 
individuals increasingly habituated to large infrastructure companies accepted the idea 
that it should be on offer.  To Howell's other accusation, it is certainly the case that some 
advocates of limited liability gave good reason to think them theoretical.  Field in 
particular was capable of some quite staggering assertions of deductive faith in the 
cause.
13
  Yet if circumstance demanded it, even Field could change tack smartly, and 
acknowledge that though 'We are all fond of building up laws on the shallow à priori 
foundation of our own wits' it might be better to look to 'the solid inductive basis of 
experience.'
14
  The likelihood must be that supporters of limited liability did what people 
arguing a case usually do i.e. formulated a stance with which they felt comfortable and 
found reasons to justify it.  The pattern of comfort was broadly predictable by age and 
occupation, as confirmed in the 1854 Mercantile Laws Commission Report.  Where 
individuals from a shared background differed, age or occupation can usually be 
identified as a predictably differentiating factor.  James and Charles Morrison, as father 
and son, were from different generations.  Brothers Francis and Swinton Boult also took 
opposing stances, the former supporting Lamont from his position as head of the family 
shipping firm in Liverpool, and the latter taking pride in his professional experience of 
unlimited liability insurance companies.  Manufacturers were always likely to object to 
limited liability.  Manufacturer William Hawes took a more sceptical stance than his MP 
brother Benjamin, before eventually coming round to a reformist point-of-view.  
Generational shift also helps account for the fading of interest in commandite, which lost 
ground in reformist rhetoric once technology became more dominant, and French terms 
of reference gave way to American.  A good representative turning-point is the 1851 
Great Exhibition.  Commandite continued to be considered beyond this and Thring's 
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commentary makes it clear that he at least believed it could play a useful role in England.  
However, despite his claim that it had been introduced to 'great advantage' in 'various 
American states', the most striking thing about commandite is how little grass-roots 
support it enjoyed - a pattern confirmed by the American experience.
15
  Its persistent 
appeal for technically-informed commentators owes more to an intuitive desire for 
balance than economic interest.
16
  Nineteenth century English interest in commandite was 
generated by limited partnerships' use in France (where they had been introduced by the 
state as an investment incentive and received a further state boost after 1848), lawyers' 
fondness for the cogency of the Code de Commerce and long-standing habits of thinking 
and talking in terms of 'partnership'.  These made commandite an accessible point of 
reference for much of the second quarter of the century.  Thomas Wilson, familiar with 
French and Dutch government-sponsored vehicles, referred readily to it as shorthand for 
limited liability companies (with some contemporaries questioning if commandite was 
really what he meant).  The habit persisted through to mid-century - the draft limited 
partnership Bill that Francis Baring prepared for Ker's 1836 inquiry continued to be 
reproduced at the back of government reports (and by Wilson) into the 1840s, as a 
standard pro forma.  By the mid-1850s however, it had been replaced in appendices by 
Massachusetts corporation statutes.  
Lawyers' noise, coupled with a failure to appreciate how narrow the interest-base in 
commandite really was, seems the reason that so many historical treatments have 
followed Saville in expressing surprise that limited partnership was 'left outside the main 
discourse' in 1855/6.
17
  From such a perspective, the breakthrough of 1855 can seem 
'almost accidental'.
18
  The existence of an orchestrated (albeit covert) campaign from 
Spring 1853 shows however, that change, when it came, was far from accidental, and that 
accounts that have 'pointed to the absence of any evidence suggesting a campaign by 
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business interests' are simply wrong.
19
  Lamont's efforts invalidate claims that '[l]arge 
capitalists played little or no role in securing the passage of the legislation'.
20
  Some of 
the very largest capitalists, established in business and often relatively advanced in years, 
were loud in opposition, but capitalism was nevertheless actively represented.  Once 
campaigning is recognised, the role of shipping also becomes clearer - as too the fact that 
several of those who opposed reform suspected that something in the nature of a co-
ordinated campaign was going on. 
Looking more closely at what actually happened then, we can see that Henry Burgess 
was right, and that the single biggest factor in limited liability's acceptance was the joint 
stock company.  It is the joint stock company that accounts for limited liability's 
emergence as a global phenomenon.  To the extent that it diffuses individual 
responsibility and focuses attention on capital, limited liability is indeed 'the natural 
consequence of the selling of shares'.
21
  Larger share companies make it harder to justify 
tying financial liability to individuals, and limited liability's adoption is largely the story 
of that acceptance.  We should now be in a position to say more too about its mechanics.  
We can rule out here the incremental cost-driven calculations favoured by economic 
theorists, which would have investors hovering between shareholder-monitoring and 
balance-sheet-monitoring costs.  Advocates of limited liability certainly talked a great 
deal about cost in headline - usually catastrophic - terms, but there is no evidence of 
concern with transaction costs.  Much analytical effort has also been expended on the 
relative contributions of corporate structures and joint stock funds to making the idea of 
limited liability accessible.  It is clear however, that limited liability could be prompted 
by either, it being a peculiarity of the English experience to focus attention on joint stock.  
When joint stock and corporate structures were forced apart in 1825, public debate 
shifted onto joint stock's closer identification with capital, and spent 30 years going round 
- sporadically - in a circle.  It took the fall-out from railway 'mania' to force 
acknowledgement that companies and capital-ownership had changed in ways too big to 
be ignored.  To this extent, change was driven by wider forces, rooted in technology.  An 
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air of inevitability must though be qualified by recognition that investors committing 
capital did not necessarily feel a need for insurance as much or as consistently as lawyers 
and economic theorists tend to think they must have done.  Hidden in a wider 
shareholder-base, and reassured by legal professionals or deeds of settlement, they seem 
largely to have accepted risk before railway 'mania' - especially if times were good, or 
court cases could be kicked into the long grass of Chancery.  An important lesson is that 
acceptance of limited liability is best thought of as a capitalist habit,
22
 for which railway 
investment provided the social tipping-point in England.  Railway investment taught 
many to regard limited liability as a norm, and to think that where it was not available 
they were missing out. 
Acceptance of limited liability was thus a two-level process, in which changing habits 
were periodically punctuated by financial shock and public adjustment.  This leaves us 
with the question of why that adjustment appears more marked in England than 
elsewhere.  We should perhaps not be too surprised by sharp legal change in itself, given 
Kuhnian observations on paradigm-shifts, and the likelihood that an older paradigm may 
persist until a new one replaces it entirely.  As detailed in chapter 4, the English 
experience offered unusual encouragement to persist with an old paradigm.  The 1855/6 
adjustment looks especially sharp too in comparison with the US (which could seed 
change in individual states) and France (where social breakdown prompted state 
initiatives) and both these countries controlled limited liability through other means, in 
corporations and transferable shares respectively.  In England it was exposed to debate as 
a distinct issue.  Limited liability needs a social excuse and, following freedom of 
incorporation, its excuse emerged in England from the experience of the late-1840s as 
decidedly democratic. 
It is therefore in a strongly socialised context, that the contribution of individuals must be 
assessed.  When John Stuart Mill read in The Times in February 1855 of the government's 
intention to bring in legislation, he told his wife that 'I did it', on the grounds that, but for 
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his 1850 Select Committee evidence, there would 'have been a great overbalance of 
political economy authority against it'.
23
  Mill made support for limited liability 
intellectually respectable, and in the process saved many the trouble of doing more than 
cite or quote him.  In the aftermath of legislation, others recorded their views on 
individuals' contributions.  Solicitor John Duncan thought that amongst limited liability's 
'many most able champions', an honourable mention should be accorded Cecil Fane.
24
  
Thomas Farrer, asked by Lowe's biographer Arthur Patchett Martin in the early 1890s for 
his nominees, named the publicly successful men whom he knew best personally, in 
Lowe, Bramwell and Thring.  Substitute Palmerston for Thring, and that seems a 
reasonable picture of reform's mid-1850s public face.  By the time he recorded his 
opinion, Farrer had read the letter that Lamont sent him at the Board of Trade in 1880, 
outlining his own role, but did not mention either Lamont or Field (who had died 
unexpectedly in an accident some years before).
25
  Both men though deserve to be written 
back into the story, for the momentum they generated in the press and amongst 
politicians.  The day they marched over to the Houses of Parliament was the day that 
support for limited liability finally became politically effective.  Lamont's role also 
highlights the significance of shipping as the conduit through which capitalism pushed its 
way through a charter-granting system, and made it plain that this had broken down.  It 
seems appropriate that the message should have been delivered by an industry with a long 
tradition of shares and liability-limitation
26
, and - in the risks to which ocean-going ships 
and their passengers were exposed - notably high moral stakes. 
These were of paramount importance to Robert Slaney, who told an 1854 Society of Arts 
audience, that when they looked to identify who had come out in support for limited 
liability 'above all you will find those who earnestly desire to improve the social 
condition of the Working Classes'.
27
  Anyone who looks at the campaigning gear-change 
of 1853, must think that legislation ultimately owed more to capitalist interest and less to 
a moral imperative than this implies.  Yet, moralising was never absent from reformist 
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argument, changing rather than diminishing, and it would be a mistake to dismiss it as a 
mere 'debating tool'.
28
  Support for limited liability is always a test of social faith - as true 
today as it was in 1856 - and those ultimately responsible for pushing through change 
make very unconvincing 'financial aristocracy'.
29
  If any of them were deluding 
themselves as to the wider import of their motives, they made a very thorough job of it.  
When Farrer reminisced with Lowe in the latter's 'failing years', it was the thought that he 
had achieved something of lasting significance which brightened Lowe's mood.
30
  Farrer 
and Patchett Martin both credited Lowe with democratising capital.  Even Lamont, with a 
clear capitalist vested interest, approached reform in the spirit of a crusade.  And social 
intuition is a more convincing explanation for the way in which the issue caught hold 
amongst politicians in the climate engendered by the Crimean war than a straightforward 
desire to exceed the return available from Consols.  John Bright understood this, in 
saying that amongst the 'overwhelming majority' of MPs who favoured limited liability, 
'probably very many of them have not examined the question much, and they 
think no doubt that it is offering facilities for persons of smaller means to go into 
business and make their way in the world, with a better chance than they have 
hitherto had'.
31
 
Social intuition provided a short-cut to understanding limited liability, and made the 
1855/6 endorsement as decisive as it was.  Support for it was undoubtedly capitalist, but 
self-centred rather than selfish, felt as a vote against polarisation.  For those who thought 
diversified capital the best social currency available for a modern, dynamic nation - better 
than land or Californian gold or the labour-interest that threatened Socialism - change 
was important and limited liability companies were something to get excited about. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
27
 Robert Slaney notebook, RAS/2/6, Slaney papers, Cadbury Research Library. 
28
 Taylor, Creating Capitalism, p.155. 
29
 Bryer, 'The Mercantile Laws Commission', p.40. 
30
 Patchett Martin,  Life and Letters, p.122. 
31
 'Chamber of Commerce - Annual Meeting'.  Newspaper report of the 4 February 1856 annual meeting of 
the Manchester Chamber of Commerce, Proceedings of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce, 1849-58, 
M8/2/5 f474. 
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Appendix 
 
 
I.  Age and occupation breakdown for 1854 Liverpool Chamber of Commerce speakers, 
from a random sample of five speakers on either side of the debate (i.e. 50% of the total).  
Robert Lamont, at 34, was significantly younger than other speakers. 
 
For limited liability: 
William Lamport, age 39, shipowner 
Charles Holland, age 55, merchant 
Joshua Dixon, age 44, cotton merchant 
Thomas Powles, age 54, merchant 
Francis Boult, age 47, shipowner 
Average age: 47 
 
Against limited liability: 
Francis Shand, age 54, West Indies merchant 
William Keates, age 53, copper merchant 
John Torr, age 41, broker 
Christopher Bushell, age 44, wine merchant 
William Tomlinson, age 49, shipbroker 
Average age: 48 
 
 
II.  Age breakdown for 1853 Mercantile Laws Commission respondents, from a random 
sample of 15 respondents for and 15 against limited liability. 
 
For limited liability: 
Sir George Rose, age 71 
Leone Levi, age 32 
Robert Slaney, age 61 
Robert Lowe, age 42 
Thompson Hankey, age 48 
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Charles Holland, age 54 
John Ludlow, age 34 
Charles Babbage, age 62 
George Warde Norman, age 60 
Charles Lawson, age 58 
Edward Vansittart Neale, age 43 
John Hollams, age 33 
Cecil Fane, age 57 
George Rickards, age 41 
John Stuart Mill, age 47 
Average age: 49 
 
Against limited liability: 
William Cotton, age 67 
David Baxter, age 60 
Lord Overstone, age 67 
William Entwisle, age 45 
JG Hubbard, age 48 
William Brown, age 69 
JW Gilbart, age 59 
William Hawes, age 48 
Henry Ashworth, age 59 
Henry Bellenden Ker, age 68 
Edward Ede, age 57 
James Bristow, age 57 
James Freshfield, jun, age 54 
J Aspinall Turner, age 56 
Clement Tudway Swanston, age 70 
Average age: 60 
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